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YESEUL HYUN
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Major Professor: Daniele Paserman, Ph.D., Professor of Economics
ABSTRACT
This dissertation contains three chapters in the field of family and development
economics. The first two chapters study the effects of traditional gender roles on
economic outcomes. The last chapter discusses the effects of a spatial development
policy in India.
Chapter 1 examines the dynamics of intra-household time allocation in response
to economic incentives, and the role of traditional gender norms. Using unique longi-
tudinal data on Japanese households, it finds that spouses in dual-income households
adjust their market hours but not home hours as own wages change. In addition,
per earthquake-induced changes in market hours, wives make little or no change
in home hours while husbands show significant, yet small in magnitude, responses.
The responses are driven by individuals with less traditional gender role attitudes.
Traditional gender roles exacerbate not only the asymmetry but also the rigidity of
gendered division of intrafamily labor.
Chapter 2 studies whether the effects of traditional gender roles on female labor
supply are greater in endogamous marriage by examining the labor supply pattern
of immigrant women in the United States. The endogenous formation of marriage is
addressed by incorporating local marriage market conditions. Using survey responses
on gender roles in source countries as cultural proxies, it finds that the negative ef-
v
fects of traditional gender roles on female labor supply are amplified in endogamous
marriage at the extensive and intensive margins of labor market. Differential pat-
terns of immigrant assimilation by marriage type fail to fully explain the asymmetry,
supporting the hypothesis that culture is more relevant within endogamous marriage.
Chapter 3 (with Shree Ravi) analyzes the aggregate and distributional effects of
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in India. It investigates the influence of Indian SEZs
by exploiting spatial variations in the timing of zonal operations. Using satellite and
survey data, it establishes that SEZs boosted economic activity within areas several
times the size of the zones. The zones also drove a structural change in the local
economy with resources shifting away from the informal sector and the formal sector
growing in size and productivity. This growth, however, differently benefits workers
across income and skill distributions.
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Does Intrafamily Time Allocation
Respond to Economic Shocks? The Role
of Gender Norms
1.1 Introduction
Working mothers bear a double burden. Portrayed as “the second shift” by Hochschild
and Machung (1989), working women continue to perform the majority of domestic
labor despite their increased presence in the workforce. The unequal division of
housework, in terms of both hours and tasks, is seen in most industrialized countries
(Fuwa, 2004). In the United States, the female labor force participation rate increased
from 58.9% to 67.1% between 1965 and 2000.1 Coupled with this increase, there
was also a sharp drop in the amount of time spent in housework by women, and a
corresponding increase in the amount of time spent by men. However, at the onset of
the 21st century, American women still spent almost twice as much time in housework
as men (Aguiar and Hurst, 2007; Bianchi et al., 2000).
Recent statistics among 30 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) countries continue to highlight the gendered division of labor at
home.2 While women spend 34.4% less than what men spend in paid work, they
spend 118.3% more in domestic labor. The top 5 OECD countries with the highest
1 Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
2 OECD time use estimates are based on national time use surveys, spanning from 1999 (Por-
tugal) to 2016 (United States).
2
female-to-male ratio of domestic labor are Turkey (4.6), Korea (4.4), Japan (3.9),
Portugal (3.5), and Mexico (2.8), all of which are known for their relatively strict
adherence to traditional gender roles.3
Japan provides a prime example where the increased equality in market labor
supply does not produce its mirrored image in the domestic sphere. While the female
labor force participation rate increased from 62.9% to 71.3% over the past decade,4
women in Japan still almost single-handedly carry out all the housework.5 In 2009,
wives who worked more than 35 hours per week spent an additional 21 hours in
housework. Their husbands, on the other hand, spent 5 hours (Tsuya et al., 2012).
Japan’s deep-rooted traditional gender roles are often blamed as the main source of
the extremely asymmetric division of household labor (Ishii-Kuntz et al., 2004) as
well as a potential driver of inefficient allocation of female labor (Akabayashi, 2006).
In this chapter, I examine the role of traditional gender norms as the driving
force of the asymmetry and rigidity of intrafamily time allocation. Specifically, I
study how traditional gender roles not only affect individuals’ time allocation but also
their responses to changes in economic incentives. I hypothesize that the presence
of traditional gender roles and individuals’ preferences to adhere to such norms (1)
lead to a more unequal division of household labor and (2) make it more costly for
individuals to deviate from serving their expected roles as they respond to economic
incentives.6
3 (1) The prevailing stigma against working wives or mothers in these countries are well-
documented by survey responses (International Social Survey Programme, for example) and also
by women’s relative presence in the labor force. (2) The bottom 5 OECD countries are Sweden
(1.3), Denmark (1.4), Canada (1.5), Finland (1.5), and Netherlands (1.6).
4 Source: OECD Statistics. The figures are among working-age population (age 15-64). In the
United States, working-age female labor force participation rate decreased from 69% to 68.2% over
the same time period.
5 A closer look at women’s increased participation in the labor market also reveals additional
important gaps in the workplace sphere. A large gender wage gap (24.5%; the third-largest gender
wage gap among the OECD countries as of 2017) and labor markets that are segmented by gender,
both horizontally (Gordon, 2017) and vertically (Nemoto, 2013), have been discussed as factors that
curtail the quality of women’s work.
6 The latter can be viewed as a situation where the realized value of returns from labor market
3
I provide one of the first studies to explicitly look at how gender roles alter the
responsiveness of individuals as they allocate their time across market and home
production, in response to changes in economic incentives.7 My framework of analysis
is in the spirit of Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) who examine how the caste system,
a traditional institution, affects career choices of students by gender and Bertrand
et al. (2016) who document the relationship between economic opportunities and the
marriage gap between skilled and unskilled women across countries and US states of
different social attitudes towards working women.
I use the Japan Household Panel Survey to empirically examine the role of gender
norms on the distribution of married couples’ time and their responses to wages. The
survey is a unique longitudinal data set that is well-suited to my endeavor, as it
includes detailed information on both spouses’ time use, employment history, income
and family background. The data allows me to undertake couple-level analyses inside
and outside the home, which is not feasible with most data with information on time
use.8 In addition, the longitudinal nature of the data allows me to exploit within-
individual variation to study the relationship between wages and time allocation.
This is a distinct advantage over purely cross-sectional data, where the possibility of
(Blood and Wolfe, 1960; Becker, 1985) are determined based on the roles individuals are expected
to serve (Kamo, 1988).
7 Kevane and Wydick (2001) compare women’s adjustments of time across home, market, and
farm activities in response to changes in farm capital across two ethnic groups of different social
norms in Burkina Faso. A recent study by Ichino et al. (2019) uses a Swedish tax reform to document
the relationship between gender roles and the elasticity of substitution between spousal inputs in
childcare. The authors find that traditional couples react more strongly a reduction in husbands’
tax rates (that induces a more traditional time allocation), while egalitarian couples show stronger
responses to a reduction in wives’ tax rates (that leads to a more egalitarian time allocation).
8 For example, the American Time Use Survey is a cross-sectional survey that contains time
use information of one household member. The recent three waves of International Social Survey
Programme’s Family and Changing Gender Roles module (1994, 2002, and 2012) provides coarse
measures both spouses’ hours spent in paid work and housework. However, the data contains a
relatively small number of individuals for each country and is not longitudinal. Bertrand et al.
(2015) use Panel Study of Income Dynamics to examine the relationship between the aversion to a
situation where the wife earns more than her husband and the division of home production. The
data does not provide information on time spent in childcare, unfortunately.
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a spurious relationship between the two variables due to omitted variables or reverse
causality would be a first-order concern.
The within-individual analysis still does not guarantee that the relationship can
be given a causal interpretation. To strengthen the interpretation, I exploit exogenous
changes in sales at workplaces generated by the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami.
I employ an additional survey, the Great East Japan Earthquake Special Survey,
which was conducted among the participants of the Japan Household Panel Survey.
The survey provides monthly records of individual behaviors and situations after
the earthquake. By documenting post-earthquake, within-individual changes in time
allocation in relation to earthquake-generated shocks to wages, I present credible
evidence on the role of gender roles on changes in time use.
I begin the analysis by presenting a simple model where a married couple jointly
decides how to allocate their time. In particular, I allow for the presence of traditional
gender roles in the form of a stigma associated with husbands engaging in domestic
production. The model shows how, with more traditional gender role attitudes, the
husband in a dual-income household spends more time in market production and less
time in home production. On the other hand, the wife spends more time in domestic
production and less time in market work.
The model additionally provides predictions on the sizes of individuals’ responses
to economic incentives based on their degrees of traditionalism. In response to changes
in own or spousal wages, less traditional husbands adjust their time more than their
traditional counterparts. This implies that husbands with egalitarian gender role
attitudes have higher wage elasticities of labor supply inside and outside the home.
Less traditional wives are also more responsive to changes in spousal wages and, under
reasonable assumptions on the model parameters, to changes in own wages.
I then empirically examine the model predictions using the Japan Household Panel
5
Survey. To capture individuals’ traditionalism, I use maternal employment status.9
The rationale behind this proxy is that gender role attitudes are transmitted across
generations, as widely documented in the literature. The persistence of gender roles
across generations (often combined with the portability of culture), from parents to
children (Cunningham, 2001; Farre and Vella, 2013) or from ancestors to contempo-
raries (Fernández and Fogli, 2009; Alesina et al., 2013), has been a key in identifying
causal impacts of gender roles on individuals behaviors. In particular, Fernández
et al. (2004) and McGinn et al. (2015) relate women’s employment status to their
children and children-in-law’s labor supply inside and outside the home. In the case
of Japan, Kawaguchi and Miyazaki (2009) find that sons of working mothers are less
likely to support traditional gender stereotypes.
Own mother’s employment status positively predicts that children exhibit less
traditional behaviors when they grow up. Maternal employment status positively
affects daughters’ market labor supply at both the extensive and the intensive margins
while being negatively associated with the daughter’s number of hours spent in home
production. Sons raised by working mothers also are more likely to participate in
home production activities, especially childcare.
Taking advantage of the longitudinal feature of the data, I then examine within-
individual responses to changes in wages at the intensive margin. A working wife
increases market hours as her own wages increase with an estimated own-wage elas-
ticity of market labor supply of 0.016. The size of increase is greater for less traditional
wives. In the domestic sphere, the results highlight the rigidity of wife’s home hours,
ruling out effects as small as -0.003 in terms of own-wage elasticity of home labor
supply. Husbands of working wives increase market hours in response to positive
changes in own wages. Their domestic labor supply, similar to the wives’ case, does
9 Some studies adopt alternative approaches by using, for instance, regional variations in sex
ratios at birth (Hwang et al., 2019) or survey responses (Fortin, 2005) in measuring gender roles.
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not significantly change in response to wages. The pattern is consistent across the
spectrum of traditionalism.
Analyzing the responses to exogenous changes in sales at workplaces, I find broadly
similar results among spouses in dual-income households. Following negative shocks
to sales in their own workplaces, the amount of time wives spend in market production
is reduced. In the domestic sphere, however, there is no significant changes in house-
work or childcare hours. Less traditional wives do not exhibit significant difference,
compared against more traditional wives.
Husbands’ reactions are relatively more dynamic. In response to negative shocks
to sales in own workplaces, husbands spend less time in market production. In the
domestic dimension, I find evidence suggesting small but significant increases in the
amount of housework and childcare. In response to a negative shock to own wages,
husbands with less traditional gender role attitudes increase their childcare hours by
a greater amount than those with more traditional attitudes. The size of adjustment,
however, is considerably small.
I then examine the relationship between market and home hours by instrumenting
decreases in market hours with exogenous shock to sales at workplaces. The results,
once again, highlight the rigidity of domestic labor supply. There is weak evidence
that changes in market hours induce changes in wives’ home production hours. How-
ever, the results are not robust to the exclusion of those who are directly affected
by the earthquake. On the other hand, husbands in dual-income households increase
their home hours as market hours decrease. Changes in childcare hours, in particular,
are driven by less traditional husbands. All changes occur in the domestic production
dimension are extremely small in magnitude compared to changes in market hours.
In summary, my findings corroborate earlier studies on the severity and rigidity
of gendered division of labor in Japan (Kamo, 1994; Tsuya et al., 2012; Ueda, 2005).
7
While married individuals in my sample respond to changes in economic incentives
by adjusting the amount of market work, it is not accompanied by changes in home
production hours. Even if it does, the magnitude of changes in time spent in domestic
production is likely to be much smaller than that in time spent in market produc-
tion. This highlights the growing concerns regarding the welfare of working wives’ as
more women engage in market production without corresponding reduction in home
production hours.
In addition, my findings suggest that individuals with traditional gender role at-
titudes are not as responsive to changes in economic incentives as those with less
traditional attitudes. Wives with egalitarian gender role attitudes make greater ad-
justments in their market hours in response to changes in own wages. In the domestic
sphere, although the size of adjustments are small, less traditional husbands are more
flexible in changing their home hours than their more traditional counterparts. The
result provides implications for policymakers as it helps identify the compliers of poli-
cies that are devised to induce more equal division of labor inside and outside the
home. It also offers an insight to design policies to facilitate changes in intrafamily
time allocation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents a con-
ceptual framework to motivate the discussion. Section 1.3 introduces the main data
and presents how maternal employment as a proxy for gender role attitudes predicts
individuals’ time allocation. Section 1.4 discusses whether and how individuals of
varying degrees of traditionalism exhibit different reactions to changes in economic
incentives. An exogenous changes in potential wages are introduced to strengthen
the argument. Section 1.5 concludes.
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1.2 Conceptual Framework
Consider a simple model where a married couple jointly determines how to allocate
limited time. A spouse i can spend his or her time, normalized to 1, in three ways:
leisure (li), market production (mi), and home production (hi). The husband and
wife decide how to use their time in order to maximize the joint utility from husband’s
leisure, wife’s leisure, and their joint consumption of market goods and home goods
while minimizing the disutility from confronting traditional gender roles. To incorpo-
rate gender roles into the model, I introduce a stigma against husband’s participation
in home production, which stems from traditional gender stereotypes.
The couple solves the following problem:
max
(li,mi,hi)i=w,h






li +mi + hi = 1 (i = w, h)
where 0 < α < 1, 0 < δ ≤ 1, and γh ≥ 0.10 The disutility coming from the
husband’s participation in domestic production is characterized by γh, which takes
a positive value when the couple finds it undesirable for the husband to take part
in household chores and is zero when the couple is perfectly egalitarian.11 I also
assume that the husband is paid more than the wife in the market (ww < wh), which,
combined with 0 < δ ≤ 1, makes the husband have a comparative advantage in
10 Since the main interest of this model is the relative productivity of wives and husbands inside
and outside the home, I assume quasilinear preferences for analytical tractability (such that the
optimal allocation is not subject to the income effect). The model is similar the existing models in
the literature in its quasilinearity and accommodation of a social stigma. For example, Fernández
et al. (2004) and Bertrand et al. (2016) present quasilinear preferences that include the stigma
against married women’s participation in market production. The husbands experience a decrease
in their utilities in proportion to the amount of time their wives spend in market production in the
former study, and do not value their wives careers as much as egalitarian husbands do in the latter.
11 A positive γh therefore effectively reduces husband’s productivity at home.
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market production and the wife have a comparative advantage in home production.
Given that each spouse enjoys a positive amount of leisure and assuming wh > βh, the
wife always does a positive amount of housework, and the husband is set to always
spends some time in market production.
When wife’s wages and husband’s productivity in home production are both suf-
ficiently high (compared to their marginal utilities derived from the other production
activities), the optimal allocation of time in the interior12 is as follows.
















































The resulting comparative statics, to be discussed below, are summarized in Table
1.1.
Gender roles determine the division of home and market production
12 For simplicity, here I discuss the interior solution where both husband and wife engage in
both home production and market production. The three other possible cases are: (1) aside from
leisure, husband spends his time in market production and wife spends her time in home production
(male-breadwinner-female-homemaker), (2) husband does not engage in home production but wife
does work outside the home and at home, and (3) working husband take part in home production
while wife dedicates her non-leisure time to home production only.
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hours.
Traditional gender roles, represented by γh, effectively decreases gains from hus-
band’s time spent in home production. Holding all else equal, a traditional husband
spends less time in home production (∂hh
∂γh
< 0) and more time in market produc-
tion (∂hh
∂γh
> 0). On the other hand, the wife spends less time in market production
(∂mw
∂γw
< 0) to engage more in home production (∂hw
∂γh
> 0).13
Gender roles influence the sizes of individuals’ responses to changes in
wages.
The model also shows that traditional gender roles determine not only the amount
of time individuals allocate across different production activities but also the size of
their responses to wages. Compared to less traditional husbands, the magnitudes
of increase in market hours and decrease in home hours are both smaller for more






> 0). In other words, given the same amount of
decrease in market wages, more traditional husbands do not reallocate their time from
market production to home production as much as their less traditional counterparts
do.
Another side of the story that is worth exploring is the cross-wage elasticity of
labor supply. Holding all else constant, the husband increases his home hours and





< 0). The model suggests that the husbands who find it more
uncomfortable to take part in home production, i.e. when γh is large, will not de-








In the case of the wives, when reacting to changes in spousal wages, the pattern of
13 An alternative way to incorporate traditional gender norm is to include the stigma against
wife’s working outside the home is explicitly by adding −γwmw to the utility function (γw ≥ 0).
With a higher γw, given equal wages, traditional working wives enjoy more leisure as it reduces the
level of perceived wages and therefore decreases the amount of time spent in market production.
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changes across the spectrum of traditionalism is the same as the husbands. To changes
in husbands’ wages, traditional wives are likely to be less responsive in adjusting






< 0). When the
husbands’ wages decrease, traditional wives will not increase their market hours and
correspondingly increase their home hours as much as egalitarian wives do.
It is, however, ambiguous how the flexibility of wife’s time allocation to her own
wages varies by the size of γh, the stigma against husband’s participation in domestic






depending on the values of the parameters
and wages: general efficiency in home production (α), husband’s relative efficiency in
home production (δ), and perceived relative wages ( ww
wh+γh
). It is only when there are a
large perceived gender wage gap (small ww
wh+γh
), low relative home production efficiency
(small δ), and high home production efficiency (large α) that strong discomfort from
husband’s spending time in home production (high γh) unambiguously deters her
from adjusting her time. ( ∂
2mw
∂ww∂γh
< 0 , ∂
2hw
∂ww∂γh
> 0). In the empirical setting of this
study, it is reasonable to expect the conditions to be satisfied, considering Japan’s
large gender wage gap and advanced technology that enables efficient conversion from
time to home goods.
In summary, I obtain the following implications on the patterns of dual-income
couples’ allocation and adjustment of time by the degree of traditionalism, represented
by γh:
(1) Less traditional husbands (wives) spend more (less) time in home production
and less (more) time in market production than more traditional husbands
(wives).
(2) In response to an increase in spousal wages, less traditional individuals decrease
market production hours and increase home production hours more than tradi-
tional individuals.
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(3) In response to an increase in own wages, less traditional husbands increase mar-
ket production hours and decrease home production hours more than traditional
husbands.
(4) It is ambiguous whether or not less traditional wives adjust their time by greater
amounts in responds to changes in own wages. However, with a large gender
wage gap, high home production efficiency, and low relative home production
efficiency of husbands, it is expected for traditional gender roles to make indi-
viduals less responsive to changes in own wages.
In the remainder of this study, I test the above predictions with longitudinal data
of married couples in Japan by examining the levels of and changes in market and
home production hours of both spouses in relation to their gender role attitudes.
1.3 Gender Roles and Allocation of Time
In this section, I use the Japan Household Panel Survey to examine the effects of
gender roles on the amount of time spent in production activities inside and outside
the home. An individual’s gender role attitudes are proxied by own mother’s past
employment status.14
Maternal employment is known to be positively associated with labor force partic-
ipation of women in the children’s generation. The two most prominent mechanisms
are (1) preferences formation of husbands raised by working mothers (Fernández
et al., 2004) and working mothers serving as non-traditional gender role models for
daughters and sons alike (McGinn et al., 2015). The predictive power depends on
14 A supplementary analysis reveals that mother-in-law’s employment status also positively affects
wives’ labor force participation decision. However, it does not significantly explain the number of
hours working wives spend in market production (market labor supply at the intensive margin) nor
their home production hours. In the case of husbands, mother-in-law’s employment status is not
significantly associated with their domestic labor supply at both the extensive and intensive margins.
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the exact definition of employment, children’s gender, country, and time. Some stud-
ies find employment status affecting daughters only (Kiecolt and Acock, 1988) while
others provide evidence where a husband’s gender role attitudes, developed through
his mother’s employment, matters more than his wife’s attitude in explaining her
work decision (Farre and Vella, 2013). Kawaguchi and Miyazaki (2009) argue, in
the Japanese context, that men raised by working wives are less likely to support
traditional gender roles.
In the domestic sphere, maternal employment is also expected to induce a more
equal division of household labor. Cunningham (2001) find a strong correlation be-
tween early maternal employment and young adults’ ideal allocation of housework.
While working mothers encourage daughters (or daughters-in-law’s) working outside
the home, they also positively affect their sons’ involvement at home. Married men
raised by working mothers spend more time in housework (McGinn et al., 2015;
Gupta, 2006), which is likely due to different attitudes toward or productivities in
home production (Fernández et al., 2004).
1.3.1 Japan Household Panel Survey
The Japan Household Panel Survey (JHPS/KHPS) is an integrated survey of two
former panel surveys: Keio Household Panel Survey (KHPS), which started in 2004,
and Japan Household Panel Survey (JHPS), which was implemented in 2009 to be
conducted in parallel with the KHPS. Both are conducted annually on the last day
of January. Prior to the integration in 2014,15 each survey had served slightly dif-
ferent purposes. The KHPS covered a wide range of topics including employment,
consumption, housing, and assets. The JHPS, on the other hand, was devised to
collect information on education, income, employment, and healthcare.
15 From 2014, The JHPS and KHPS survey subjects are given the same questionnaires. The data
files are still provided separately.
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Despite the differences, both surveys always collected information on employment,
work hours, and time allocation to home production activities of both spouses. There-
fore, in addition to the post-2014 data, I merge the pre-integration surveys to have
more individuals in the sample in all available years, making the final data span from
2004 to 2017.
The KHPS began with a total of 4,005 nationally representative individuals who
were 20-69 years old as of January 31, 2004. In 2007 and 2012, 1,419 and 1,012
additional survey subjects, respectively, were included to replace those who became
unavailable. In 2009, five years after the launch of the KHPS, the JHPS was initiated.
A total of 4,000 nationally representative individuals who were 20 years old or older
as of January 31, 2009 were included in the survey. The participants were selected
by means of two-stage stratified random sampling, with no participant taking both
surveys.
The JHPS/KHPS offers several unique advantages. First, in the cases where
survey respondents are married, their spouses are asked the same survey questions.
It is therefore possible to observe changes in the employment situation and time use
of both the main respondent and his or her spouse across time. This allows me to
analyze individuals’ time use inside and outside the home at couple-level, which is
not feasible with most surveys with information on time use.
In addition, I can obtain the employment history of each individual before he or
she joined the survey as the participants are asked to report employment activities
for each year since age 15. This feature enables precise calculation of individuals’
experiences in the labor market, measured in years. This is particularly valuable for
married women whose careers are likely to be interrupted before and after marriage
and/or childbirth.16 A rich set of information including but not limited to individuals’
16 Japan’s female labor force participation rate across age groups is known for its strong and
persistent M shape as women in their 30s (at least temporarily) exit the labor market due to
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household income and asset, types of employment and compensation scheme, and
parental education and employment also provides unique background data for the
analysis.
Constructing Key Variables
I merge all available waves of both surveys into a single panel. Due to the differences in
survey questions and formats across surveys and across time, some of the survey items
are simplified so that the most amount of information can be retained. Examples
include but are not limited to categories of educational attainment, occupation, and
household expenditure. A number of additional assumptions are made to create some
of the key variables in the analysis.
Time use: Throughout the analysis, I focus on two particular time use categories:
market production (market hours) and household production (home hours). Market
hours in this study is the average hours of paid work performed each week17 and are
reported in hours per week. Home hours include routine housework (preparing meals,
doing laundry, grocery shopping, cleaning, etc.) and childcare.18 Survey respondents
are first asked to report whether they perform the activity (1) almost every day, (2)
a few times per week, (3) once a week, (4) almost never, or (5) never. Then, those
who choose any of the first three options report the average time they spend for the
activity per day (for those who perform the activity almost every day) or per week
marriage- and childbirth-related reasons.
17 Market hours in this study thus include actual hours worked only (“core” market hours as
defined in Aguiar and Hurst (2007)) and exclude other work-related activities such as time spent on
commuting or job searching.
18 Home hours in this paper therefore cover a subset of a broader category of all unpaid domestic
labor, which includes adult care and other non-routine housework activities. This may underestimate
husbands’ home production hours since the housework tasks performed by wives and husbands tend
to be different. While the wives do more traditionally feminine or routine tasks such as cooking,
cleaning, and shopping, husbands do masculine or non-routine categories of housework such as
household repairs and car fixing (Coltrane, 2000). However, non-routine tasks are likely to be more
optional, less frequent, and easy to be replaced by market goods and services, which alleviates the
concern.
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(for those who perform the activity a few times or once a week).
To make a continuous measure of weekly home hours, I multiply the average hours
per day spent for each activity by six for those who answer (1) almost every day as
their answers are in hours per day and assign zeros for those who answer they perform
the activity (4) almost never or (5) never. For those who choose (2) a few times per
week or (3) once a week, the answers are already in hours per week. Home hours are
then calculated as the sum of housework hours and childcare hours per week. For
both market and home hours, I assume that one spends no more than 15 hours per
day for any given activity and censor the weekly hours at 90 (since “almost every day”
is 6 days per week by assumption) to reduce the potential bias created by outliers.
Experience: Survey subjects are given a matrix of ages (from 15 to 70) and main
employment activities, in which they report their activities for each year since they
were 15 years old. The main activities are: (1) attending school, (2) job seeking, (3)
temporary work (part-time employment), (4) regular employment (full-time employ-
ment), (5) self-employed or professional, (6) working at home, (7) worker at family
business, and (8) changed job or school.19 In measuring each individual’s experience
in years, I count each year where any of the options from (2)-(6) are marked as one
“experience year” for all years since the individual was 15 years old until he or she
joins the survey.20 Upon the individual’s entering the survey, in the initial year, he
or she obtains the experience years measured from the matrix as explained. For each
following year, an additional experience year is added based on the previous year’s
answers.
19 Multiple answers are allowed. For example, one can report that he or she had a part-time job
then later switched to a full-time job at age 23 by marking (3), (4), and (8) for the year.
20 Due to the questionnaire’s structure, however, it is not straightforward to identify “non-
experience” year; i.e., an empty cell in the matrix can be interpreted as nonresponse or no-experience.
I assume that, if a survey participant marked any cell in the age×activity matrix, an empty cell
means no-experience. On the other hand, if he or she did not mark any of the 432 cells, the individual
as treated as a non-responder.
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Hourly wages: Since the survey does not directly ask the participants to report
hourly wages (unless they are paid hourly), I calculate hourly wages based on individ-
uals’ compensation scheme, amount of payment, work hours reported last year.21 All
individuals who had labor income last year are asked to report their compensation
scheme (yearly, monthly, weekly, daily, or hourly) and corresponding pre-tax income
(per month for monthly and weekly salary earners, per day for daily wage earners,
per hour for hourly wage earners, and per year for annual salary earners). To obtain
hourly wages, I calculate total hours worked for corresponding time periods (hour,
day, month, and year) based on individuals’ average days worked per month, and
hours worked per week that are reported last year as well as the number of months
they worked last year. The resulting hourly wages thus can be understood as total
compensation received for a given period last year (hour, day, week, month, or year)
divided by total hours worked during the period.
To understand the pattern of wives’ labor supply at the extensive margin, I assign
wages for non-workers. I follow Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) and take advantage
of the panel feature of the data. Those who do not work currently but have worked
in any of the previous waves are assigned with own past wages retrieved from nearest
available waves.
Descriptive Analysis
I restrict the sample to individuals who finished education and are currently married,
with both spouses being less than 65 years old at any time during the sample period:
2004-2017. Since one’s maternal employment status in the past is the key variable
that proxies individuals’ gender role attitudes, I further restrict the sample such
that the mothers of all individuals (respondents and spouses) were alive when the
21 Using last year’s work hours and total wages eliminates a potential division bias created by
using this year’s hours worked.
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individuals were 15 years old. Retaining all individuals who satisfy the above criteria
and supply all relevant background information, the resulting sample is comprised
of 3,900 unique couples with an average tracking period of 6.2 years. All husbands
in the final sample employed in any given year,22 which simplifies the dimensions of
husband-side behaviors.
Figure 1·1 contains four graphs that plot the distributions of market and home
hours by wives and husbands. Figure (a) highlights gender asymmetry in time alloca-
tion in the market sphere. All husbands in the sample engage in market production,
mostly are employed full-time, and work extremely long hours. Wives, on the other
hand, exhibit a different employment pattern where about half of the working wives
are employed part-time. Figure (b) switches the focus to the household dimension. A
large chunk of the husbands do not participate in home production and, even if they
do, spend a small amount of time in housework and childcare. Wives, on average,
spend significantly more time in domestic production. To check whether the pat-
tern is different for dual-income households, Figures (c) and (d) restrict the sample
to dual-income households where the wives work part-time (less than 35 hours per
week) and full-time (at least 35 hours per week), respectively. While husbands of
wives working full-time are more likely to take part in home production, there is no
noticeable increase at the intensive margin.
I extend the comparison between dual-income and single-income households in
Figure 1·2. The graph presents how the husbands’ average housework hours varies
across wife’s housework hours by wife’s employment status. Both groups, dual-income
couples and single-income couples, exhibit a negative relationship between the hours
spent in housework by spouses, indicating the duty of housework is shared to some
extent. Husbands of working wives are shown to invest more time in market produc-
22 0.98% of the observations across all years reported that they did not perform any paid work
in the previous month, but they were on leave.
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tion. It is, however, important to note that the scales are very different, meaning
that the extent of housework sharing is extremely limited.
Lastly, in Figure 1·3, I show an outcome of the above rigid, gendered division of
household labor. The figure is generated with all observations of dual-income house-
holds. It presents how home hours and total hours, a combination of market and
home hours, of both spouses evolve as wife spends more time in market production.
While wives reduce the amount of time they spend in domestic production, the mag-
nitude of decrease is much smaller than the increase in their market hours, resulting
in a monotonous increase in total work hours. Husbands’ home hours increase, but
it is by a negligible amount. As a result, as wives increase their market labor supply,
their total hours surpass the husbands’ total hours and continue to increase. This
figure highlights the double burden of working wives.
Having discussed some snapshots that highlight the extremity of gendered division
of labor and its consequences, I present summary statistics of the sample individuals
by pooling all years. Table 1.2 reports the characteristics of individuals by their
mothers’ employment status.
Wives and husbands in the sample are in their mid to late 40s during the sam-
ple period. While the age gap between the spouses are 2.13 years, the gap between
their accumulated experiences is significantly wider at 7.33 years. The experience gap
among the wives, between those who were raised by working mothers and those who
were raised by stay-at-home mothers, is 1.15 years and is statistically significant. A
similar pattern is observed from the husbands where maternal employment is associ-
ated with longer experiences. However, controlling for ages, the difference becomes
smaller in magnitude and is statistically less significant.
Both wives and husbands whose mothers worked in the past are less educated
than their counterparts. The same pattern is observed from the hourly wages where
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those raised by working mothers earn less than those raised by stay-at-home mothers.
This raises a concern that maternal employment status might not be a pure proxy
for gender role attitudes. The differences in education are consistently observed in
the parents’ generation as well, as reported in Table A.1. This fits the scenario
where, within each generation, the wife bases her decision to join the labor market on
husbands’ income, which is likely to be higher for more educated wives due to assor-
tative matching. Furthermore, across generations, parents’ socioeconomic status can
be passed down to the children. This threatens the validity of maternal employment
status as the proxy for egalitarian gender role attitudes.
To address this concern, I check the validity of the proxy in two ways. One is
to include parents’ educational attainments in the analysis in an attempt to capture
potential differences in socioeconomic status, following Fernández et al. (2004). The
other is to redefine maternal employment. Mothers who had any jobs can be divided
into those who had professional occupations or were employed and those who worked
at family business or with no employee relations.23 If the negative selection story holds
true, it is reasonable to expect professional or wage-workers to be more comparable
to stay-at-home mothers as they are more likely to have pursued career. They are
also less likely to have worked due to the low income earned by their husbands’,
compared to those who were self-employed, worked at family business, or worked
with no employee relations. In terms of education, the former group is indeed more
comparable to mothers who did not work.24 In the second exercise, therefore, I
23 In the survey, individuals are asked to report whether their mothers had a job when they
were about 15 years old. The options are (1) self-employed, (2) professional, (3) worker at family
business, (4) wage worker. (5) working at home (with no employee relation), (6) consigned work or
subcontractor (with no employee relation), (7) unemployed, and (8) was already deceased. Maternal
working status, a dummy variable, takes 1 if an individual’s mother (1)-(6) had any job and 0 if
she was (7) unemployed. Individuals whose mothers were already deceased are excluded from the
analysis.
24 Both working-mother groups, children as well as their parents, are still less educated than stay-
at-home mother group. However, the differences are smaller between stay-at-home mother group
and the group where the mothers were professionals or wages workers. The statistics are reported
21
compare those who were raised by wage-workers or professional mothers to those
whose mothers were stay-at-home mothers.
To test the validity of the proxy, I replicate the first three columns of Table 1.3, to
be discussed in Section 1.3.2, and examine the effect of maternal employment status
on wives’ market labor supply. The strong positive association between maternal em-
ployment status and female labor supply survives the two exercises described above.
The results are provided in Table A.3.
Coming back to Table 1.2, the employment status of own-mother as well as
mother-in-law is positively associated with the employment status of daughters. Wives
raised by working mothers are more likely to work than those raised by stay-at-home
mothers by 8 percentage points. The probability of home production participation,
an indicator of any home production by the husband, barely surpasses 0.5. There is
no noticeable difference by maternal employment status.
The next four rows document the amount of time spent in production activities
inside and outside the home. Note that individuals are assumed to spend no more
than 15 hours per day for any given activity. Housework hours and childcare hours
therefore do not perfectly add up to home hours due to the treatment of outliers.
Wives whose mothers worked in the past spend more time in market production and
less time in home production. There is no significant difference among husbands
by maternal employment status. However, the size of husbands’ home production
hours relative to the wives’ is noteworthy. Wives, on average, spend 34.4 hours in
home production, while their husbands spend 3.1 hours, less than 10% of wives’ home
hours. The average housework and childcare hours increase to 3.5 hours and 6.7 hours,
when the sample if restricted to husbands who spend nonzero time in housework and
childcare, respectively.25
in Table A.2.
25 Restricting to couples who have at least one child under age 6, the average weekly hours spent
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Couples in the sample have 1.8 children co-residing, with the average number of
children decreasing to 1 if the age restriction is applied at 18. While wives raised by
working mothers have more children, husbands raised by working mothers have fewer
children. It is ambiguous whether and how maternal employment affects the fertility
outcomes of the children’s generation.
1.3.2 Maternal Employment and Allocation of Time
Using the data presented above, I first examine the relationship between the time
allocation of married couples and maternal employment status, a proxy for gender
role attitudes. Included in the regressions but not reported in the tables discussed
in this section are experience and experience squared of both spouses, couple’s non-
labor income, total number of family members, co-residence status of any parent,26
region fixed effects, and year fixed effects.27 Robust standard errors are reported in
the parentheses.
Starting with the wives, the first three columns of Table 1.3 report the relationship
between wives’ market labor supply at the extensive margin and maternal employment
status. Maternal employment status is positively associated with the labor force
participation decision of married women. Compared to those raised by stay-at-home
mothers, wives raised by working mothers are more likely to participate in the labor
market by 5.1 percentage point. Considering that the average probability of labor
force participation is 0.69, maternal employment status plays a significant role in
magnitude.
The probability of labor force participation is positively associated with a wife’s
in childcare are 6.4 hours for husbands and 50.5 hours for wives.
26 The presence of parents is known to decrease Japanese wives’ reservation wages as they (1)
expect the parents to share the burden of housework or childrearing activities are expected (Sasaki,
2002) or (2) want to avoid conflicts with the co-resident parents (especially the in-laws) by reducing
time at home (Kumagai and Kato, 2007).
27 The results are consistent when experience is replaced by age. To remove outliers, individuals
in the top and bottom 0.5% of non-labor income distribution are trimmed out.
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own university or higher degree, while being negatively associated with her husband’s
having a bachelor’s degree of higher. Wives who have any child under age 6 are
significantly more likely to stay out of the labor force.
Columns (2) and (3) look at the number of hours spent in market production.
Wives who were raised by working mothers spend 2.2 hours more in market production
than those whose mothers were stay-at-home mothers. Restricting the sample to
working wives, in column (3), there is still a significant gap by maternal employment
status. Having a bachelor’s degree or higher and living with any parent are both
positively associated with the number of hours spent in market production for working
wives. The presence of young children, under age 18 and 6, predicts a decrease in
market hours.
Column (4) reports whether maternal employment status significantly explains
sons’ market labor supply. While the estimated coefficient is positive, it lacks statis-
tical significance. Compared to junior high school graduates (the omitted education
category), high school graduates and those who received 4-year university or higher
education are both likely to supply more time in market. production. The presence of
young children, unlike the estimates for wives, is positively associated with husbands’
market hours.
Table 1.4 reports the relationship between maternal employment status and home
labor supply. Columns (1) to (3) show hows wives’ weekly home hours are explained
by maternal employment status. Wives who were raised by working mothers tend to
spend less time in home production: 64 minutes less in housework and 51 minutes
less in childcare.28 In terms of total home hours, the amount of time spent by wives
whose mothers worked are smaller than that spent by wives raised by stay-at-home
28 If sample is restricted to working wives only, less traditional working wives (raised by working
mothers) spend 53 minutes less in housework than more traditional working wives (raised by stay-at-
home mothers). Less traditional wives spend 1.04 hours less than more traditional wives in childcare
when only those living with children are considered.
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mothers by 1.4 hours, which amounts to 4.1% of the average home hours.
While having a bachelor’s degree or higher is negatively associated with the
amount of time spent in housework, it is positively associated with the number of
hours spent in childcare. The latter is true for having graduated from junior college
or a specialized school. This is consistent with the earlier findings in the litera-
ture that more educated mothers spend more time in childcare in the United States
(Guryan et al., 2008) and in Spain (Gimenez-Nadal and Molina, 2013). Living with
any parent predicts a significant decrease in childcare hours and therefore in total
home hours, which supports the findings of (Sasaki, 2002) that co-residing parents
share the burden of home production.
In columns (4) to (6), considering that only 52% of all husbands in the sample
have nonzero home production hours, I first look at home labor supply the extensive
margin. Those who were raised by working mothers are more likely to do any childcare
by 2% and any home production activities by 2.3%. There is no significant difference
between the two groups when it comes to housework activities. Wife’s education is
positively associated with husband’s participation in housework and childcare. More
educated husbands are more likely to take part in housework activities.
Consistent with the wives’ case, residing with any parent is significantly negatively
associated with the home production participation decision of the husbands. Being
fathers of young children, especially. those who are under age 6, husbands are more
likely to engage in home production activities, especially childcare.
The last three columns show the results when the dependent variables are in weekly
hours. Note that many of the observations contain zero hours, causing the results in
columns (7) to (9) to be noisier. The estimated coefficients to maternal employment
status remain insignificant even if I only consider those with nonzero home hours. A
comparison across columns (1) to (3) and (7) to (9) show that, for each additional
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child under age 6, wives spend an additional 21.8 hours in childcare while the figure is
2.7 hours for the husbands. This shows the difference in the magnitude of variations
in home hours between spouses with respect to the presence of young children.
Overall, the findings in Tables 1.3 and 1.4 show that own mother’s past employ-
ment status leads to more equal divisions of labor supply in the market and at home.29
In the remainder of the paper, I consider those who were raised by working mothers
as individuals with more egalitarian, less traditional gender role attitudes.
1.4 Gender Roles and Responses to Economic Incentives
In this section, I analyze the influence of gender role attitudes on individuals’ re-
sponses to changes in wages. The model in Section 1.2 suggests that those with more
egalitarian gender role attitudes are likely to make greater adjustments in their time
uses. In response to an increase in own wages, less traditional men are predicted
to increase market hours and decrease home hours by greater amounts. In response
to an increase in spousal wages, egalitarian men are also expected to increase home
hours and decrease market hours more than traditional men. For the wives, while the
pattern of reactions to spousal wages are symmetrical with the husbands’, differences
in their responses to changes in own wages across the degrees of traditionalism is am-
biguous. However, given the severe gender wage inequality and advanced technology
that enables efficient home production, it is reasonable to expect less traditional wives
29 The survey format, which directly asks the participants to report the amount of time spent
in activities, raises a concern of reporting bias. While gender reporting gap in housework hours has
been the main interest of the literature (Geist, 2010), it is plausible that there exists a reporting
gap between egalitarian and traditional husbands (Kamo, 2000). More egalitarian husbands can
overreport their time spent in housework more than traditional ones in order to appear socially de-
sirable. Less egalitarian husbands, on the other hand, can underreport their contribution, compared
to less traditional husbands, because they prefer to preserve their traditional self-image (Hochschild
and Machung, 1989). While this attitude-based bias might partially drive the differences in home
production hours among husbands, the fact that I do not observe any systematic differences at the
intensive margin alleviates the concern. In the rest of the analysis, estimates are obtained from
within-individual variations, and the individual-level bias is no longer a concern.
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to be more responsive to changes in own changes. Going into the empirical analysis, I
hypothesize that more egalitarian husbands and wives incur greater changes in their
division of time in response to changes in wages.
1.4.1 Responses to Changes in Wages
The longitudinal data allows me to explore changes within each individual across
years and therefore to avoid comparing different individuals of different unobservable
characteristics. Incorporating individual fixed effects, I track the changes in survey
subjects’ and their spouses’ time allocation at the time of survey (January) in response
to the usual hourly wages received the year before. All estimates presented in this
section are additionally controlled for time-varying characteristics: experience and
experience squared of both spouses, couple’s non-labor income, total number of family
members, co-residence status of any parent, number of children under age 18 and 6,
region fixed effects, and year fixed effects. To remove outliers, individuals in the top
and bottom 0.5% of wage distribution and non-labor income distribution are trimmed
out. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
Table 1.5 presents the effects of wages on market labor supply of husbands and
wives. In columns (1) to (3), sample includes those who exhibit variations in their
labor force status within the sample time frame.30 Hourly wages are own past wages
retrieved from the nearest waves. Interestingly, there is no significant relationship
between predicted wages and labor force participation decision. This suggests that
wives’ entering and exiting the labor market might not be strongly associated with
the level of wages. The probability of labor force participation is significantly lower
among women in prime marriage and childbearing ages, which further indicate that
the variations in labor force participation status are caused by factors other than
30 Out of 3,900 wives in the sample, 1,134 individuals (29% of the sample) experience interruptions
during the survey period. 2,034 wives (52% of the sample) always stay in the labor market.
27
wages.
In columns (4) to (9), I restrict the attention to individuals in dual-income house-
holds and exploit within-individual variations in wages and market hours. In columns
(4) to (6), sample includes working wives, and the hourly wages are previous year’s
wages reported by individuals. Starting with column (4), wife’s own wages positively
predict the number of hours worked. Given that an average working married woman
in the sample works 28 hours at 1,990 JPY per hour (18.2 US Dollar), her own-wage
(Hicksian) elasticity of labor supply at the intensive margin is 0.016. The figure is
comparable to the lower end of what Bargain et al. (2014) find from married women
in the United States and 17 European countries with data from late 1990s to early
2000s as well as Chetty et al. (2011)’s findings from married women in Denmark from
1994 to 2001. Goldin (1992) interprets that the reasons behind the low own-wage
elasticity of American women’s labor supply in the beginning of the 20th century are
limited labor market options for women and strong stigma against married women’s
working outside the home, which can be applied to the Japanese case as well.
Column (5) shows that less traditional wives increase their hours in the market
more than their counterpart in response to an increase in wages. A simple reading
of the coefficients reveals that while more traditional wives increase their market
hours by 0.045 hours, less traditional wives additionally increases their working hours
by 0.301 hours. Running specification reported in column (4) separately for the
two groups of wives, the own-wage elasticities of labor supply for traditional and
egalitarian wives are 0.003 and 0.023, respectively. The result, therefore, supports
that more egalitarian wives adjust their market hours by greater amounts compared to
traditional women. Column (6) reports that husbands’ hourly wages are not relevant
in predicting working wives’ number of hours worked. The pattern is not differential
across traditional and egalitarian wives.
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Columns (7) to (9) examine how changes in own and spousal wages explain differ-
ences in husband’s market hours, and whether the effect is asymmetrical across tra-
ditional and egalitarian men. For every 1,000 JPY increase in wage, which amounts
to 29% of the average wages, husband’s hours in market production increases by
0.287 hours. The resulting own-wage elasticity is 0.021. Similar to the wives’ cases,
spousal wages do not statistically significantly predict the number of hours spent in
market production. I do not find significant difference between the responses of more
traditional and less traditional husbands.
Table 1.6 switches the focus to the domestic dimension. Sample includes dual-
income households such that it includes working wives in columns (1) to (3) and
husbands of working wives in columns (4) to (6). In the last three columns, I further
restrict the sample to husbands of dual-income households who participate in home
production. Hourly wages are previous year’s wages.
Columns (1) to (3) show that the number of market hours of working wives is
not significantly associated with their own as well as their husbands’ wages. The
lack of statistically significant adjustments is consistent across both types of wives,
traditional and egalitarian. Taking the point estimates without considering their
significance, a comparison between column (1) of Table 1.5 and column (1) of Table
1.6 shows that the magnitude of decrease in home hours is much smaller than the size
of increase in market hours in response to an increase in their wages. The implied
own-wage elasticity of home labor supply is -0.003 as opposed to that of market
labor supply at 0.016. Considering that working wives spend similar amounts of time
in market and home production, the results are consistent with the story of working
wives’ double burden. There is little of no changes in home production accompanying
changes in market hours in response to economic incentives. This indicates a further
decrease in leisure.
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I examine husbands’ time spent in home production and report the results in
columns (4) to (9). In columns (4) to (6), the dependent variable is a binary variable
that takes 1 if the husband does any housework or childcare and 0 otherwise. Not
only are the coefficients to the variables of interest extremely noisily estimated, they
are also close to zero in magnitude. While the estimates are not reported to save
space, the number of young children is the only determinant that significantly predicts
husband’s participation in home production. Having a child less than 18 years old
(or 6 years old), husbands of working wives are more likely to take part in home
production by 2 percentage point (or 5.6 percent), a significant increase given that
the average probability of husbands’ doing any home production is 0.49. Breaking
home hours into housework and childcare hours, I find that most of the increase at
the extensive margin comes from the childcare dimension. This implies that, as the
number of children increases, husbands tend to engage in childcare but not necessarily
in housework.
I further restrict the sample to observations with positive home hours in the last
three columns. Own and spousal wages do not explain variations in home hours, and
the pattern is consistent across traditional and egalitarian husbands. Similar to the
extensive margin analysis in columns (4) to (6), the number of children under ages
18 and 6 predict significant increases in the amount of time they spend in housework
or childcare, given that the husbands do any home production.
1.4.2 Responses to Economic Shocks
In the previous section, taking advantage of the longitudinal feature of the data, I
include individual fixed effects. This enables me to make comparisons across time
within individuals rather than across individuals, preventing unobservable but struc-
tural differences between those who raised by working mothers and those raised by
stay-at-home mothers from contaminating the empirical results. Being able to ana-
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lyze the relationship between this year’s time use and last year’s wages also helps me
to reduce the concern of reverse causality.
The empirical results, however, are not perfectly free from endogeniety issues as
predetermined wages are not strictly exogenous. Due to the potential presence of
serial correlation of wages and time use, the classic division bias problem as well
as the issue of reverse causality arise. Also, wages can potentially affect unobserved,
unaccounted variables that in return influence the allocation of time, making it harder
to interpret the results as purely causal.
To address this concern, I exploit exogenous shocks generated by an unforeseen
event – the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, also referred as the Great East
Japan earthquake and tsunami. The magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck off the east
coast of Japan, approximately 70 kilometers (43 miles) east of Tohoku, a north-
eastern region of the country on March 11, 2011. It was the fourth most powerful
earthquake in the world since 1900, and the most powerful earthquake ever reported
in Japan. The earthquake was followed by powerful tsunami, which not only directly
damaged the nation but also caused nuclear accidents including nuclear power plant
meltdowns. The natural disaster negatively affected individuals and firms across the
nation through supply chain disruptions (Carvalho et al., 2016; Tokui et al., 2017).
In the following analysis, I examine the effects of changes in sales at workplace on
changes in the amount of time individuals use in certain activities: market production,
housework, and childcare.31
Great East Japan Earthquake Special Survey (GEES)
To understand the effects of the natural disaster on the households in Japan, the
Great East Japan Earthquake Special Survey (GEES) was conducted. Two rounds
of survey were carried out among the 2011 JHPS and KHPS participants in June and
31 See Appendix for the construction of these variables.
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October.32
One notable strength of the GEES is that the two waves practically cover sev-
eral consecutive months. Round 1, conducted in June, asks the participants about
individuals’ situations and activities in March (immediately after the earthquake) to
June, while round 2, carried out in October, is devised to document the situations
and behaviors from June/July to October. Therefore, I can retrieve individuals’ em-
ployment situation from the 2011 round of the JHPS/KHPS, which took place on
the last day of January (less than two months before the earthquake) and link the
information to the (effectively) monthly surveys from March to September.
Unfortunately, the GEES is only filled by the main respondents of the 2011
JHPS/KHPS, and the spouses were not offered duplicate questionnaires. As a re-
sult, a direct analysis of the effect of exogenous shocks to spouses wages on the main
respondents’ or the spouses’ time use is not feasible. In an attempt to understand the
effect of changes in spousal wages on how individuals adjust their time, I construct
a proxy variable for the potential changes in compensation for spouses. Based on
the spouses’ industry reported in the 2011 wave of JHPS/KHPS and region of resi-
dence, the proxy is computed as the average changes in sales of the main respondents
working and residing in corresponding industry and region for each month.
I restrict the sample to individuals who finished education and are less than 65
years old. To understand the behaviors of dual-income couples, I further restrict the
sample to working wives and husbands of working wives. Restricting to individuals
with all required information, including maternal employment status, the resulting
sample is comprised of 467 males and 432 females.33 The average tracking period of
32 For the first round, the subjects are the respondents of the 2011 JHPS and KHPS (about 6,000
households), of which 68.1% participated. Four months later, the respondents of the first round
GEES are asked to participate in the second round, and 85.1% of them mailed the survey back.
33 Based on the responses in January, the GEES participants and the rest of the 2011 round
of JHPS/KHPS participants are not vastly differently from each other. Wives who, or whose hus-
bands, participated in the GEES are slightly more educated and spend more hours in housework.
32
4.6 months between March and. September.34
While 37% of the sample individuals reside in the areas that are likely to be
directly hit by the earthquakes (Tohoku and Kando), 12% reported that they had
been directly affected35 by the earthquake. Between March and September, 28% of
the observations experience changes in the sales at workplaces due to earthquakes,
79% of which are negative changes. 23% and 19% of the observations experienced
changes in income and expenditure, respectively. In the time use dimension, the
proportions of sample observations experienced any changes in market, housework,
and childcare hours are 17%, 10%, and 5%, respectively. The summary statistics are
reported in Table A.4.
Estimation Strategy
A natural way to use percentage changes in sales at workplaces generated by the earth-
quake is to use the changes as a proxy for exogenous variations in potential wages.
However, the relationship between changes in market hours and changes in sales
should be interpreted with caution. An immediate concern is that changes market
hours might have been partially driven by demand-side restrictions. As noted earlier,
the earthquake was followed by powerful tsunami that caused nuclear accidents. Be-
fore the earthquake, 30% of Japan’s electricity supply was generated from its nuclear
power reactors,36 all of which were at least temporarily closed after the earthquake.
Husbands are also slightly more educated and have higher wages. However, there is no further dif-
ference in observable characteristics. The summary statistics are reported in Table A.4. I also check
whether the geographic distribution of the GEES respondents is significantly different from that of
all JHPS/KHPS participants. The distribution of the GEES respondents in my sample across 8
regions is: Hokkaido (4%), Tohoku (6%), Kanto (31%), Chubu (23%), Kinki (17%), Chugoku (7%),
Shikoku (4%), and Kyushu (11%), which is similar to that of the usual JHPS/KHPS sample.
34 Since the first round of GEES conducted among the KHPS participants has a different format
that cannot be incorporated, the available data length is longer for JHPS participants.
35 Individuals are considered “affected” if (1) their residence (and/or the building the residence
is in) or household belongings are damaged due to the earthquake or (2) they reported themselves,
their spouses, or their children had suffered damages caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake.
36 Source: World Nuclear Association.
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Due to the fear of electricity shortages, there was a nationwide energy-saving move-
ment especially during the summer months. Companies took various measures from
encouraging employees to wear lighter outfits to implementing “no-overtime days.”
Therefore, it is possible that the coefficients reflect involuntary adjustments in addi-
tion to individuals’ voluntary responses to negative shocks to sales at workplaces.37
The variations in time spent in domestic production, however, can still be inter-
preted as supply-side adjustments. The question here is, given the changes in market
hour, whether or not the changes reflect purely supply-side responses, how much of
the changes is mirrored in the domestic sphere. For instance, given a reduction of one
hour in market production, how to reallocate the one “free” hour depends on individ-
ual preferences. The lack of significant changes in home production hours, therefore,
represents the rigidity of domestic labor supply. Comparing across traditional and
egalitarian husbands, traditional husbands are more likely to spend the free hour in
leisure than in housework or childcare. Less traditional husbands, on the other hand,
are expected to convert more of the free hour into home production hours. Hence,
I argue that the difference in time adjustments between traditional and egalitarian
husbands represents the effect of gender role attitudes.
I present two empirical exercises. In the first analysis, I examine percentage
changes in market hours, housework hours, and childcare hour in response to exoge-
nous decreases in sales at workplaces. In an attempt to capture the effects of changes
in spousal wages, I include a proxy for changes in sales at spouses’ workplaces as
explained in Section 1.4.2. The estimated effects on changes in market hours need a
careful interpretation as discussed above.
In the second analysis, I use exogenous, negative shocks to sales at workplaces as
an instrument for percentage decreases in market hours, and examine the relationship
between market hours and time spent in home production activities. The coefficient
37 This explains the large magnitude of coefficients in columns (1) to (3) in Table 1.7.
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represents the percentage changes in home production hours in response to a 1%
decrease in market hours, instrumented by the exogenous shock to sales at workplaces.
This shows how much of the “free” time available due to a 1% decrease in market hours
is converted to home production activities. The hypothesis is that less traditional
individuals show larger increases in home production hours in response to decreases
in market hours.
In addition, it is reasonable to question whether the earthquakes affect individuals’
adjustment of time allocation only through changes in sales. To test the robustness
of the results, I run the analysis by excluding all individuals who are directly affected
by the earthquakes.
Empirical Results
Table 1.7 presents the results of the first analysis. All specifications include individual
and month fixed effects, and robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
The table shows (1) how wives and husbands in dual-income households change their
time uses across market production, housework, and childcare in response to decreases
in sales in own and the spouse’s workplace and (2) whether the patterns are different
by their proxied gender role attitudes.
Panel A documents the reactions of all working wives. Following a 1% decrease in
sales at own workplace due to earthquake, the amount of wives’ time spent in market
production is decreased by 0.13%. The proxied decrease in sales at their husbands’
workplaces do not explain variations in market hours. There is no significant difference
in the responsiveness across traditional and egalitarian wives.
The amount of time she spends in domestic production does not change signifi-
cantly. The result is consistent with the findings from the analysis in the previous
section that uses the wage information of the JHPS/KHPS participants. The effects
are extremely noisily estimated with inconsistent signs.
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The percentage changes can be translated into minutes by retrieving the usual
amount of time spent in each activity reported in January (JHPS/KHPS). Wives
in the sample, on average, spent 28.2, 22.1, and 7.8 hours in market production,
housework, and childcare per week. Combined with the estimated coefficients in
Table 1.7, a 10% decrease in sales at own workplaces is associated with a decrease of
22 minutes in market production hours with virtually no change in home production
hours. The changes in market production hours fail to generate the mirrored changes
in the domestic sphere in magnitude, suggesting an extreme rigidity in wives’ domestic
labor supply.
Panel B repeats the same analysis but with husbands of working wives. Starting
from columns (1) to (3), the amount of time spent in market hours decreases by
0.2% following a 1% decrease in sales at his own workplace. In the home production
dimension, a typical husband of a working wife increases his housework and childcare
hours by 0.05% each, in response to a 1% decrease in sales at his own workplace. A
comparison between columns (7) and (8) indicate that most of the positive changes
in childcare is generated by less traditional husbands. That is, in response to an
exogenous decrease in potential wages, less traditional husbands adjust their childcare
hours while more traditional husbands do not. Unlike the wives, columns (7) and (8)
also indicate a possibility where husbands adjust the amount of time spent in childcare
in response to potential changes in spousal wages.
Converting the coefficients to the amount of time, the imbalance between the
changes in market hours and home hours becomes more severe. The husbands’ average
hours spent in market work, housework, and childcare are 46.6, 2.3, and 2.1 hours in
January 2011. Following a 10% decrease in sales at own workplaces, the estimated
coefficients suggest a decrease in market hours by 55 minutes and an increase in total
home production by 1.4 minutes. Less traditional husbands differentially increase his
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childcare hours by 1 minute. Although less traditional husbands are more flexible in
adjusting his childcare, the magnitude of the effect is still extremely small.
The results are robust to the exclusion of those who are directly affected by the
earthquake. Changes in market hours, especially for the working wives, becomes
smaller in magnitude. The rest of results remain qualitatively the same. The robust-
ness check results are reported in Table A.5
As discussed in the previous section, it is fair to question if one can interpret the
coefficients in columns (1) to (3) purely as supply-side responses. However, the small
changes in the home production dimension still highlight the rigidity of intrafamily
labor supply. In the next analysis, I use exogenous shocks to sales at workplaces as
an instrument for percentage decreases in market hours. The exercise allows me to
make a more direct interpretation on the size of adjustment of home hours in parallel
to changes in market hours.
The results are reported in Table 1.8. Columns (1) to (4) contain the estimation
results for working wives. A 1% decrease in market hours is associated with a 0.23%
decrease in housework hours and a 0.1% increase in childcare hours. The negative
coefficient to decreases in market hours in columns (1) and (2) are unexpected. When
those who are directly affected by the earthquake are excluded, however, the effects
become insignificant. The results of the robustness checks are reported in columns
(1) to (4) in Table A.6.38
Columns (5) to (8) present the results for the husbands of working wives. A
1% decrease in market hours induces an increase in the time spent in housework by
0.29% and childcare by 0.31%. Retrieving the January averages, the elasticities can
be translated into hours and minutes. Per one “free” hour that is available due to
a decrease in market hours, husbands in dual-income households increase their total
home hours by mere 1.7 minutes. Less traditional husbands are significantly more
38 Note that the first-stage F statistics are considerably small.
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responsive in terms of adjusting childcare hours. However, in levels, the additional
increase in time spent in childcare is only 1 minute.
The implications stay valid even if individuals who are directly affected by the
earthquake are excluded, and do not necessarily become (even) smaller. The results
of the robustness checks are reported in columns (5) to (8) in Table A.6.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, building on the literature of the effects of traditional gender stereotypes
on economic outcomes, I expand the discussion by examining whether and how gender
roles generate differences in individuals’ responsiveness to economic incentives inside
and outside the home.
Studying the patterns of time use of 3,900 married couples in Japan across years,
I find that maternal employment status, a proxy for gender role attitudes, has a
significant effect on how adult individuals allocate their time. Married women raised
by working mothers are more likely to participate in the labor market, supply more
hours given that they are working, and are likely to spend fewer hours in home
production. Sons of working mothers also are more likely to take part in home
production, especially childcare.
Exploring within-individual variations in wages and time use, I find that spouses in
dual-income households adjust their time spent in production activities only outside
the home as own wages change. Both spouses exhibit small, yet significant own-wage
elasticity of market labor supply. However, wives’ home hours, husbands’ participa-
tion in home production, and husbands’ home hours do not respond to wages of both
spouses. The patterns are consistent across more and less traditional couples.
An additional analysis that makes use of exogenous changes in sales at work-
places, generated by the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, confirms the rigidity
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of intrafamily labor supply. Exogenous changes in sales at workplace are expected to
induce changes in market hours, which could be a result of supply-side adjustments,
demand-side restrictions, or both. I find that there is little or no change in housework
and childcare hours that accompany relatively large changes in market hours.
Lastly, I present evidence that individuals with traditional gender role attitudes
might not be as responsive as those with egalitarian gender role attitudes. In the
market sphere, among working wives, less traditional wives are likely to increase
market hours by greater amounts in response to an increase in own wages. Examining
individuals’ post-earthquake experiences, I also find that less traditional husbands
are more flexible in adjusting the amount of time they spend in home production,
especially childcare.
Overall, my findings provide explanations for extremely gendered, inflexible intra-
household labor supply in Japan. I also find evidence that traditional gender roles
not only affect the levels of individuals’ time allocation but also their responsiveness
to changes in economic situations. When it comes to the responsiveness of husbands
in adjusting home production hours, the difference between two types of husbands is
extremely small in magnitude. This is likely due to the fact that traditional gender
roles are strong and prevalent in the country. Although the effects are not to be
extended linearly, the differences could be larger in an alternative setting that is less
homogenous and less traditional in general.
The lack of time adjustments inside the home with respect to changes in economic
incentives offers the grounds for policies that involve behavioral features rather than
monetary incentives only. The results additionally suggest that the changes in house-
hold division of labor, especially childcare, are likely to be generated by husbands.
This supports the recent trend in parental leave policy that acknowledge fathers as
caregivers.
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(wives work ≥ 35 hrs/wk)
Note: These figures demonstrate the distributions of market hours (hours of paid
work performed) and home hours (hours spent in housework and childcare) per week
for wives and husbands in the sample. Figures (a) and (b) use all individuals in the
sample whereas Figures (c) and (d) restrict the sample to households where wives
work part-time and full-time, respectively.
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Wife's housework (hours/week)
Dual-income couples Linear fit (dual-income)
Single-income couples Linear fit (single-income)
Note: This figure shows the distribution of wife’s housework hours (x-axis) and hus-
band’s housework hours (y-axis) per week. The size of markers is proportional to
the frequency of corresponding observations. Sample is divided by wife’s employment
status.
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Wife's market hours
Wife's home hours Wife's total hours
Husband's home hours Husband's total hours
Note: This figure shows the average hours spent in domestic production by wives
(orange dashed line) and husbands (red long-dashed line), and the average hours
spent in any production activities inside and outside the home by wives (green dash-
dotted line) and husbands (blue long-dash-dotted line). X-axis represents market
production of wives. Sample includes individuals in dual-income households only. The
lines are generated with local polynomial smoothing, and the shaded areas represent
95% confidence intervals.
42
Table 1.1: Comparative Statics for Dual-income Couples
Wife Husband
Time spent in: Market Home Market Home
Degree of traditionalism (γh)
∂
∂γh




+ – – +
by degree of traditionalism (γh)
∂2
∂ww∂γh




– + + –
by degree of traditionalism (γh)
∂2
∂wh∂γh
+ – – +
Note: The comparative statics are derived from the interior solution presented in
Section 1.2 and hence apply to couples where both spouses spend nonzero amount of
time in both market and home production. Higher γh represents a stronger stigma




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.3: Maternal Employment Status and Market Labor Supply
Wives Husbands
Dependent Variables: LFP Market hours Market hours
Market hours
(all wives) (all wives) (working wives)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mother worked
0.051∗∗∗ 2.160∗∗∗ 1.218∗∗ 0.587
(0.012) (0.473) (0.481) (0.377)
Wife’s education
High school
0.028 2.123 0.626 -0.437
(0.030) (1.354) (1.413) (1.130)
Junior college 0.031 2.887∗∗ 1.268 -0.317
or a specialized school (0.032) (1.425) (1.484) (1.194)
4-year university or above
0.087∗∗∗ 6.504∗∗∗ 4.301∗∗∗ 0.144
(0.033) (1.515) (1.584) (1.244)
Husband’s education
High school
-0.001 0.288 0.295 2.613∗∗
(0.025) (1.154) (1.154) (1.023)
Junior college -0.027 -1.096 -1.016 1.930
or a specialized school (0.031) (1.392) (1.385) (1.245)
4-year university or above
-0.080∗∗∗ -2.846∗∗ -1.609 2.825∗∗∗
(0.027) (1.210) (1.220) (1.075)
Household characteristics
Living with any parent
0.013 1.295∗∗∗ 1.581∗∗∗ -0.075
(0.011) (0.474) (0.478) (0.425)
Children under age 18
-0.009 -1.042∗∗∗ -1.178∗∗∗ 0.328∗
(0.006) (0.213) (0.218) (0.193)
Children under age 6
-0.177∗∗∗ -4.844∗∗∗ -1.190∗∗∗ 0.685∗∗
(0.010) (0.307) (0.433) (0.303)
Dependent variable mean 0.69 18.56 28.02 46.55
Observations 24,045 23,488 15,557 23,039
Note: Sample includes all wives in columns (1) and (2), working wives in column (3), and
all husbands in column (4). Included in the regressions but not reported in the table are
experience and experience squared of both spouses, couple’s non-labor income, total number
of family members, region fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Gender Roles and Labor Supply of
Immigrant Women: Does Culture Matter
More in Endogamous Marriage?
2.1 Introduction
The pattern of female labor supply varies significantly across countries.1 This is an
outcome of country-specific factors such as history, institutions, and macroeconomic
conditions, which are intertwined with each other. While the mutual-dependence
poses a challenge, the continuity of culture enables researchers to identify the effects
of culture on economic decisions and outcomes. The persistence (vertical continu-
ity) of culture, or the intergenerational transmission of culture, enables researchers
to examine the effect of culture by utilizing individuals’ parental or ancestral charac-
teristics as cultural proxies. (Fernández et al., 2004; Farré and Vella, 2007; Hansen
et al., 2015) In addition, the portability (horizontal continuity) of culture justifies
the analysis of immigrants who possess heterogenous cultural backgrounds yet face
homogeneous economic conditions and institutions. (Alesina et al., 2013; Antecol,
2000; Fortin, 2005; Fernández, 2007)
In this paper, I present a novel angle to expand the scope of the latter strategy and
tackle one of the questions it presents: Does culture matter more in social settings?2 I
1 Among OECD countries, the female labor force participation rate among working population
varies from 0.38 (Turkey) to 0.85 (Iceland) in 2018.
2 Fernández (2007) discusses potential drawbacks of the strategy, one of which stems from the
fact that culture is socially constructed and therefore is socially relevant. In other words, to study
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examine the effects of shared culture on female labor supply within a social institution,
marriage. Specifically, I study whether the effects of traditional gender roles are
stronger in endogamous marriage – a marriage where both spouses belong to the same
ethnic group and share the same culture. The endogenous formation of marriage is
addressed by incorporating geographically constrained marriage market conditions.
Studying first-generation immigrant women in the United States (US) between
2010 and 2014, I find that those with more traditional gender role attitudes are less
likely to participate in the labor market when married to husbands who share the same
culture, compared to less traditional women. At the intensive margin, the negative
effects of traditional gender roles on full-time employment is stronger in endogamous
marriage. The results are robust to the exclusion of those who arrived after the age
of 13 or those who originated from Mexico at the extensive margin.
I interpret the stronger effects of traditional gender norms in endogamous marriage
as a greater relevance of culture in marriage where both spouses adhere to common
cultural values – as opposed to differential effects of endogamy on individuals with
varying gender role attitudes. To support my claim, I present evidence that differ-
ential patterns of immigrant assimilation by marriage type fail to fully explain the
greater effects of traditional gender roles in endogamous marriage.
The following conceptual distinction between gender role attitudes and gender
roles further strengthens my interpretation. Gender role attitudes refer to views held
by individuals regarding the roles men and women should play in society (Michalos,
2014). On the other hand, gender roles are defined as shared expectations about
appropriate qualities and behaviors that apply to individuals on the basis of their
socially identified gender (Eagly, 2013).3 Therefore, in this paper, I analyze the
the effects of culture on immigrants’ behaviors, they may have to be in a larger social body such as
a neighborhood or ethnic network.
3 Gender role attitudes, therefore, can be interpreted as gender roles that individuals form
(internalize) through the process of socialization where such gender roles are partly shaped by
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effects of gender roles shared by two people within marriage on the behaviors of a
member of the couple, the wife, rather than the effects of her own gender role attitudes
on the behaviors of the wife as an individual.
This paper builds on the literature concerning the effects of spousal gender role
attitudes on female labor supply. Husband’s traditional gender role attitudes are
known to be negatively related with wife’s labor force participation4 (Fernández and
Fogli, 2009; Blau et al., 2011), which might be greater than the effects of the wives’
own attitudes (Blood and Wolfe, 1960; Fox and Murry, 2000). Although these findings
do not specifically focus on the consequences of endogamous marriage, they provide
strong empirical evidence that there is a negative relationship between husband’s
traditional gender role attitudes on wife’s labor supply.
I study the pattern of labor supply of first-generation immigrant women in the
US found in the 2010-2014 American Community Survey (ACS) from Integrated
Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) (Ruggles et al., 2015). I construct a proxy
for individuals’ gender role attitudes based on the responses to International Social
Survey Programme (ISSP) (ISSP Research Group, 1997, 2013, 2014) conducted in
41 source countries (the US, for American husbands).5 The proxy measures how
likely it is for one’s contemporaries in the source country to think it is undesirable
the collective attitudes of individuals in the society. According to the theory of planned behavior
proposed by Ajzen (1985), attitudes and subjective norms are two of the three major factors that
build an individual’s intentions and behaviors.
4 Del Boca et al. (2000), Fernández et al. (2004), and Farré and Vella (2007) particularly em-
phasize how intergenerational transmission of preferences can play a role; there is a strong positive
association between the employment status of mothers-in-law and the likelihood of married women’s
labor force participation.
5 (1) Alternatively, researchers use ethnicity-specific historical gender division of labor (Alesina
et al., 2013), source country female labor force participation rate (Antecol, 2000), or survey responses
conducted in source countries (Fortin, 2005) to measure culture. (2) Using survey responses on
gender roles to proxy individuals’ gender role attitudes offers a couple of advantages over using
economic measures such as the female labor force participation rate. First, it provides a clearer
interpretation than economic measures, which are outcomes of not only cultural beliefs but also
institutions and economic conditions. Second, since the survey data comes with respondent-level
demographic information, it helps understand variations of gender role attitudes by individual-level
characteristics.
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for married women to participate in the labor market. By allowing the proxy to vary
by the year of birth within the same source country, I capture the trend within each
source country where younger cohorts tend to be more egalitarian than older cohorts.
Additional information specific to each source country is incorporated in order to
account for the initial cultural, socioeconomic, and linguistic distance.
To study how the effects of culture are amplified when the beliefs and values are
shared between the spouses, I estimate the joint effect of traditional gender roles
and endogamous marriage. An immigrant woman is considered as endogamously
married if her husband is also an immigrant from the same source country or if her
US-born husband has the same ethnicity as hers. An immediate concern arises from
the endogeneity in marriage types. I borrow the methodology used in the literature
of intermarriage and immigrant assimilation (Furtado and Theodoropoulos, 2010;
Kantarevic, 2004; Meng and Gregory, 2005) to address the challenge in identification.
Three conditions of geographically constrained marriage market are incorporated as
determinants of marriage type: (1) the availability of men in the same age and ethnic
group relative to that of all men in the same age group, (2) the availability of men
relative to women in the same age and ethnic group, and (3) the relative density of
ethnic population in the marriage market.
I test the robustness of the empirical results with two subsamples. I first restrict
the sample to those who migrated before the age of 13. Studying immigrants who
arrive before reaching their adolescence attenuates the concerns of immigrant selection
and assimilation. They are not likely to have migrated based on their own decision
and are expected to assimilate into the American society and labor market more easily
than those who migrated at older ages. Second, since those originated from Mexico
make up the lion’s share of the immigrant women in the sample, it is a concern that
their collective characteristics could bias the results and also threaten the validity
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of the instruments. I exclude all women from Mexico and run the same analysis to
confirm whether the results survive with such a major exclusion.
The empirical results reveal, compared to their non-traditional counterpart, immi-
grant women with traditional gender role attitudes become less likely to participate
in the labor market by marrying endogamously. At the intensive margin, compared
to those with less traditional gender role attitudes, traditional women’s probability
of working full-time significantly decreases when they are in endogamous marriage.
The findings are qualitatively robust to the exclusion of those who arrive after the
age of 13 or those who originate from Mexico at the extensive margin.
I interpret the stronger effects of traditional gender norms in endogamous mar-
riage as a greater relevance of culture in endogamous marriage. To strengthen my
argument, I present evidence that the greater effects cannot be fully explained by
differential patterns of immigrant assimilation by marriage. I conduct three tests
to check whether the asymmetry between more and less traditional women can be
attributed to (1) differential access to legal status by marriage type, (2) differential
speed in their improvement in English proficiency by marriage type, or (3) differ-
ential benefit from the labor market or social network provided by their husbands.
The results indicate that it is unlikely that the joint negative effect of traditional
gender roles and endogamous marriage is entirely driven by asymmetric patterns of
assimilation across more traditional and less traditional women by marriage type.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces datasets
utilized and explains how they are combined. Section 2.3 discusses the empirical
methodology. Section 2.4 lays out the main results, and Section 2.5 interprets the




I employ multiple sources of data to put together a sample of married immigrant
women with their proxied gender role attitudes. In order to account for the ini-
tial cultural and linguistic distance from the US, I introduce additional information
specific to source countries.
2.2.1 American Community Survey
The main data I use is the 2010-2014 American Community Survey (ACS) extracted
from Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) (Ruggles et al., 2015). The
sample consists of married women with foreign birthplaces (excluding those who were
born abroad of American parents) who are between 26 and 45 years old at the time
of survey and co-residing with their spouses. Individuals who reside in farms or
group quarters, have agricultural occupations, are currently enrolled in school, or
whose metropolitan status is unavailable are excluded. Those whose home country
or whose husband’s home country is not surveyed in any round of the International
Social Survey Programme (ISSP) are removed from the sample. Individuals are also
excluded if there are fewer than 30 people from the same source country. The resulting
sample consists of 114,553 first-generation immigrant women from 41 countries6 whose
husbands are either born in the US or from any of the 43 countries7 surveyed by the
ISSP. For the analysis in Section 2.5.1, a separate sample of women who meet all
criteria above but are in domestic partnership instead of legal marriage is considered.
6 Canada, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden,
England, Ireland, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Austria, Bul-
garia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia,
China, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Philippines, India, Israel/Palestine, Turkey, South Africa, Australia,
and New Zealand.
7 All countries listed above, Iceland and Cyprus.
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2.2.2 International Social Survey Programme
The ISSP carried out a series of surveys under the theme ‘Family and Changing
Gender Roles’ in 1988, 1994, 2002, and 2012. I use the recent three waves (ISSP
Research Group, 1997, 2013, 2014) to construct a proxy for gender role attitudes for
the immigrant women and their husbands in the sample. The surveys were conducted
in 22, 33, and 36 countries in corresponding years, and 1,445 respondents participated
per country and year on average. To construct a measure of gender role attitudes by
country and birth year, I combine all three modules and focus on the three questions
that measure one’s attitudes towards married women’s labor force participation:
Do you agree or disagree?
1. A working mother cannot establish just as warm and secure a relationship
with her children as a mother who does not work.
2. A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.
3. All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job.
Survey participants were asked whether they strongly agree, agree, neither agree
nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the above statements.8 For each
question, I collapse the answer to ‘agree’ if the respondent strongly agrees or agrees
and to ‘disagree’ otherwise, generating a binary variable that takes a value of 1 in
case of agreement and 0 otherwise. Then, for each respondent, I generate the measure
of gender role attitudes by averaging the three answers with equal weights.9
There is a general tendency across survey rounds that the more recent the survey
year is, the smaller the average value of traditional gender role attitudes, meaning
8 The only exception is Spain in 2012 where an option corresponding to ‘neither agree nor
disagree’ was missing.
9 Table B.1 contains the averages of this measure and the numbers of respondents for all countries
by survey round.
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that respondents in recent years are less traditional than their preceding cohorts.
I examine whether this is more of a cohort effect or of a time effect and find that
the variations are significantly explained by birth year, not by survey year, within
country.10 In other words, comparing across birth cohorts within a country, the more
recently they were born, the less likely that they are to hold a negative view towards
married women’s working.11 Over the lifetime of a given birth cohort, however, it is
not likely that their attitudes would change systemically. This is consistent with the
literature that individuals’ gender role attitudes are formed at young ages.
In order to verify whether the measure of gender role attitudes predicts the actual
labor supply decision of individuals, I present the relationship between the measure
and the probability of married women’s working. Using the 2012 ISSP, I relate the
respondents’ gender role attitudes to their working status for female respondents and
to spousal working status for male respondents. I average the individuals’ attitudes
and their working status by country and plot the relationship in Figure 2·1. The
horizontal and vertical lines correspond to the probability of being in paid work for the
US women and their average gender role attitudes (of their own or their husbands’),
respectively. The figure suggests that those who have a more negative view towards
married women’s working are less likely to be in paid work.
2.2.3 Home-country Information
In addition to the individual-level demographic characteristics, I collect two types
of information in an attempt to account for the initial cultural, socioeconomic, and
linguistic distance of an individual based on her home country. First, the analysis
10 For a pool of all ISSP respondents across all survey years, I regress the measure of gender
role attitudes on country fixed effects, birth year, birth year squared, survey year, and survey year
squared and cluster the errors at the country level. Coefficients on birth year and birth year squared
are statistically significant (both with p-values of 0.001), while the ones on survey round and survey
round squared are not.
11 Figure B.1 presents the evolution of gender role attitudes by birth year for each home country
zone, explained in Section 2.2.3.
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deals with general cultural distance from the US by incorporating home country zone
fixed effects. Home countries are divided into five regional groups using the United
Nations’ definition: African Group, Asia-Pacific Group, Eastern European Group,
Latin American and Caribbean Group, and Western European and Others Group.12
The other is language distance, which is a proxy for how far one’s mother tongue
is from English. Although the ACS provides self-reported English proficiency, current
English fluency not only affects but also is affected by the outcome variables: labor
force participation and full-time employment status. Therefore, I build a proxy for
the initial linguistic distance to approximate the current linguistic ability. The proxy
takes a value between 0 and 3 where 0 means no language barrier, 1 means least distant
from English, and 3 means most distant from English. An individual is assigned with
0 when her home country uses English as official language. For individuals whose
home country does not list English as an official language, I utilize the language
score suggested by Chiswick and Miller (2004), which takes 1 if the language is most
distant from English and 3 if it is least distant.13 For home countries where the official
language’s language score is not listed in Chiswick and Miller (2004), I impute the
language score based on the linguistic origin and linguistic similarities to languages
whose language scores are known. For home countries with multiple official languages,
I use the simple average of language scores of all official languages.14 See Table B.2
for the full list of home countries and their corresponding language distances.
12 African Group: South Africa; Asia-Pacific Group: China, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, the Philip-
pines, India, Israel/Palestine; Eastern European Group: Bulgaria, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Poland, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia; Latin American and Caribbean Group: Mexico,
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela; Western European and Others Group: Canada, Denmark, Fin-
land, Norway, Sweden, England, Ireland, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy, Portugal,
Spain, Austria, Germany, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand.
13 This measure is based on how fluent Americans become in foreign languages after a period of
training.
14 According to the language distance measure, among the ones whose home countries do not
adopt English as an official language, individuals from Japan or Korea are likely to have most
difficulty in obtaining fluency in English and those from Belgium and Netherlands are likely to have
least difficulty in becoming fluent in English.
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2.2.4 Merging Data
Variables explained in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 are attached to the sample of immigrant
women described in Section 2.2.1. In assigning the proxy for gender role attitudes to
individuals in the US, the key assumption is that one would have similar gender role
attitudes with his/her contemporaries in the home country. Specifically, a person
born in year t in home country c is assumed to have similar gender role attitudes
with his/her non-immigrant counterparts who were born in year t± 5 and are found
in ISSP conducted in country c. For example, a German female immigrant born in
1979 is assigned with the average gender role attitudes of ISSP survey participants in
Germany who were born between 1974 and 1984.15 Husbands who were born in the
US are assigned with the average gender role attitudes of corresponding age cohorts
of US men. Home country zone label and language distance are then linked to each
individual based on their source country.
Column (1) of Table 2.1 summarizes some key characteristics of all individuals in
the data. A typical individual in the sample is 36.9 years old, received 12.94 years of
education and has 1.91 children. It is 69% likely that she is fluent in English16 and
58% likely that she participates in the labor market. Moving to the proxied gender
role attitudes, it is 29% likely that she agrees with the statement “A working mother
cannot establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother
who does not work,” 63% likely that she agrees with the statement “A preschool child
is likely to suffer if his or her mother works,” and 57% likely that she agrees with
the statement “All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job.”
15 In case her home country was surveyed only in the earlier round(s) of ISSP, and the gender
role attitudes cannot be calculated for recent birth cohorts, I assigned the attitudes of the youngest
available cohort to all younger cohorts. For example, Italy is only included in the early two waves
of ISSP, and the youngest cohort who can be assigned with gender role attitudes with the above
assumption is cohort born in 1976. For individuals who were born in and after 1977, I assign them
with the same gender role attitudes as the 1976 cohort.
16 One is regarded to be fluent in English if she reported (1) that she speaks only English, (2)
that speaks English very well, or (3) that she speaks English well.
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Her degree of traditional gender role attitudes (gendernorm), which is the average
of workingmom, preschooler, and familylife, is 0.5. Restricting the attention to
women who work, 63% of them are employed full-time, working 40 hours or more
per week. A working individual, on average, works 36.4 hours per week, earning
24.4 dollars per hour.17 Column (4) is generated with the American counterpart,
American-born married women who otherwise satisfy the same criteria as the main
sample. A simple comparison across the means show that immigrant women in the
sample on average are less educated, less likely to participate in the labor market,
likely to have more children, and likely to hold more traditional gender role attitudes.
However, given that they work, there is no substantial difference between immigrant
and native women in the probability of full-time employment, hours worked per week,
and hourly wages. The difference in hourly wages is not statistically significant.
I then divide the individuals in the sample based on their proxied gender role
attitudes. Those with the attitudes in the upper half of the distribution are grouped
together and labeled traditional, and their summary statistics are provided in column
(2). Column (3) is generated with the remaining sample who are less likely to hold
traditional gender role attitudes. On average, traditional women are less educated,
less likely to participate in the labor market, less likely to speak English fluently, and
are likely to have more children. Restricting the sample to working women and again
dividing them into two groups,18 traditional women are less likely to be employed
full-time and are likely to work fewer hours per week at lower average hourly wages.
Figure 2·2 plots the relationship between the average labor force participation rate
and gender role attitudes by home country where the horizontal and vertical lines
17 Average hourly wage is calculated by dividing yearly wage and salary income by total hours
worked (weeks worked multiplied by hours worked). Weeks worked are reported in intervals, and
the midpoint of each interval is used for calculation.
18 In other words, working traditional women are traditional women (who are in the upper half
of the distribution of the proxied gender role attitudes) among working women, not working women
among those who are labeled as traditional in the full sample.
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represent the proxied gender roles and the probability of labor force participation
for American women, respectively. gendernorm, which is a proxy for the likelihood
of holding a negative view towards married women’s labor force participation, is
negatively associated the probability of labor force participation.
2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Couple’s Gender Role Attitudes and Wife’s Labor Supply
I first examine the extent to which women’s labor supply pattern are governed by
their own traditional gender role attitudes. Since the measure of gender role attitudes
is generated based on survey responses of their contemporaries in home countries, the
concern regarding reverse causality is less severe. The outcome variables of interest are
two binary variables, labor force participation status and, among working individuals,
full-time employment status, which represent labor supply at the extensive and the
intensive margins, respectively. For a married immigrant woman i born in in home
country c in year t and residing in state s in year y, I run
Outcomeictsy = α + βgendernormct + γXictsy + δs + δc + δy + εictsy. (2.1)
Xictsy includes age, age-squared, dummy variables for the presence of children at
age 0-4 and 5-17, total income of husband in logarithm, race (black and Asian with
white being the base category), and educational attainment (high school, some col-
lege, college, and graduate school with high school dropout and below being the base
category). Note that educational attainment, which is included to control for indi-
viduals’ ability, could also be an outcome of gender role attitudes. Since traditional
women (or their parents have) do not wish to be active in the labor market, they
might not invest in human capital, leading to a lower level of educational attainment.
I therefore separate educational attainment from other basic demographic character-
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istics and present results with and without the information on education. In addition,
I add language distance, age at immigration, and whether or not she received any
education in the US.19 These variables are introduced to capture the advantages and
disadvantages in assimilation into the US culture and labor market. Finally, state,
metropolitan status, and census year fixed effects are included to account for the local
labor market condition. Standard errors are clustered at home country times 10-year
birth cohort level.
Next, I study the effects of husband’s gender role attitudes on wife’s pattern of
labor supply pattern. To simplify the interpretation, I label those with the value of
gendernorm in the upper half of the distribution as more traditional (Traditionalct =
1) and the rest of the sample as non-traditional (Traditionalct = 0). I run the
following regressions where Xictsy includes all control variables listed above. Standard
errors are clustered at home country level. For a married immigrant woman i born
in home country c in year t and residing in state s in year y, and whose husband was
born in country d in year j,
Outcomeictsy = α + βTraditionalct + γXictsy + δs + δc + δy + εictsy, (2.2)
Outcomeictsy = α + βTraditionaldj + γXictsy + δs + δc + δy + εictsy. (2.3)
It is, however, not straightforward to identify the causal relationship between
husband’s gender role attitudes and wife’s labor force participation pattern as the
choice of whom to marry is endogenously made. The direction of bias is ambiguous.
A woman who is attached to her cultural background might prefer to marry someone
with the same or a similar cultural background. It is also possible that a female
without a particular interest in participating in the labor market or in building her
own career marries a man who has strong preferences towards stay-at-home wives.
19 The last variable is computed based on age at immigration and years of schooling.
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This would generate a negative bias in the effect of husband’s gender attitudes on
wife’s labor force participation.
On the other hand, it is also plausible that there is a positive bias. Since the
cultural background of a woman forms an expectation about her post-marriage role
in the household and in the labor market, a non-traditional man with preferences to
stay-home wife might be attracted to a woman with traditional cultural background
and expect his traditional wife to accept a submissive role in marriage (Menj́ıvar and
Salcido, 2002). In addition, if individuals with traditional gender role attitudes share
socioeconomic characteristics that encourage both spouses to participate in the labor
market, it is likely that the effect of husband’s gender attitudes on wife’s labor force
participation is overestimated.
2.3.2 Effect of Traditional Gender Roles in Endogamous Marriage
In examining the causal effect of gender roles within marriage, I hypothesize that the
effect of traditional gender roles on wife’s labor supply is more negative in endogamous
marriage. I define endogamy as a marriage between two individuals with the same
ethnic background. Although the ACS no longer provides information on parental
birthplaces, respondents are still required to report their ancestry (up to two). For
an immigrant woman, her husband is considered to have the same ethnic background
(Endogamy = 1) if (1) he himself is from the same home country or (2) he was born
in the US but his ancestry response (any of the two) matches hers (any of the two).
This approach, however, introduces a threat to the identification. An immigrant
married to a native spouse (and therefore is less likely to have married endogamously)
can positively select into the labor market (Meng and Gregory, 2005; Kantarevic,
2004). It is also possible that being in the labor market or spending more time
at the workplace increases the chance of intermarriage (Basu, 2015). In other words,
immigrant women who are more willing to assimilate, or who have already successfully
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assimilated, into the native culture or labor market might choose to marry native
men rather than men from the same home country. On the other hand, an immigrant
who is able to culturally and economically assimilate on her own might prefer to
marry endogamously since the benefits she gets from marrying someone with the
same ethnic background (e.g. complementarity in the production of ethnicity-related
household public goods (Adserà and Ferrer, 2014)) might be larger than the benefits
of intermarriage.
To deal with the endogeniety in marriage type, I introduce the characteristics
of geographically concentrated marriage market and the absolute and relative ethnic
densities.20 First, following the literature of intermarriage and immigrant assimilation
(Furtado and Theodoropoulos, 2010; Kantarevic, 2004; Meng and Gregory, 2005), I
include geographically restricted marriage market conditions.21 The instruments are
the ratio of men who have the same ethnic background to all men in a woman’s age-
area group (probability of marrying within) and the ratio of men to women in her
own ethnicity-age-area group (sex ratio).22
20 Kalmijn (1998) argues that the determinants of endogamous marriage can be categorized
as follows: (1) individuals’ preferences for certain characteristics in a spouse, (2) the influence or
interference of society, and (3) the constraints of the marriage market where individuals search for
a spouse. My instruments represent the last two categories.
21 The relative availability of men and women in the marriage market influences individuals’
marriage decision. If the number of men is relatively larger than that of the women, male marriage
rates will be lower while female marriages rates will increase This phenomenon is called ‘marriage
squeeze’ against males. (Becker, 1973; Schoen, 1983) Marriage markets tend to be local since the
largest and most common search costs arise from the spatial distribution of potential partners
(Adserà and Ferrer, 2014).
22 Note that since the data is not longitudinal, the exact location where the women married
their husbands is unknown. Rather than using the national ratio, I assume that each individual
has stayed within the state upon marriage, and have state as the scope of marriage market. The
empirical results are qualitatively unchanged when I replace state with the census region.
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For a woman in state s with ethnicity e and birth year t,








I also include the size of social influences. The instruments are the relative size of
the local ethnic group to the local population (Statewide ethnic density) and also that
to the national level of ethnic concentration (Nationwide ethnic density). Including
both the national and statewide density allows me to capture the absolute level of
ethnic density as well as the degree of concentration relative to the national ethnic
density. The influence of an ethnic group is expected to be stronger when the group’s
size is larger and especially when individuals are in an ethnic enclave.23
I restrict the attention to individuals who married upon arriving in the US as
the instruments are not relevant to those who arrived as married.24 To simplify the
interpretation, I divide the individuals into two groups based on their proxied gen-
der role attitudes. Those with the value of gendernorm in the upper half of the
distribution are considered more traditional (Traditional = 1), and the rest of the
sample is labeled non-traditional (Traditional = 0). The probability of endogamy is
predicted using age at immigration, age at marriage, language distance, educational
attainments, indicator of any education in the US, race, home country zone, and the
four variables discussed above: probability of marrying within, sex ratio, nationwide
ethnic density, and statewide ethnic density.25 When estimating the joint effect of en-
dogamy and traditional gender role attitudes, the predicted probability of endogamy
is multiplied by the indicator of traditional attitudes to form an instrument for the
23 Edin et al. (2003) defines a neighborhood as an ethnic enclave if the share of the ethnic group
in the resident population is at least twice as large as the share of the ethnic group in the US
population.
24 The average age at arrival decreases significantly by placing the restriction from 21.87 to 18.79.
25 See Table B.3 for the results.
66
product of Endogamy and Traditional (Wooldridge, 2002). For a married immigrant
woman i born in home country c in year t and residing in state s in year y,
Outcomeictsy = α + β1Traditionalct + β2Endogamyictsy
+ β3Traditionalct × Endogamyictsy
+ γXictsy + δs + δc + δy + εicts. (2.4)
Xictsy includes all control variables listed in Section 2.3. Standard errors are clustered
at home country times 10-year birth cohort level.
Since the choices of residential location, marriage, marriage type, and labor supply
are likely to be correlated, it is natural to question the validity of the above instru-
ments. For the instruments to satisfy the exclusion restriction, the local marriage
market conditions and relative degree of ethnic concentration must affect individuals’
labor supply decisions only through the type of marriage. Although there is no formal
test validating the exclusion restriction, I run a falsification test with individuals who
arrived as married. The local marriage market conditions and ethnic density and
concentration theoretically must not predict the marriage type of those who married
before moving to the US and remain the same marriage relationship at the time of
survey. Therefore, if the exclusion restriction is satisfied, the instruments should not
explain these individuals’ labor force participation and, if they work, their full-time
employment status. The results, reported in Table B.4, show that the instruments
are not collectively correlated with the outcomes.
2.4 Effects of Traditional Gender Roles within Marriage
2.4.1 Effects of Traditional Gender Role Attitudes
Table 2.3 reports how the proxied gender role attitudes predict married females’ labor
supply decision at the extensive and the intensive margins. Columns (4) and (6) show
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that the impact of gender role attitudes immediately dies out or even gets reversed
once the set of educational attainments is added in the regressors. This corroborates
the concern that educational attainment are correlated with gender role attitudes as
they play a role in the decision to invest in human capital. A ten percentage point
increase in gender role attitudes, which can be translated as ten percentage point in-
crease in the likelihood of having a negative view on married women’s working, would
predict a 2.65 percentage point decrease in the probability of labor force participation
before controlling for the educational attainment (column (4)). When the full set of
control variables is included, gender role attitudes lose the predictive power although
the sign of the coefficient still stays negative. At the intensive margin, column (12)
shows that ten percentage point increase in gender role attitudes is associated with
a 1.29 percentage point increase in the probability of working full-time controlling
for all other characteristics. This possibly indicates that more able, more ambitious,
or more progressive traditional women are receiving higher education to pursue their
careers.
I proceed to examine the relationship between wives’ labor supply patterns and
husbands’ gender role attitudes. To simplify the interpretation, as discussed in Section
2.3.1, I use binary variables indicating whether the spouses are considered more or
less traditional. The results are shown in Table 2.4. Column (1) shows that more
traditional wives are less likely to participate in the labor market by 5 percentage
points.26 Those whose husbands are relatively more traditional are also 6.8 percentage
point less likely to participate in the labor market. The larger coefficient is consistent
with the literature that husband’s attitudes tend to govern wife’s behavior more than
her own attitudes do (Fernández and Fogli, 2009; Fox and Murry, 2000). Columns (3)
and (4) do not find significant effects of the indicators on working women’s full-time
26 Note that the continuous measure of traditional gender role attitudes, gendernorm, has in-




2.4.2 Effects of Traditional Gender Roles within Marriage
The empirical results are reported in Table 2.5. Due to the nature of instruments that
represent the marriage market and ethnic density conditions in the US, the sample
of analysis is restricted to individuals who married upon their arrival.
Panel A presents the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates. Columns (2)
and (3) suggest that there is a negative relationship between endogamous marriage
and the probability of labor force participation, which is driven by those with more
traditional gender role attitudes. Among working individuals, endogamously married
women are more likely to work full-time. Interestingly, the pattern is solely driven by
non-traditional women whose probability of working full-time is positively associated
with endogamy.
Panel B reports the Instrumental Variables (IV) regression results where the endo-
geneity in marriage type is addressed using local marriage market conditions. Column
(2) shows that there is endogamous marriage has a negative effect on the probability
of labor force participation. This is consistent with the literature that the type of
marriage can affect not only the wage assimilation but also the decision of labor force
participation itself. (Basu, 2017) Column (3) reports an interesting pattern where,
among exogamously married women, those with traditional gender role attitudes are
more likely to participate in the labor market. Column (6) shows that this is not
preserved at the intensive margin. At both the extensive and intensive margins, the
negative effects of traditional gender norms on married women’s labor supply are
amplified in endogamous marriage.
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2.4.3 Robustness Checks
I check the robustness of the empirical results by examining particular subgroups of
the sample: those who immigrated before reaching their adolescence and those who
originated from countries other than Mexico.
Immigrant Generations: Generations 1.0 and 1.5
Researchers studying immigrants typically restrict their attention to particular groups
of immigrants based on their ages at immigration or where they were born. The ap-
proach of focusing only on first-generation immigrants, those who were born in foreign
countries and then moved to the destination country, allows the sample immigrants
to be exposed to their home country culture before migration. However, there are
concerns about studying immigrants who migrate as adults due to the issues of im-
migrant selection (Borjas, 1987) and assimilation in terms of both acculturation and
economic adaptation (Friedberg, 1992; Bleakley and Chin, 2010). For this reason,
even among the studies of first-generation immigrants, the focus varies. Some stud-
ies exclusively look at immigrants who migrated as adults (Blau et al., 2011; Frank
and Hou, 2015), while others restrict their sample to younger entrants (Basu, 2015;
Furtado and Theodoropoulos, 2010). An alternative is to focus on second-generation
immigrants, individuals born in the destination country under first-generation immi-
grant parents, for whom the decision of migration was made by their parents and
therefore whose immigrant selection issue is much more atte‘nuated. Since they are
born and raised in the destination country, the speed and pattern of assimilation and
integration should also be similar among themselves.
In this paper, the sample is comprised of first-generation immigrants with foreign
birthplaces. Acknowledging the potential concerns about using the first-generation
immigrants, I check the robustness of the main results by repeating the same exercise
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with those who are believed to behave similarly to second-generation immigrants.
Following Rumbaut (2004),27 I divide the sample into two groups based on their
ages of arrival. Individuals who arrived at the age of 13 or order are grouped and
labeled as the 1.0 generation, and those who arrived at the age below 13 are named
as the 1.5 generation. Generation 1.5, which comprises of those who arrive before
they reach their adolescence, is expected to have moved to the US following their
family, not necessarily by their own will, and the barrier for them to assimilate into
the US society and labor market is also likely to be lower compared to those arrived
as adults. To alleviate the issues from immigrant selection and differential speed
of cultural assimilation, therefore, I present the empirical evidence where I focus
exclusively on the 1.5 generation.
The first three columns of Table 2.2 display the summary statistics for the 1.5
generation. It is expected that the 1.5 generation, those who arrive before their ado-
lescent years, would exhibit more similar characteristics to those of the American
counterpart and have more comparable labor supply patterns and outcomes. Con-
firming the hypothesis, compared to the 1.0 generation, the 1.5 generation is more
educated, more likely to participate in the labor market, and is more likely to be
fluent in English. Among working individuals, interestingly, generation 1.5 is more
likely to be employed full-time and to work longer hours at higher wages than the
American counterpart. All differences are statistically significant. Columns (2) and
(3) present the summary statistics by subgroups of generation 1.5 by their gender
role attitudes. Although the magnitudes of differences are smaller (with the excep-
27 Rumbaut (2004) refines the broad group of first-generation immigrants into four groups, gen-
erations 1.0, 1.25, 1.5, and 1.75, depending on their ages of arrival. Those who arrive in early
childhood (ages 0 to 5) are labeled as the 1.75 generation because they are similar to the second
generation immigrants. Those who arrive in middle childhood (ages 6 to 12) are the 1.5 generation
immigrants who learn how to read and write in their mother tongue at schools abroad but whose
subsequent education is largely completed in the destination country. Those who arrive in their
adolescent period (ages 13 to 17) are labeled as generation 1.25, and those who arrive as adults are
defined as the 1.0 generation.
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tion of hourly wage) by focusing on the 1.5 generation, the signs of differences between
traditional individuals and non-traditional ones are preserved.
Generation 1.5 Only
The results are presented in the first six columns of Table 2.6. The sample now
includes those arrived before reaching their adolescence and got married thereafter.
Starting with Panel A, the results in column (3) show that there is a mildly significant
increase in the probability of labor force participation associated with endogamous
marriage for traditional women compared to their less traditional counterpart.
Moving onto Panel B, the IV regression results are consistent with the main results
reported in Table 2.5 at the extensive margin. At the intensive margin, the estimated
coefficient to the interaction term in column (6) loses its statistical significance (p-
value = 0.11). Overall, the results indiicate that it is unlikely that the estimates
reported in Table 2.5 are entirely driven by immigrants who arrived at older ages and
therefore have differential patterns of selection and assimilation.
Imbalance in Sample Composition: Immigrants from and not from Mexico
It is well-documented that the share of immigrants from Mexico is by far the largest
among all immigrant groups in the US. According to the 2010 ACS, foreign-born pop-
ulation accounts for 12.9% of total population, and immigrants from Mexico account
for 29% of the foreign born population. In the sample used in this project, among
married immigrants between the ages of 26 and 45 satisfying all criteria specified
in Section 2.2.2, those from Mexico account for 46.5%. Among working individuals,
the share of Mexican-born women decreases to 38.4%. In addition, immigrants from
Mexico have a distinct cultural background and behave differently from other immi-
grants in the sample. Mexican immigrants in the sample are on average less educated,
less fluent in English, and are less likely to participate in the labor market. Among
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working individuals, an average Mexican immigrant is likely to work fewer hours at
lower wages.
Coupled with the collectively distinct characteristics of immigrants from Mexico,
their large share in the sample is concerning for the following reasons. First, Mexican
women are classified as traditional according to their proxied gender role attitudes
and they exhibit lower probability of labor force participation, which will bias the
estimate of the effects of gender role attitudes on labor supply. Second, compared
to other immigrants, their incentives to assimilate into the mainstream US culture
and labor market might be weaker considering their large size. Lastly, this puts the
validity of instruments into a question. The probability of marrying within, sex ratio,
the nationwide ethnic density, and the indicator of ethnic enclave are all expected
to be fundamentally different for Mexican immigrants. Immigrants from Mexico also
make the ethnic group that is second most likely to marry endogamously.28 Therefore,
I run the analysis excluding the immigrants from Mexico and check whether the
implications of the empirical results are robust to such major exclusion.
Summary statistics for non-Mexican immigrants are reported in columns (4)-(6)
of Table 2.2. The average years of education, probability of labor force participation,
and average English proficiency increase while the average number of own children
decreases. Among working individuals, the probability of full-time employment, hours
worked per week, and hourly wage all increase to the extent that they surpass the
corresponding statistics for American counterparts reported in column (4) of Table
2.1. Interestingly, when the non-Mexican immigrants are sorted into two groups based
on their gender role attitudes: traditional and non-traditional, the usual patterns are
not preserved and, in fact, are reversed. Among non-Mexican immigrants, those who
are relatively more traditional tend to be more educated, more likely to participate
28 Given that the women married upon their arrival in the US, immigrants from India (90.1%),
Mexico (80.7%), and China (73.8%) are the top three groups that are most likely to marry endoga-
mously.
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in the labor market, more likely to be fluent in English, and are likely to have fewer
children. Restricting the sample to working women and again dividing them into two
groups, traditional women are more likely to be employed full-time and are likely to
work longer hours per week at higher average hourly wages.
Non-Mexican Immigrants Only
The results are reported in columns (7) to (12) of Table 2.6. Starting with Panel A,
column (7) shows that those who are labeled as traditional are 7.1 percentage point
less likely to participate in the labor market. Column (8) suggests that the effects
of traditional gender norms on the probability of labor force participation might be
more negative for traditional women when they are married endogamously.
The IV regression results reported in Panel B reveal that once the endogeneity in
marriage type is taken care of, the effect of endogamy is captured at the extensive
margin of the labor market. Endogamously married individuals become 8.9 per-
centage point less likely to participate in the labor market. Among non-traditional
women, the probability of labor force participation increases by 11 percentage point
by marrying a husband of same cultural background. On the other hand, the negative
effects of traditional gender norms are greater for traditional women in endogamous
marriage. All coefficients in columns (10) to (12) are estimated noisily although their
signs are preserved. This indicates a possibility that the results shown in column (6)
of Table 2.5 are driven by immigrants from Mexico.
2.5 Interpretation of the Results
The empirical results reveal that a traditional woman becomes less likely to supply
her market labor by marrying a man of the same cultural background compared to
her non-traditional counterpart. I argue that this represents the reinforced effects
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of common beliefs within marriage since endogamously married couples, sharing the
same cultural values, are more likely to adhere to the values.
It is reasonable to question that the empirical findings might merely reflect the
differential penalty of endogamy, or premium of exogamy, for immigrants. However,
in this paper, I define endogamous marriage as a marriage between people who are
highly likely to share the same cultural background, which is not the opposite concept
of intermarriage where immigrants marry natives.29 Among the women who married
upon their arrival in the US and hence comprise the sample of Section 2.4.2, 11.1% of
the husbands of endogamously married women were born in the US, and 15.5% of the
husbands of exogamously married women are born outside of the US. Therefore, the
comparison across endogamously married women and exogamously married women in
this study does not fit perfectly into the usual framework of studies of intermarriage
premium, which is the premium of marrying native husbands.
The possibility still remains that there is a differential pattern of assimilation
across traditional and non-traditional women by their marriage type. Traditional
and non-traditional women can exhibit different pattern and speed of assimilation
(Blau et al., 2011), but whether or not endogamy can further magnify the differences
is another issue. Endogamy might impose heavier toll on traditional women if the
assimilation is more facilitated through exogamy for traditional women than for their
non-traditional counterparts.30 To show that the joint negative effects of endogamy
and traditional gender roles are not entirely driven by the asymmetric penalty of
endogamy across traditional and non-traditional women, I present three tests on the
cost of endogamy by focusing on whether the cost is differential for traditional and
29 An immigrant woman is in an endogamy if her husband is considered to have the same ethnic
background. That is if (1) he himself immigrated from the same home country or (2) he was born in
the US but his ancestry response (any of the two) matches her ancestry response (any of the two).
30 Basu (2015) suggests the opposite case where the effects of intermarriage are negative for Asian
women. Despite being a high-skill group, their post-marital human capital investment is discouraged
by cultural traditions such as patriarchy.
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non-traditional women.
2.5.1 Access to Legal Status
Immigrants can enjoy employment gains through an improvement in their legal status
(Chi, 2017) and also facilitate their assimilation process. If the joint negative effect of
endogamy and traditional gender roles is due to the differential pattern of legal status
acquisition through marriage type across traditional and non-traditional women, the
same effect should not be observed among individuals in domestic partnership. From
the 2010-2014 ACS, I consider immigrant women who satisfy all criteria in Section
2.2.1 but are in domestic partnership rather than marriage.31 I then run Equation
2.4 for partnered individuals.
Table 2.7 reports the results. Column (3) in Panel B shows, among individuals
living with domestic partners of different ethnic groups, the ones with traditional
cultural background are more likely to participate in the labor market. Living with
partners with the same ethnic background decreases the probability of labor force
participation more for traditional women than for non-traditional women. The same
pattern is observed at the intensive margin. Column (6) confirms that the probability
of working full-time is reduced more for traditional women than their non-traditional
counterpart by having domestic partners of the same ethnic group. This undermines
the hypothesis that differential access to legal status drives the asymmetric impact
of endogamy across traditional and non-traditional women.
2.5.2 Language Skills
The necessity and difficulty of acquiring English proficiency can vary across marriage
types. It is possible that endogamously married women continue to use their mother
31 Women in a domestic partnership are on average younger (34.7 years old), less educated (11
years of education), more likely to be in the labor market (labor force participation rate of 0.63),
and have fewer children (0.89 children) than the married women in the main sample.
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tongue in the household and have disadvantages in improving their English skills
compared to exogamously married immigrant women. If such pattern is asymmetric
across individuals of different degrees of traditionalism, it could result in differential
effects of endogamy across traditional and non-traditional women. To test this hy-
pothesis, I utilized the current self-reported English proficiency to construct a variable
(Fluency) that takes 1 if one speaks English very well or speaks only English, 2/3 if
she speaks English well, 1/3 if she speaks English but not well, and 0 if she does not
speak English. I test whether endogamously married traditional women exhibit lower
English proficiency compared to their counterparts, controlling for the proxied initial
English skill (language distance). For a married immigrant woman i born in home
country c in year t and residing in state s in year y, I run the following regression.
Fluencyictsy = α + β1Traditionalct + β2Endogamyictsy + β3Lengthictsy
+ β4Traditionalct × Endogamyictsy
+ β5Endogamyictsy × Lengthictsy
+ β6Endogamyictsy × Lengthictsy
+ β7Traditionalct × Endogamyictsy × Lengthicts
+ γXictsy + δs + δc + δy + εictsy, (2.5)
where Lengthicts is the length of the current marriage in years. Xictsy includes initial
language distance, age at immigration, age, age squared, whether or not the individual
received any education in the US, race (black and Asian, with white being the base
category), educational attainment (high school, some college, college, and graduate
school with high school dropout and below being the base category), home country
zone fixed effects, and location (state and metropolitan status) and census year fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at home country × 10-year birth cohort level. If
the improvement of the English, conditional on the initial language distance and other
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control variables, is differential by marriage type and traditional gender role attitudes,
the magnitude of difference is likely to be larger for those who have been married for
longer compared to the ones who are just married. That is, if the coefficient associated
with Traditionalct × Endogamyictsy × Lengthictsy in Equation 2.5 is negative and
significant, it might be that the joint negative effect of endogamous marriage and
traditional roles is due to the differential pattern of English skill improvement.
The results are reported in Table 2.8. Note that the coefficients do not necessarily
represent perfectly causal relationship but provide suggestive evidence. Looking at all
women who married after arriving in the US (column (1)), although traditional gender
roles and endogamy are jointly negatively associated with English skill improvement
among just married individuals, it is not amplified with the length of marriage. This
pattern is robust when the sample is reduced to the 1.5 generation, those who immi-
grated before the age of 13 (column (2)). When only non-Mexican immigrants are
considered, however, the opposite is observed. In column (3), traditional gender roles
and endogamy are not jointly related to English skill improvement among recently
married individuals. However, an additional year in the endogamy for traditional
women is associated with 0.4 percentage point decrease in their English proficiency
improvement. The results are qualitatively unchanged when the sample is further
restricted to those who married once.
2.5.3 Network
Different marriage types can also provide immigrant women with networks of hetero-
geneous characteristics. I adopt two test on the importance of network in explaining
intermarriage premium from Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2010): (1) intermarriage
premium is larger when the employment gap is higher and (2) for less-educated immi-
grants. I focus on whether the labor market or social assimilation through the network
provided by husbands is significantly different across traditional and non-traditional
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immigrant women by their marriage type. For a married immigrant woman i born
in home country c in year t and residing in state s in year y, I run the following
regressions.
Outcomeictsy = α + β1Traditionalct + β2Endogamyictsy + β3Employment gapsy
+ β4Traditionalct × Endogamyictsy
+ β5Endogamyictsy × Employment gapsy
+ β6Endogamyictsy × Employment gapsy
+ β7Traditionalct × Endogamyictsy × Employment gapsy
+ γXictsy + δs + δc + δy + εictsy, (2.6)
where Employment gapts is local employment gap, defined as the gap between na-
tive population’s employment rate and immigrant population’s employment rate in
corresponding census year, at the state level, and
Outcomeictsy = α + β1Traditionalct + β2Endogamyictsy + β3Y ears of educationictsy
+ β4Traditionalct × Endogamyictsy
+ β5Endogamyictsy × Y ears of educationictsy
+ β6Endogamyictsy × Y ears of educationictsy
+ β7Traditionalct × Endogamyictsy × Y ears of educationictsy
+ γXictsy + δs + δc + δy + εictsy. (2.7)
Xicts includes all control variables discussed in Section 2.3. If the coefficient as-
sociated with Traditionalct × Endogamyictsy × Employment gapsy in Equation 2.6
and the one associated with Traditionalct×Endogamyictsy×Y ears of educationictsy
in Equation 2.7 are estimated significantly, it would suggest that traditional and
non-traditional women benefit from networks differently by marriage type. In partic-
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ular, for the heterogeneous advantages of network to explain the joint negative effect
of endogamy and traditional gender roles, the signs must be negative and positive,
respectively.
Table 2.9 contains the results. For space considerations, only the coefficients of
main interest are reported. It is shown that hypothesis (1), the local employment gap
and intermarriage premium scenario, is not likely to be able to explain the asymme-
try in the effect of endogamy across traditional and non-traditional women. None of
the estimated coefficients, for different samples and different outcome variables, are
statistically significant except for the case of full-time employment of the working 1.5
generation women where the coefficient of interest is positive and marginally signif-
icant. Hypothesis (2), on the other hand, might partially contribute to explain the
asymmetry between traditional and non-traditional women. The cost of endogamous
marriage might fall more heavily to traditional women than to non-traditional women
at the extensive margin of the labor market through the type and quality of network
provided by husband. The pattern, however, does not hold among the women who
are already working (at the intensive margin) or when immigrants from Mexico are
excluded.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I explore a novel angle of studying the effect of traditional gender roles
on married females’ labor supply, viewing the wife as a member of a larger social
institution, marriage. I identify the impact of traditional gender roles within mar-
riage on immigrant women’s labor supply patterns in the US. Individuals’ gender
role attitudes are proxied using surveys conducted in their home countries. I ad-
dress the endogenous formation of marriage by incorporating local marriage market
characteristics.
80
The empirical results suggest that the effects of traditional gender roles are magni-
fied in endogamous marriage. Individuals with traditional gender role attitudes, when
married endogamously, are less likely to participate in the labor market. Conditional
on working, they are also less likely to work full-time. The results are qualitatively
robust to the exclusion of those who arrived at the age of 13 or order or those who
originated from Mexico at the extensive margin. I argue that this represents a greater
relevance of traditional gender roles in a social setting as the cultural beliefs and val-
ues are shared between both spouses. To support my claim, I present evidence that
rules out the case where the differential effects are explained by differential benefits
or costs of endogamous marriage across traditional and non-traditional women.
Looking beyond the scope of this study, the results also motivate future research to
examine how cultural norms on the desired gender division of labor affect individual
behaviors in an even larger social setting such as family, neighborhood,32 or society.
32 Bisin et al. (2016) examine how the ethnic density of one’s neighborhood can shape his or her
ethnic identity through the processes of cultural distinction and conformity. Khattab (2002) studies
the effect of cultural model (traditional gender roles restrict women’s employment) and enclave
model (ethnic enclaves facilitate women’s labor market participation) by comparing three major
Palestinian-Arab religious groups of women in Israel.
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Figure 2·1: Probability of Working by Gender Role Attitudes
(ISSP 2012)
Note: This figure shows the relationship between the probability of being working
and women’s (or their husbands’) gender role attitudes. Sample individuals are the
female respondents (or male respondents’ wives) of the 2012 ISSP. The horizontal and
vertical lines correspond to the probability of being in paid work for American women
and the average gender role attitudes (of their own or their husband’s), respectively.
The dashed line represents the linear fit (Slope= -0.386, R2= 0.27).
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Figure 2·2: Labor Force Participation of Immigrants in the US
and Gender Roles by Source Country
Note: This figure shows the relationship between the probability of labor force par-
ticipation and the mean gendernorm by home country. Sample individuals include
all foreign-born female immigrants satisfying the criteria specified in Section 2.2.1
and their American counterpart. The horizontal and vertical lines correspond to the
probability of being in paid work for the US women and their proxied gender role
attitudes. The dashed line represents the linear fit (Slope= -0.146, R2= 0.08).
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Married female immigrants aged 26-45 American
All Traditional Non-traditional counterpart
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: All Individuals
Labor force participation
0.58 0.50 0.66 0.77
(0.49) (0.50) (0.47) (0.42)
Age
36.85 36.9 36.79 36.77
(5.33) (5.35) (5.31) (5.52)
Years of education
12.94 10.33 15.57 14.68
(4.43) (4.11) (2.94) (2.42)
Number of children
1.91 2.37 1.45 1.72
(1.24) (1.26) (1.04) (1.23)
English proficiency
0.69 0.51 0.86 1.00
(0.35) (0.35) (0.23) (0.05)
workingmom
0.29 0.35 0.22 0.10
(0.08) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03)
preschooler
0.63 0.74 0.52 0.29
(0.15) (0.03) (0.14) (0.03)
familylife
0.57 0.71 0.44 0.26
(0.16) (0.02) (0.13) (0.04)
gendernorm
0.50 0.60 0.39 0.22
(0.13) (0.01) (0.10) (0.03)
Endogamy
0.80 0.90 0.69 0.99
(0.40) (0.29) (0.46) (0.12)
Observations 114,553 57,438 57,115 596,989
Panel B: Individuals who work
Full-time employment
0.63 0.57 0.69 0.64
(0.48) (0.49) (0.46) (0.48)
Hours worked per week
36.35 34.94 37.76 36.68
(11.69) (11.58) (11.64) (11.80)
Hourly wage (USD)
24.38 17.73 30.79 24.76
(34.23) (28.13) (38.14) (96.48)
Observations 62,388 30,637 31,751 445,311
Note: This table provides the summary statistics of selected variables for all individ-
uals in the sample (column (1)) by having traditional gender role attitudes (columns
(2) and (3)). Column (4) is generated with the American counterpart and provided
for comparison. Reported in the parentheses are standard deviations. workingmom,
preschoole, and familylife can be interpreted as how likely an individual is to agree
with the three statements in Section 2.2.2, respectively. gendernorm is the aver-
age of workingmom, preschooler, and familylife, which is defined as the degree of


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.4: Effects of Couples’ Traditional Gender Attitudes
Dependent variable Labor force participation Full-time employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wife is traditional -0.050∗∗ -0.005
(gendernorm ≥ median) (0.112) (0.017)
Husband is traditional -0.068∗∗∗ 0.009
(gendernorm ≥ median) (0.017) (0.015)
Dependent variable mean 0.58 0.58 0.63 0.63
Observations 114,553 114,553 66,660 66,660
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.13 0.06 0.06
Note: All specifications include full set of controls: age, age squared, has a child
at age 0-4, has a child at age 5-17, log of spousal income, race dummies (black and
Asian), educational attainment dummies (high school, some college, college, gradu-
ate school), language distance, age at immigration, any US education, metropolitan
status, state and census year fixed effects, and source country zone dummies. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at home country × 10-year birth cohort level and reported
in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.5: Effects of Traditional Gender Roles within Marriage
Dependent variable Labor force participation Full-time employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: OLS
Traditional
-0.047∗∗ -0.006 -0.047∗ -0.016
(0.020) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025)
Endogamy
-0.029∗∗ -0.013 0.023∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.018) (0.010) (0.011)
Traditional × Endogamy -0.047
∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.014)
Dependent variable mean 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.65 0.65 0.65
Observations 77,320 77,320 77,320 47,491 47,491 47,491
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.06
Panel B: IV
Traditional
-0.047∗∗ 0.188∗∗ -0.047∗ 0.080
(0.020) (0.084) (0.026) (0.052)
Endogamy
-0.147∗∗∗ -0.046 -0.011 0.096∗∗
(0.029) (0.040) (0.042) (0.043)
Traditional × Endogamy -0.257
∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.070)
Dependent variable mean 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.65 0.65 0.65
Observations 77,320 70,365 70,365 47,491 43,020 43,020
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.06
F-statistic (Endogamy) 44.48 61.65 58.62 92.87
F-statistic (Traditional × Endogamy) 30.02 27.79
Note: Sample is restricted to individuals who married upon arriving in the US. In columns (4)-(6), sample is further
restricted to individuals who work. All regressions include full set of control variables: age, age squared, has a child
at age 0-4, has a child at age 5-17, log of spousal income, race dummies (black and Asian), educational attainment
dummies (high school, some college, college, graduate school), language distance, age at immigration, any US
education, metropolitan status, state and census year fixed effects, and source country zone dummies. Standard
errors are clustered at home country × 10-year birth cohort level and reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.7: Effects of Traditional Gender Roles for Domestic Partners
Dependent variable Labor force participation Full-time employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: OLS
Traditional
-0.001 0.099∗∗∗ 0.015 0.122∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.033) (0.015) (0.022)
Endogamous partnership
-0.088∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗ -0.000
(0.024) (0.021) (0.017) (0.016)
Traditional × Endogamous partnership -0.108
∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.027)
Dependent variable mean 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.61
Observations 10,992 10,992 10,992 6,810 6,810 6,810
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.09 0.09
Panel B: IV
Traditional
-0.001 0.381∗∗∗ 0.015 0.188∗∗
(0.010) (0.113) (0.015) (0.083)
Endogamous partnership
-0.427∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗ -0.087
(0.104) (0.079) (0.073) (0.075)
Traditional × Endogamous partnership -0.403
∗∗∗ -0.183∗
(0.118) (0.097)
Dependent variable mean 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.60
Observations 10,992 9,729 9,729 6,810 5,871 5,871
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.08
F-statistic (Endogamy) 47.1 36.92 52.74 35.04
F-statistic
23.75 31.98
(Traditional × Endogamous partnership)
Note: Sample is restricted to legally unmarried individuals who are co-residing with a partner. In columns (4)-(6),
sample is further restricted to individuals who work. All regressions include full set of control variables: age, age
squared, has a child at age 0-4, has a child at age 5-17, log of spousal income, race dummies (black and Asian),
educational attainment dummies (high school, some college, college, graduate school), language distance, age at
immigration, any US education, metropolitan status, state and census year fixed effects, and source country zone
dummies. Standard errors are clustered at home country × 10-year birth cohort level and reported in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.8: Endogamy and Linguistic Ability
All Generation 1.5 Non-Mexican











Endogamy × Length 0.001 0.001 0.002
∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Endogamy × Traditional -0.173
∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ 0.025
(0.018) (0.008) (0.025)
Traditional × Length 0.002
∗ -0.000 0.002∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)












Dependent variable mean 0.73 0.90 0.90
Observations 77,320 16,087 39,923
Adjusted R2 0.51 0.29 0.32
Note: Sample is restricted to individuals who married upon arriving in the US. All spec-
ifications include age, age squared, race dummies (black and Asian), educational attain-
ment dummies (high school, some college, college, and graduate school), metropolitan
status, state and census year fixed effects, and source country zone dummies. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at home country × 10-year birth cohort level and reported in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.9: Endogamy and Network
All Generation 1.5 Non-Mexican
Dependent variable LFP Full-time LFP Full-time LFP Full-time
Hypothesis 1: Intermarriage premium is larger when the employment gap is higher
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Local employment gap 0.504 -0.257 -1.010 2.558 0.125 0.367
× Traditional × Endogamy (0.821) (0.835) (1.605) (1.769) (0.690) (1.109)
Dependent variable mean 0.61 0.65 0.71 0.68 0.71 0.70
Observations 77,320 47,491 16,087 11,458 39,923 28,633
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.09 0.06
Hypothesis 2: Intermarriage premium is larger for less educated immigrants
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 12)
Years of Education 0.010∗∗ -0.003 0.015∗∗∗ 0.009 0.001 -0.007
× Traditional × Endogamy (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Dependent variable mean 0.61 0.65 0.71 0.68 0.71 0.70
Observations 77,320 47,491 16,087 11,458 39,923 28,633
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.09 0.05
Note: Sample is restricted to individuals who married upon arriving in the US. In columns (2), (4),
and (6), sample is further restricted to individuals who work. All regressions include full set of control
variables: age, age squared, has a child at age 0-4, has a child at age 5-17, log of spousal income, race
dummies (black and asian), educational attainment dummies (high school, some college, college, graduate
school), language distance, age at immigration, any US education, metropolitan status, state and census
year fixed effects, and source country zone dummies. Traditional, Endogamy, Local employment gap,
Traditional×Endogamy, Traditional×Local employment gap, and Endogamy×Local employment gap are
included in specifications (1)-(6). Traditional, Endogamy, Years of education, Traditional×Endogamy,
Traditional× Years of education, and Endogamy× Years of education are included in specifications (7)-
(12). Standard errors are clustered at home country × 10-year birth cohort level and reported in paren-
theses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Chapter 3
Place-based Development: Evidence from
Special Economic Zones in India
This chapter is a joint work with Shree Ravi.
3.1 Introduction
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are a popular policy tool used by both developed
and developing economies to boost growth in specific geographic areas and economic
sectors. Governments typically direct infrastructure development and regulatory con-
cessions at narrow regions in order to influence the location of large and productive
firms within them. The resulting agglomeration of economic activity is expected
to increase local competition, produce denser input and labor markets, and produce
knowledge spillovers among firms and workers that drive long-term development. Em-
pirical evidence of such benefits is, however, limited and focused on the study of such
programs in developed economies.1 The unique institutional and economic features
of developing countries, such as the size of their informal sectors and tight credit
markets, are certain to influence the success of their SEZ programs. There is hence a
need to understand their zonal development initiatives separately.
In this paper, we provide one of the first empirical evaluations of the Indian SEZ
policy to understand its aggregate and distributional impact on the Indian economy.
1In the case of the US, while such policies seem to increase employment and wages (Busso et al.
(2013); Empowerment Zones) the benefits are offset by losses elsewhere in the country (Kline and
Moretti (2013); Tennessee Valley Authority program).
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India introduced the 2005 Special Economic Zones Act as one of the biggest pushes
to industrial development in its history. Over ten years since 2005, it has annually
invested roughly 0.5% of its GDP, totalling 62 billion US dollars. The size of its
investment is substantial by both Indian and international standards.2 As of 2016,
221 SEZs began operation across the nation, attracting firms through tax exemptions,
infrastructural benefits and regulatory concessions, directly employing 1.4 million
people and contributing to almost one-third of the annual national exports.3
However, the observed economic activity of SEZs is insufficient evidence of the pol-
icy’s success. It is necessary to study the indirect effects of such spatial policies when
evaluating them. One particular concern is that these observed benefits to regions
receiving SEZs could be offset by losses elsewhere in the economy through resource
relocations, which would produce little, if any, aggregate gains at considerable costs.4
Using the stages of approvals for SEZs as a source of quasi-experimental variation,
our study not only reveals an increase in general economic activity in the immediate
neighborhoods of SEZs but also confirms that regions several times the size of the
zones benefit- up to the sub-national level of a district. Additionally, we study how
the SEZ policy interacts with the informal and formal sectors of the economy, a dual
economy framework which is unique to low income countries. The most pertinent
characteristics of informality in India are the absence of any form of regulation in
production, omission from the tax base, and workers that are often unskilled and
2 Roughly half the amount was spent over a decade by the Indian government for financing
infrastructural development and providing tax exemptions to all firms in two eastern Indian states
(Shenoy, 2016). According to Kline and Moretti (2013) and Busso et al. (2013), the investments in
the Tennessee Valley Authority program and the Empowerment Zones are around 20 billion and 3
billion US dollars, respectively.
3 Statistics are sourced from the Ministry of Commerce website and Mukherjee and Bhardwaj
(2016).
4The literature on such place-based development policies stresses the necessity to study the
response of the wider private sector to the policies and measures their cost-effectiveness based on
the programs’ ability to form linkages with the local economy. See Duranton and Venables (2018),
Farole et al. (2011) and Aggarwal (2011) for a discussion.
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that do not receive social security benefits. While the Indian informal sector is char-
acterized by low productivity, it is a major source of employment hiring about 80%
of the total labor force.5 Therefore, it is important to analyze the effects of SEZs in
the dual economy framework for a more comprehensive understanding. Our analysis
reveals that SEZs instigate a structural change of the economy, increasing firm size
(in terms of production, employment and investment) and productivity in the formal
sector while causing a shift of resources out of the informal sector and crowding out
its production. Greater formality is considered more desirable in developing countries
because it brings a larger part of the economy under beneficial government regulation
(in matters such as worker safety and welfare) and broadens the tax base. Moreover,
a shift of resources from the less productive informal sector would increase the over-
all productivity of the economy.6 While our result show-cases the potential of such
policies to bring about long-term development, we also find evidence suggestive of a
rise in inequality in the short-term.
Our results are especially striking given the unique nature of Indian SEZs. The
Indian government incentivized the participation of the private sector in zonal de-
velopment and allowed SEZs to be of substantially smaller physical sizes than found
elsewhere in the world. Small zones were doubted to be capable of producing signif-
icant additional economic activity. In addition, private sector participation in SEZ
development was viewed as tax-free profit generation at the cost of issues such as
misuse of land and inequities favoring large companies over small ones.7
The challenge to our identification strategy comes from the non-random nature
of program location. This is a common concern for studies analyzing place-based
5 Authors’ calculations from the 2005 round of National Sample Survey (NSS) on Employment
and Unemployment.
6 Hsieh and Klenow (2009) estimate a 40% increase in overall productivity from reallocating
resources to larger (formal) firms.
7 See Aggarwal (2006) for a summary of the policy debate.
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development policies. Due to private sector participation in program location, how-
ever, we face the opposite concern of studies generally involving zones in developed
economies, which usually target under-industrialized regions. In order to credibly
isolate the effect of SEZs on the regional economy, we exploit a source of variation
in the government-regulated approval process for SEZs. We consider only those re-
gions surrounding SEZs that have reached the penultimate stage of approval before
beginning operation. This stage, henceforth referred to as notification, ensures that
both the regions and the developers possess qualities that make the project viable-
the government signals its approval of the developer’s detailed business plan, and the
developer signals keenness in the region and his commitment to the plan by com-
pleting the purchase or rental of land. Forming our analysis based on comparisons
only among regions that were actively targeted by SEZ developers takes care of the
first-order concern that the targeted regions may be different, for example in terms
of potential for growth, than other parts of India.
While we base our analysis on the variation in the preparatory levels of SEZs,
we adopt separate empirical frameworks for exploring different questions. Firstly, we
trace the pattern of SEZ influence through time and space using granular satellite
lights data as a proxy for economic activity. For this, we apply panel data analysis
to a 14-year panel of all 1-square kilometer cells that are within 15 kilometers of any
SEZ in our sample. This helps us establish that the beginning of operations inside an
SEZ sets off an increase in economic activity not only within the SEZs, but also in the
immediate neighborhoods around it. We find the effect to be moderately persistent
across time and up to areas that are comparable in size to the administrative division
of an Indian village. We also find that areas farther away are not hurt significantly
(by a potential withdrawal of resources) thus recording net-positive effects up to
areas spanning 1,200 square kilometers, one-fourth the size of a median district in
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our dataset.8
Our main results on the aggregate effects of SEZ spillovers are derived from a
difference-in-differences framework using a rich set of variables on firms and workers
drawn from formal and informal sector surveys. We compare outcomes between
regions that have at least one operating SEZ (treated regions) and those with at least
one SEZ that pass notification but no operating SEZ (control regions). In choosing
control regions in this fashion, our strategy is in line with Busso et al. (2013) in not
comparing areas to their geographical neighbours, limiting the concern of spillovers
to the treated regions from control regions (such as movement of workers) that may
mechanically bias our treatment effect. Additionally, we are able to separate the
direct effects of SEZs (on firms and workers within SEZs) from the indirect effect on
the local non-SEZ economy by studying subsets of firms and workers with varying
possibilities of being located within SEZs. For robustness, we conduct a series of pre-
trends analyses for the regions in our study to address the concern that there may be
serious differences among areas of consideration in the timing of SEZ operations.
Our results indicate that the average labor productivity of formal sector manu-
facturing firms in treated districts increases differentially by 24% between 2005 and
2010. We also find evidence for within-industry expansion in formal production by
46%, employment by 18%, and investment in plant and machinery by 37% over the
same time period. Along with productivity gains and an increase in the demand for
labor, the wages in the treated formal sector experienced a differential increase of
14% over wages in the control district.
Our findings also suggest that the resulting agglomeration spillovers from SEZs
structurally transform the economy away from informal lines of production towards
greater formality. This is especially true in the case of informal manufacturing where
we observe a halving of total production within industries of treated districts with
8 The district is the main level of local government below the state in India.
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total employment declining by 24% and labor productivity by 42%. One possible
explanation for this trend is a selection effect driven by an increase in registrations
among the most productive firms in the informal sector or those that previously stayed
“under the radar” to escape taxes and other regulations. The presence of SEZs likely
increased the demand for higher quantity and quality of local goods and services,
thus motivating informal sector firms to register themselves to signal quality and
expand customer base.9 We also find evidence of a significant decrease in employment
in firms at the lower end of the productivity spectrum, such as small household
businesses. This suggests a reduction in “forced informality,” which is usually a
result of insufficient formal employment opportunities.
Although the impact of the SEZ policy has been positive in terms of stimulating
formalization in the economy, we find evidence suggestive of increasing inequality
represented by a non-uniform effect on overall worker wages. While workers at the
90th percentile of the income distribution gain as much as 38% over the years in
which their district was treated with SEZs, those at the lower end of the wage and
educational distribution seem not to gain significantly. This suggests that workers
are left out of the wage benefits due to their inability of being absorbed by the formal
sector. It corroborates the current concern in both developed and developing countries
about the problem of “skill gap” where the workforce is unable to fulfill the demand
for skilled labor thus holding back further prospects of development.
Our work makes novel contributions to the study on place-based development
policies. Firstly, we provide a general framework for evaluating place-based develop-
ment policies using remote sensing data, which can be easily adapted for analyzing
other such programs in India or other countries. Our framework is especially useful
when policies are not implemented at an administrative level such as state, province
9 An upcoming work evaluates if increasing registrations and the quality channel are strong
explanatory channels.
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or county.10 Our cell-level analysis of policy impact provides a method for studying
changes that are within these larger regions, such as industrial corridors, technology
parks and other important spatially narrow infrastructure projects.
Secondly, we draw important insights from our focus on how zonal development
programs affect the little-explored dual economic structure of the Indian economy.
Earlier works studying SEZs and similar programs in India and China, such as Wang
(2013), Alder et al. (2016), Chaurey (2016) and Shenoy (2016), do not touch upon the
effect of such programs on the formal-informal sector dynamics. The closest work to
ours, in this respect, is Magruder (2013) who finds that the change in minimum wage
rule in Indonesia acted as a big-push mechanism leading to greater formalization.
Lastly, we contribute on a positive note to the mixed evidence on the role of firm
agglomeration in boosting productivity and development of a region. Our analysis
of the formal sector is comparable to the work of others in studying the impact of
place-based programs in developed countries that do not have prominent informal
sectors. Greenstone et al. (2010) find positive productivity gains to firms located
in the same county as “million dollar plants” in the United States while Kline and
Moretti (2013) find that agglomeration gains from the Tennessee Valley Authority
program are offset by losses elsewhere in the country. The evidence is also mixed
in the case of programs in developing countries when only the impact on the formal
economy is considered. Wang (2013) finds that municipalities receiving early waves
of Chinese SEZs experience productivity gains while Chaurey (2016) does not find
state-level productivity gains from firm agglomeration in the Indian state of Himachal
Pradesh as a result of the New Industrial Policy.11 Our findings of an increase in
10 Such policies allow for analytical methods such as spatial discontinuity design along adminis-
trative borders, as employed by Shenoy (2016) in his analysis of the New Industrial policy in the
Indian state of Uttarakhand.
11The movement of resources to treated regions from other regions is potentially responsible for
muted gains at a spatially aggregated level. Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008) point out that this shift
may still have an overall welfare impact on the aggregate economy if the elasticity of productivity
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employment and wages in the formal sector of treated regions, both real and nominal,
are in line with those of Kline and Moretti (2013), Busso et al. (2013), Wang (2013)
and Chaurey (2016). Given the traditionally low level of labor mobility in India,12
real wage increases are also consistent with the prediction of Moretti (2010) that low
labor mobility implies that any benefits from a shock to labor demand accrues to
workers residing within a region.13
The paper proceeds in the following steps: Section 3.2 provides the reader with
an overview of Indian SEZs. In Section 3.3, we study the pattern of spillovers caused
by SEZs on the surrounding areas. Section 3.4 explores the aggregate effects of these
spillovers and their implications for firms and workers. Section 3.5 summarizes our
insights and highlights further areas of research.
3.2 The Indian SEZ Experience
The Government of India’s SEZ policy was influenced by the success story of the Chi-
nese SEZs. Impressed by the SEZs in Guangdong province in 2000, the Commerce
Minister of India initiated changes in India’s Export-Import policy, which converted
existing Export Processing Zones (EPZs), which were industrial estates that produced
export-oriented goods, to Special Economic Zones (SEZs).14 SEZs were envisioned as
comprehensive industrial townships with social facilities like housing blocks, schools
and hospitals. The real growth in SEZ activity was kick-started by the SEZ Act of
2005, which officially proclaimed its objectives to be: (a) generation of additional
to agglomeration is greater in places receiving the programs. Empirically, non-linearity of agglom-
eration effects is a challenge to establish and many papers, including this one, focus on attempting
to document if there are positive net effects on the surrounding economy, up to a sub-national level
of aggregation.
12 Topalova (2010) finds that the landmark trade reform of 1991 that officially opened India
to international trade had a surprisingly little impact on the already low inter-district migratory
patterns.
13 High mobility, on the other hand, would predict an in-migration of workers who would apply
an upward pressure on land prices and cancel out the effect of any increase in nominal wages.
14 EPZs do not form part of our sample.
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economic activity, (b) promotion of exports of goods and services, (c) promotion of
investment from domestic and foreign sources, (d) creation of employment opportu-
nities, and (e) development of infrastructure facilities.
The Indian SEZs differed in two key ways from SEZs and other place-based pro-
grams in the world, including the Chinese model. First, the minimum size require-
ment was much lower. This resulted in Indian SEZs being physically much smaller
than municipality-sized SEZs in China and census tracts designated as Empowerment
Zones in the United States. The size requirements were sector-specific; while Infor-
mation Technology (IT) SEZs were allowed to be as small as 0.1 square kilometers,
multi-product SEZs needed to be at least 10 square kilometers of area. The second
distinguishing feature of Indian SEZs is that they were open to development by both
the public and private sectors, resulting in 70% of the SEZs being either private or
joint sector initiatives.15 These features resulted in two main trends in zone location:
both public and private sector SEZs tended to locate in urbanized areas with already
existing industrial clusters, or they clustered in belts to promote the development of
a new industry within the state.16 Hence, despite the small size of an individual SEZ,
the tendency to cluster increased the potential of agglomeration spillovers to impact
regional productivity and economic growth. Studying this unique pattern of SEZ
development could thus provide useful lessons to countries that find it economically
and politically infeasible to develop large-sized SEZs.
Similar to other place-based development programs through the world, India pro-
vided largely fiscal incentive packages to the SEZ developers as well as to the firms
locating within SEZs (henceforth referred to as units). Table C.1 in the Appendix
provides an overview of these incentives. The most notable of these is the 100% tax
exemption on profits for the first five years of operation, which converted to a 50%
15 Authors’ estimates.
16 See Aggarwal (2011) for a detailed survey of SEZ developers on issues including zone location
and development.
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exemption in the next five after which the same rate was applied to any profit that
was reinvested into SEZ activity.17 Additionally, both developers and SEZ firms were
exempted from paying the Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT), which is currently set at
18.5% of book profits in India.18 The MAT is a compulsory tax levied on companies
that make substantial profits but have low, or even zero, tax liability due to the host
of deductions and exemptions available under the income tax law. According to a
representative survey of SEZ developers and companies by Mukherjee and Bhardwaj
(2016), 84% of the interviewed units declared that the tax exemptions formed the
biggest motivating factor for them to begin production within SEZs.
Apart from tax benefits, both developers and companies wishing to locate within
SEZs enjoyed an ease in administrative procedures through the “single-window” mech-
anism. Applications were reviewed jointly by both the Central and State governments
through a single regulatory body, the Board of Approval (BoA), which was set up to
facilitate a fast pace of clearances and resolution of bureaucratic red-tape typically
surrounding the starting of a business venture. All of these incentives helped to cre-
ate a relatively hassle-free environment for firms, wished to operate in a country not
known for its ease of doing business.19
Our empirical analysis hinges on the approval process for establishing SEZs. Ap-
plications to develop SEZs were submitted to the BoA, which met quarter-yearly and
reviewed them based on the following criteria: the quality of the business plan, the
plan for financing, land type targeted20 and prior approvals of the state government.21
While these factors were repeatedly highlighted during the decision making process,
17 The corporate tax rate is 35% in India.
18 This exemption was reversed in 2011.
19 In 2017, India ranked 130 out of the 190 countries considered in the World Bank’s Ease of
Doing Business Index, and has been consistently ranked below countries such as Iran, Nicaragua
and Uganda.
20 The land should not only meet the minimum size requirements, but it should also be a con-
tiguous area that is preferably waste land or unsuitable for double-crop cultivation.
21 Information is derived from the BoA meeting minutes.
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the relative importance of each, and whether this list is exhaustive, is unclear. If the
application meets the requirements, the developing company is issued a formal ap-
proval. After this, it needs to revert to the BoA with documentation on land rental or
purchase agreements as well as with any revisions to the development plan suggested
by the BoA. At this stage, the body issues a notification for the SEZ. This is usually
brought to the attention of the general public through news articles as well as notice
boards erected at the site of the planned SEZ. Construction then commences and an
SEZ is considered operational once the first unit starts production within it. Figure
C.1 illustrates the approval process of the SEZs.
In our analysis, we only consider those SEZs that pass the penultimate stage,
i.e., notification. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry is the primary source of
information on Indian SEZs in the form of lists of notified and operational SEZs in
India. We merge the lists to obtain information on the developer, date of notification,
whether the zone has started operation, zone size, the industrial sector as well as
the location of each SEZ (down to the village level, and occasionally to the street
level). We then add the actual starting dates of operational SEZs, defined as the year
in which the first unit within the SEZ becomes operational, which we source from
newspaper articles, BoA meeting minutes and developers’ websites. Our dataset,
given the rich location details, can easily be analyzed at multiple levels of aggregation-
at the neighborhood level with geo-coded location data, village, and district level.
This is helpful in merging it with secondary data of different aggregation possibilities
(as we do in this paper). Our sample includes all notified SEZs in the states of Andhra
Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu,
which host more than 80% of total operational SEZs. At any point in time, we
compare regions that host (or are about to host) operating or notified SEZs.
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3.3 Patterns of SEZ Influence Across Space and Time
3.3.1 Data Overview
Our main dataset for analyzing the pattern of spillovers from SEZs is the Nightime
Lights (henceforth referred to as NTL) time series. The raw data (National Geo-
physical Data Center, 2013) is obtained from the National Centers for Environmental
Information. The resolution is 30 arc-seconds, which is equivalent to approximately
854 meters when measured around the center of India, and the data values range
from 0 (background noise) to 63 (brightest). We clean the series from 2000 to 2013
by removing ephemeral events and gas flares to obtain persistent and stable lighting.
Nighttime luminosity has been extensively utilized as a proxy for economic growth
and development (Henderson et al., 2012), degree of urbanization (Ma et al., 2012),
degree of electrification (Min et al., 2013), population density (Sutton et al., 1997),
etc.22 The NTL has three main advantages- it is available annually at a high level of
disaggregation and provides a neutral measure of a region’s economic activity. In the
Indian context, given that economic data is spatially coarse, available at infrequent
intervals and may fail to capture the extent of economic activity in its vast unorga-
nized sector, the usage of a neutral measure of economic activity enriches the overall
examination and adds robustness to the findings derived from other datasets that
are available at higher levels of spatial aggregation. The annual availability further
helps in confirming the effects of an SEZ that appear precisely in the year it becomes
notified or operational, over neighbourhoods of varying proximity. Our reliance on
nighttime lights data to capture general economic activity at the sub-national level is
further bolstered by Bhandari and Roychowdhury (2011) who find that district-level
22 The frequency and disaggregated nature of the lights data allows for creative applications
in studying a variety of interesting and previously unexplorable issues, such as regional political
favoritism as in Hodler and Raschky (2014), and the effects of spatial distribution of ethnicities
before colonization (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013).
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GDP in India can be significantly explained by lights data and by Dugoua et al. (2018)
who find that lights data has strong predictive power for village-level electrification in
India. Furthermore, by being agnostic to the nature of economic activity captured by
nighttime lights, we handle the criticism that sub-national comparisons of economic
development using nighttime lights is problematic. Works such as Mellander et al.
(2015) argue that the correlation between the nighttime lights and economic activity
is weak for wages and strong for population and establishment density in the case
of Sweden. In our case, even if nighttime lights are only correlated with population
density, not economic growth, it still provides us with meaningful interpretation since
we are also interested in spatial reallocation of human resources.
Using the NTL data and geo-coding the locations of all the SEZs in our dataset,
we overlay a fine grid layer over the map of India and use each cell as the unit of
analysis. Each cell is defined as a square with the length of 0.01 decimal degree,
which is approximately 1.025 kilometers at around the center of India. In order to
see the indirect or spillover effects of SEZs on the cells, we restrict our attention to
cells that are believed to be strictly outside of SEZs. For identifying cells outside
the zones, we assume that SEZs are circularly shaped since the exact shape of SEZs
are unknown. Using the area of the SEZ reported by its developer, we calculate the
radius of the SEZ and draw a circle around the point. The circular shape assumption
is a strong one and creates a concern that we might label area that is actually inside
the SEZ as non-SEZ area. To avoid defining inside-SEZ cells as outside-SEZ ones,
we take a conservative approach and increase the radii of SEZs by 10%.23 We then
record for each cell, the NTL reading over the years24 and the distances between the
centroid of the cell and the projected boundary of every SEZ in our database, thus
23 See Figure 3·1 that depicts the fine grid of cells superimposed on circles that indicate SEZ
locations and sizes.
24 In cases there were two satellites collecting data for a cell, we take the average of the two
readings.
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linking SEZ-level information (such as notification and operation years) with cell-level
information. We restrict our attention to cells that are at most 15 kilometers away
from their closest SEZ, and the resulting number of observations (cells) is 62,386 per
year.
We additionally use the Gridded Population of the World (GPW) data (Center
for International Earth Science Information Network, 2016) series in order to measure
the extent to which the effects recorded by our analysis of the NTL data is driven by
population movements. This dataset, downloadable from the NASA Socioeconomic
Data and Applications Center, is available at 5-year intervals from 2000. The lowest
level of data resolution is the same as the NTL (roughly 1 kilometer-wide cells). The
data for each cell is derived using the population listed by national and sub-national
administrative units. In the case of India, this is the level of the sub-district. Each
grid cell is assigned with values of population density per square kilometer according
to a proportional allocation gridding algorithm, which allocates the same value to
all cells within a sub-district.25 We hence acknowledge that the dataset may have
limitations for study at a granular level. However, since the cell-level population
is at least not derived from its NTL reading, it is useful to analyze cell-level NTL
per population. This provides us with an estimate for how important population
movements are as an explanation for the effects produced by the NTL analysis.
Table 3.1 provides us with an overview of the SEZs in our sample. We have 251
notified SEZs in our sample, with 133 of them operational by 2014. The median
size of an SEZ is about a third of a square kilometer, the size of around 32 soccer
fields. The mean is much larger at 1.5 square kilometers due to the presence of a
few exceptionally large SEZs such as that the Mundra SEZ in Gujarat, which spans
64 square kilometers. Since the IT and electronic sector SEZs make up 69% of the
25 The allocation is based on an assumption that the population of a grid cell is the exclusive
function of the land area within that pixel. Water area such as lakes, rivers, and ice-covered areas
are excluded.
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total and their minimum size requirements are small, such size distribution is to be
expected. It is also apparent from Panel A that SEZs are largely a private sector
venture with 70% of the zones being developed by purely private or joint sector
entities. The average year of notification of an SEZ is 2008 (Panel A) with operating
SEZs being notified slightly earlier (Panel B). The difference between average year of
notification and operation for SEZs in Panel B shows us that the developers take an
average of two and half years to secure the necessary permits, complete substantial
construction and attract their first tenants. Panel A of Table 3.1 also displays the
average NTL and NTL per population in 3 kilometer-neighborhoods around SEZ
boundaries. These neighborhoods experienced an increase in economic activity, which
goes beyond the increase in population judging by the values of both variables after
the initiation of the SEZ Act.
It is important to note that due to the NTL data being top-coded at 63, our
analysis may be capturing the lower bound of the actual growth that took place.
This is because SEZs tend to locate in relatively urban areas with already high values
of NTL and may result in the right-censoring of our empirical results. We, therefore,
anticipate spillover effects to be underestimated in our study. Figure C.2 indeed
confirms that by the end of sample period, 2013, a non-negligible fraction of the data
is top-coded implying that our estimates are conservative.26
3.3.2 Empirical Strategy
We utilize the 14-year panel dataset of cells, which is constructed as detailed in the
earlier section. Our general approach is to compare cells based on their proximity
to SEZs and measure the differential effects on them through time due to an SEZ’s
presence.
For clarity of interpretation, we focus on the time and distance dimensions in
26 See Section C in the Appendix for a brief discussion.
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separate analyses. The time-dimension analysis uses an event-study framework and
examines how a given area reacts to the event of a nearby SEZ beginning operation.
The cells considered in the event-study are those that have exactly one SEZ within 3
kilometers that begin operation between 2006, the first year of SEZ operations, and
2013, the last year of observation of the NTL. In making this selection, we aim to (a)
focus on the reaction of the immediate neighborhood and (b) reduce the number of
SEZs that affect a cell.27
For such a cell i that is situated outside of SEZs in year t, we run the following
specification:
log(lightit) = αi + βt +
k 6=−1∑
−13≤k≤7
γk ∗Dikt + εit, (3.1)
where the outcome variable is logged luminosity of cell i at time t, which is the
logged transformation of the cell’s NTL value incremented by 1. A binary variable
Dikt takes the value of one if the SEZ within 3 kilometers away from cell i has been
operating for k years in year t. Year 0 is the initial year of operation of an SEZ.
We use cell and year fixed effects to add robustness to our findings. Additionally, we
correct the standard errors for spatial autocorrelation following the specification of
Conley (1999) up to a cutoff of 30 kilometers.28
The estimates of interest are γk’s, for k ∈ [−13, 6]. Each γk can be interpreted
as the change in brightness (in log deviations) of a cell, k years since the operation
of the nearby SEZ, relative to the year before its operation (γ−1 is normalized to 0).
We expect γk to be positive and its magnitude to be increasing in k after the initial
year of operation, indicating persistence in the effect of operating SEZs. Prior to
operation, we should not expect any significant trend in γk since we do not expect
27 Since the treatment is at the SEZ level and the analysis at the cell level, it is possible that a cell
is influenced by multiple SEZs in its vicinity, with overlapping notification and operation timelines,
especially given the tendency of SEZs to cluster.
28 The results are robust when the cutoff is alternatively set to 10, 20, 50, and 100 kilometers.
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regions to be affected by an SEZ even before it establishes its presence. We also
use the same framework and have similar expectations from the coefficients when we
study the event of notification of an SEZ.
For the distance-dimension analysis, we classify the SEZs at any point in time
into three main age groups: period0 denotes years before the SEZ is notified, period1
covers the post-notification and pre-operation years, and period2, the years after
operation. For a cell i that is not located in any SEZ, an SEZ in the x-th distance
ring (x− 1 to x kilometers away from the cell) exerts an effect that is dependent on
whether the SEZ is in period 0, 1 or 2 of its lifetime. In order to study the varying








The main outcome variable is logged luminosity of cell i in year t and we run the
above specification for each integer value of x from 0 to 15. For the xth distance ring
analysis, we consider all cells that have their closest SEZ in this ring. periodθixt is
the number of periodθ SEZs that are in the xth ring away from cell i in year t, for
θ values 0, 1 and 2.29 The average difference in the effects of period 2 and period 0
SEZs (the base group), denoted by δx, captures the additional effect felt on a cell due
to the operation of an SEZ in the xth ring. The average change to the NTL of a cell
due to the notification of an SEZ in the xth ring is similarly denoted by γx. δx can
be thought of as a long-run effect of an SEZ on a cell, and γx, the short-run effect.
Both measures are useful in developing an understanding of the changes that the local
economy experiences, although the latter effect is of greater economic interest. The
double summation term indicates that we control for all farther away SEZs affecting
29 The empirical results are qualitatively unchanged when the terms become dummy variables of
whether or not there is at least one SEZ in each period.
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the cell (but not within the xth ring), in whatever period of life they may be. Standard
errors are corrected for spatial autocorrelation.
We expect δx to be decreasing in x, i.e., cells closer to SEZs experience the most
positive effects while cells farther away experience less positive or even negative effects.
The latter would be the case if there was a movement of resources away from farther
areas to areas closer to SEZs. This is a reasonable expectation given that the zones
bring in new firms that attract workers as well as other firms to the region due to an
increase in opportunities for work. We also expect that the effects of operating SEZs
are greater in magnitude than the effects of notified SEZs at all distances from the
SEZs (δx ≥ γx).
Using the specification above, we are also able to test if changes to the neigh-
borhoods of SEZs in terms of NTL is driven by population movements, a channel
we can test at the granular level with the main outcome variable being logged lights
per population. Since the population data is available at 5 year intervals, the period
of life of an SEZ is updated every 5 years. We expect that a significant portion of
the expected increase in NTL at neighborhoods close to SEZs will be driven by an
increase in population in that neighborhood. The magnitudes should, however, be
taken as less reliable than in the analysis using only NTL data due to the way in
which population data is constructed for India, as discussed in Section 3.3.1.
3.3.3 Evidence from Nighttime Lights
Inside SEZs: Event Study of Activity within SEZs An event-study of areas
inside SEZs confirms the relevance of Specification 3.1. Figure 3·2a reports the percent
change in the cells’ NTL (derived from the γk’s), which shows a clear and persistent
increase in activity after the beginning of SEZ operation. The figure, however, also
indicates an upward trend in economic growth prior to the SEZs’ operation. One
possible explanation for this trend is the preparatory activity undertaken in and
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around SEZs after notification (in terms of building, road construction, setting up
water distribution networks, etc.). As discussed in Section 3.3.1, the data shows that
it took 2 to 3 years on average after their notification for the operating SEZs in
our sample to begin operation. Figure 3·2b, which studies the event of notification,
confirms that the pre-operation growth in Figure 3·2a may indeed be driven by post-
notification activities.
SEZ Spillovers over Time We then restrict our attention to areas strictly outside,
but within 3 kilometers from any SEZ to study the spillover effect of SEZs across
time. Figure 3·2c displays a similar trend as the within-SEZ analysis. When an SEZ
starts operating, the immediate neighborhood experiences a significant increase in
NTL, which is lower than the increase within SEZs as expected. It is persistent in
magnitude but loses significance over time. We suspect that this is due to the small
number of SEZs older than 4 years old by 2013, considering the mean year of initial
operation is 2009 according to Table 3.1.
We still observe the upward trend in NTL prior to operation. Since the area
of analysis is physically outside zones, the increase in post-notification activity can
be a result of both construction activities that may extend outside zones such as
building external connecting roads as well as the surrounding economy preparing for
the impending shock to local demand for goods and services. Examples of the latter
would be the construction of hostels and residential properties to host potential out-
of-area SEZ workers. This may still not explain the upward-sloping trend prior to
even the notification of SEZs as Figure 3·2d shows.30 However, we can still argue that
regions around notified SEZs experience a noticeable increase in the slope of NTL,
i.e., growth rates, upon notification.
Figures C.3a and C.3b display results from an alternate specification in which
30 The pattern is preserved when we control for time trends in addition to year fixed effects.
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we modify the event to be the year of the earliest operating/notified SEZ within
3 kilometers. This specification is more flexible in the selection of cells than the
current one and allows for the presence of multiple SEZs within the 3 kilometer
radius. For example, these cells could be representative of more urban areas, which
attract a greater number of SEZs. This does not, however, produce significantly
different patterns, adding to the robustness of our finding.31
SEZ Spillovers across Space Figures 3·3a and 3·3b, plot γx’s and δx’s in Specifi-
cation 3.2, illustrating the spatial extent of SEZ spillovers in the long- and short-run,
respectively. The resulting trends are in line with our expectations. In the long- and
short-run scenarios, we observe a sharp increase in NTL in neighborhoods of opera-
tional SEZs and notified yet not operating SEZs (relative to the average level in the
pre-notification period), respectively. The positive impact especially continues to be
significant for areas with the closest SEZ within 4 kilometers in the long run.
Interestingly, from Figure 3·3a, we do not find evidence of a zero-sum relocation
of resources due to the SEZ policy, at least at the level of aggregation considered in
this paper- at areas up to 15 kilometers away from SEZs.32 While areas at a distance
greater than 5 kilometers from SEZs seem to return to their normal growth pattern,
there is no strong evidence of farther regions being negatively affected by a withdrawal
of resources. This area is equivalent to quarter the size of a median district in our
dataset. We cannot, however, rule out zero-sum effects over wider regions with this
framework.
One concern about Specification 3.2 is that it considers cells that have their closest
SEZ in the xth distance ring and thus looks at different sets of cells for the analysis
31 We also experiment with increasing the radius of the neighborhood to 5 kilometers to get
similar results, which are not included in the data appendix and are available on request.
32 This holds true when we check patterns over a wider area of 20 kilometers’ radius that spans
1,200 square kilometers.
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across distances, i.e., cells that do have SEZs in the xth distance ring are not considered
for the xth distance ring analysis if they have at least one SEZ that is nearer than x
kilometers.
We consider an alternate, less restrictive specification by examining all cells that
have at least one SEZ in the xth distance ring, and controlling for both nearer and
farther away SEZs when studying the effects of SEZs at a particular distance ring
x around a cell.33 Results from this alternate specification is displayed in Figures
C.4a and C.4b. While the pattern of influence is similar to the ones produced with
the original specification, there is stronger evidence that regions farther away than 5
kilometers do not get hurt and in fact experience positive and significant effects due
to operational SEZs.
In Figures 3·3c and 3·3d, we adopt Specification 3.2 to show the effect of having
an SEZ nearby by the distance to the closest SEZ on NTL per population while
acknowledging the drawback of the population data detailed in Section 3.3.1. The
population movements do seem to drive some, but not all, of the increase in NTL
especially in the long-run scenario. This suggests that there are other channels at
play, especially in the case of effects produced by operating SEZs.34
The chief takeaway from the analysis in this section is that we find evidence of
Indian SEZs producing persistent and positive spillovers on the local economy as
measured by nighttime lights. While they boost economic activity in areas up to
4 kilometers from zones (comparable to the size of a typical Indian village), farther
away areas do not seem to be significantly hurt. SEZs, therefore, can be viewed as
generators of net positive effects on areas several times the actual size of the zones
33 See Section C in Appendix.
34 Acknowledging the limitation of the GPW data, we run a separate analysis examining the
influence on SEZs on sub-district level population movements by aggregating the NTL and GPW
data at the sub-district level. A detailed explanation and the corresponding result is presented in
Section C. In short, it is unlikely that there are any population movement across sub-districts that
can be attributed to the introduction fo SEZs.
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and even comparable to the size of an Indian district. An important caveat to our
findings is that we are unable to determine if there are net positive effects at the
national level. It is possible that activity shifts from elsewhere in the country to
areas around SEZs, producing little if any net benefits at the aggregate level. Our
results speak only to regional positive effects. This finding, however, motivates a
deeper look into the forces behind the spillovers generated in the local economy. In
addition, it also lend credibility to the results derived in the following section which
use more traditionally available datasets on firms and workers in the Indian economy
that are available at the spatially aggregated level of the village or district.
3.4 Aggregate Effects of SEZs on Firms and Workers
We have shown in the previous section that the introduction of SEZs into a region
promotes general economic activity. The effect appears positive up to a level of
geographical aggregation, a district, which is of interest to political and administrative
authorities. A district is the main level of local governance below the state and is
divided further into sub-districts that consist of villages and towns. In our sample,
there are 68 districts, each of which is, on average, divided into 19 sub-districts. Each
sub-district is further divided into an average of 9 villages. In order to understand
the general equilibrium effects of SEZ activity, we now examine individual and firm
behavior in response to the introduction of SEZs.35 We employ multiple data sets at
different levels of administrative units- the village, sub-district and district.
3.4.1 Key Variables
At the village level, we analyze firm and worker numbers using the Economic Cen-
sus (EC). The strength of the EC data is that it is a complete enumeration of all
enterprises in India (except those engaged in crop plantation and cultivation) and
35 ‘Firm’ implies establishment or factory.
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is identifiable at the village level. Through firm-level information on employee size,
industry and ownership type, it provides us with an overview of the distribution of
activity across industrial sectors, both manufacturing and services, in every village or
town. The EC data covers information on 28 million firms located in the districts of
our interest in each of the two rounds available, 2005 and 2012.36
At the district level, we make use of more detailed firm characteristics such as
production and wages to shed light on the mechanism behind SEZ effects. For study-
ing movements within the formal manufacturing sector,37 we use the Annual Survey
of Industries (ASI) dataset. The ASI dataset is an annual survey of firms in manu-
facturing that are considered formal, i.e., those registered under the Factories Act.38
It is a complete enumeration of firms above a 100 in worker strength with an annual
survey of a repeated random cross-section of smaller firms. This data contains more
information than the EC, which allows for a deeper analysis of firm-level variables
such as size (employment, asset base and production), new firm formation and costs
of production including wages and rents. The data set covers around 30,000 firms
in the districts of our interest annually from 2000 to 2009. We also make use of a
similarly rich set of firm-level information provided by the informal sector counter-
part to the ASI, the National Sample Survey (NSS) Unorganized Manufacturing and
Services quinquennial survey data, which covers firms in the unregistered sector of
the Indian economy. Each survey round in our study (2000, 2005 and 2010) contains
information on around 35,000 firms in the districts of our interest.
We complement the firm analysis with worker-level information which allows us
to analyze worker wage effects within districts taking into consideration individual
36 Results pertaining to village- and sub-district level analyses can be found in the Appendix.
37 Nationally representative surveys on formal service firms have not been conducted so far in
India.
38 Registration under the Factories Act is required for firms above 10 workers if the unit uses
power, and above 20, if not. This is also the standard definition of formality adopted by researchers
on the Indian economy.
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characteristics such as education level attained and household demographics. This
information is derived from the NSS Employment and Unemployment Surveys. The
data is a repeated cross-section of a nationally representative sample of workers from
across all industrial activities. Information on firm type and industry, wages, house-
hold characteristics, education and consumption is provided. The data set covers
around 104,000 workers in every round considered (2000, 2005 and 2010) among the
districts in our study. While the worker-level survey data does not have explicit in-
dicators for whether the worker is employed in the formal or the informal sector, we
make the distinction using the 10- worker rule of the Factory Act in order to analyze
the effects of SEZs separately on the informal and the formal work-force.
Table C.2 in the Appendix provides an overview of the regions and population
studied in 2005. The regions in our study were on average much denser than the
all-India average of 382 people per square kilometer. More than 90% of the working
population in a district received no education above secondary level. Average firm
size was small with 96% of the firms employing below 10 workers. This indicates
the highly skewed firm size distribution and the vast size of the informal sector.39
The extent of informality in the economy is also apparent from indicators such as the
proportions of firms that hire no workers at all (40%), operate without power (34%),
do not have external financing options (96%) and rely on informal sources of finance
(around 40%). We also find evidence of the low level of productivity in the informal
sector with wages in the formal sector manufacturing being on average almost 10
times that of those in the informal sector.
3.4.2 Empirical Strategy
In this section we adopt a difference-in-differences framework which chiefly requires
that both treated and control regions follow common trends prior to the initiation
39 The figure is comparable to estimates in Amirapu and Gechter (2014).
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of the SEZ policy. This is a challenge since the locational choices of such place-
based policies are not random. In the case of developed economies, zones are usually
located in under-industrialized regions. In the Indian context, however, because SEZ
development was mainly a private sector initiative, the program targeted regions with
a greater degree of urbanization, human capital quality and profitability. A simple
comparison of areas with SEZs and those without would therefore be unsatisfactory
as it will likely violate the common pre-trends assumption and bias our difference-in-
differences estimate of effects upwards.
Our solution is to adopt a similar strategy to the one commonly used in the
literature on place-based development policies. We use the the approval process of
SEZs as a source of quasi-experimental variation to compare regions that have at least
one SEZ that has passed notification but none that is operating in them (the control
group) with those that have at least one operating in them (the treated group). The
exact set of regions that fall into treatment and control categories differ according to
the frequency and level of aggregation allowed by the multiple datasets used.40 In the
case of Busso et al. (2013) and Kline and Moretti (2013), control regions were formed
out of rejected areas. There is an added strength in our case such that the control
areas were never disqualified by administrative authorities and were indeed expected
to have operating SEZs in the near future.
A point immediately in favor of our identification strategy is that it takes care
of the first-order concern that areas attracting SEZs, both notified and operational,
may be fundamentally different from other areas in terms of worker and industrial
composition and growth potential. Table 3.3 provides some evidence for this when we
compare across treated, control and other districts in the states in our sample. Both
treated and control districts are almost ten times as dense as other districts in the
states, consistent with the trend of SEZs locating in relatively urban areas. Treated
40 Refer to Table C.3 for an overview.
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and control districts also seem to have substantially different worker compositions
than the rest of the state, especially with respect to the proportion of workers em-
ployed in agriculture and manufacturing. The rest of the state seems to predominantly
depend on agriculture for its livelihood with 64% in related professions compared to
only 7% in treated or control districts. The average monthly income of workers and
their education level in the districts compared against each other in our analysis are
also clearly higher with the proportion employed in informal household businesses
being lower by around 10 percentage points. This table tells that results from our
proposed comparison of treatment and control districts will be more credible than a
simple comparison of SEZ and non-SEZ districts.
The second-order concern comes from the fact that treated regions seem to be dis-
proportionately among those with earlier notified SEZs, as shown in the bottom panel
of Table C.3. This could imply that the order of timing in application and notification
is correlated with unobservables relevant for the outcomes studied. However, anecdo-
tal evidence points to developers being spatially restricted in their choice of location.
Locations were not chosen solely based on profitability but also giving weight to the
own-state bias of SEZ developers, both public and private. State governments always
started SEZs within their states, and private sector developers usually chose locations
within the state or district in which they are headquartered.41 It is then quite likely
that the control areas did not form part of the choice set of developers in treated
regions. This could be more due to their out-of-state location rather than growth
potential. Moreover, we find that 60 percent of the control districts were targeted
earlier by SEZ developers that did not manage to reach the stage of notification. We
derive this information from the BoA meeting minutes which discuss the decisions
made on all the SEZs that ever applied for approvals. These areas attracted initial
interest around the same time as treated areas according to the bottom rows of Table
41 Evidence is gathered from interviews with SEZ developers in Tamil Nadu.
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C.3. We find that SEZs in both control and treated districts received early formal
approvals within the first year of the SEZ Act. The average difference between the
two groups receiving a formal approval was only about 8 months.
Given that treated and control regions received developer interest within a compa-
rable time frame, one is also naturally concerned about the delays to notification and
eventual operation of SEZs in control regions, and whether this was correlated with
the potential of the regions and the selective success of the SEZ policy. If the set of
selection criteria for regions were completely known, as was in the case of Busso et al.
(2013) in their evaluation of Empowerment Zones, we could use techniques such as
propensity score weighting to increase the comparability between treated and control
regions. In our case, however, the exact set of conditions used by the BoA to deem an
SEZ notification-worthy, is unknown. What we know from the BoA’s meeting min-
utes is that these included other criteria than economic indicators for the region- such
as the ability of the developer to possess the land, obtain environmental clearances
and propose a viable development plan. The difficulties in land acquisition and clear-
ing administrative steps including environmental clearances, which were prerequisites
for notification, are also well documented by Mukherjee and Bhardwaj (2016) and
Aggarwal (2006). Arguably these measures are related to state-level factors such as
the lack of land banks, or delays in administrative clearing that can be believed to be
time-constant at least within the short-frame of our analysis of the SEZ policy. There
is also the possibility that treated regions differ in the number of ‘capable’ developers
than control regions given that they have earlier operating SEZs; we address these
issues with the addition of region fixed effects to our framework which would take into
account non-time varying differences in business and administrative potential among
regions.
We derive additional evidence of common trends among treated and control re-
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gions by utilizing NTL data to compare time trends among cells in 5 kilometer-
neighborhoods of SEZs that eventually became operational versus those that never
became operational (by 2013, the last observation year for NTL). Figures 3·4a and
3·4b show that both kinds of regions did not experience significantly different pre-
trends (as captured by trends in NTL) before notification, regardless of whether the
SEZs in them ever began operation. Since the areas covered by a 5 kilometer radius
is roughly twice the size of an average village in our sample, the analysis confirms
common trends among relative large portions of land. We also find evidence for
‘developer seriousness’ in control regions from the trend in Figure 3·4b where areas
around notified SEZs seemed to experience an increase in economic activity in the
initial couple of years after notification judging from the spike in economic activity
before the region returned to its normal growth path. This supports our belief that
the developers of notified SEZs were committed to the region and to the project.
We also take advantage of the ASI data to analyze pre-trends in district totals
of production, assets used and employment in formal manufacturing sectors prior to
the SEZ Act. Figure 3·5 shows that there are no discernible differences in trends
among treated and control districts, except for a slightly higher trend in employment
in treated districts. We also carry out the following falsification test using the same
information at the firm-level, to see if operating and notified SEZs produced effects
on formal firm activity even before their introduction in districts:
log(yfidt) = α0 + αi + βt + γ ∗No.EventuallyOperatingSEZsd (3.3)
+ δ ∗No.EventuallyNotifiedSEZsd + εfidt
The outcome variable yfidt takes the logged values of variables related to an aver-
age firm f in 2-digit industry i in district d at time t: such as production, investment,
employment, wages and average productivity. The main regressors are the number of
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eventually operating and notified SEZs that the district receives after 2005. Since the
analysis is over the time period between 2000 and 2005 (before the announcement of
the SEZ Act.), the corresponding coefficients, γ and δ , should not show any signif-
icance if there had not been any differential growth pattern before the introduction
of the SEZ Act. The results can be found in Table 3.3 and confirm that there were
not any significant differences in growth patterns in the pre-periods.
Given the supporting evidence for parallel trends among districts with notified
SEZs and those with operational SEZs before the initiation of the SEZ policy, we first
utilize the annual data on the formal manufacturing sector in a generalized difference-
in-differences framework to study the year-on-year effects of additional SEZs as they
become notified or operational within a district. We only consider districts that have
been notified with at least one SEZ before 2010. The treatment variables are now the
stock of operating SEZs in district d at time t and the stock of notified but not yet
operating SEZs in the same district at time t:
yfidt = α0 +α1 ∗No.OperatingSEZsdt+α2 ∗No.NotifiedSEZsdt+βi+γd+δt+εfidt
(3.4)
yfidt is the outcome variable of an average formal manufacturing firm f in industry
i and district d at time t. These include logged values of production, average labour
productivity (defined as total production per worker), wages, employment and value of
plant and machinery. No.OperatingSEZsdt refers to the total number of operational
SEZs in district d at time t and No.NotifiedSEZsdt refers to the number of notified
but not yet operational SEZs in district d at time t. District, 2-digit industry and
year fixed effects are included with the standard errors being clustered at the district
level. In the above specification, we assume that every SEZ, operational and notified,
has a uniformly additive effect on the outcomes of a firm in a district-industry cell.
We expect positive effects on firm-level measures such as average labor productiv-
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ity, employment and production due to the presence of an additional operating SEZ,
i.e., α1 to be positive. This would provide proof of the push that SEZs give to local
demand and of the productivity spillovers that they are capable of generating. The
specification also allows us to evaluate the changes that are brought about by notified
SEZs in the region (α2) which could reveal the mechanism behind the increase in light
activity following SEZ notification shown in the previous section.
In order to analyze the formal sector data along with the less frequently available
informal sector data, we use the following framework:
yirt = α0 + α1Tr + α2TrAFTERt + βi + γr + δt + εirt (3.5)
yirt is the average firm-or worker-level outcome variable (such as logged worker
wages or firm size) in industry i in region r in year t. Tr is the treatment indicator,
which takes the value of 1 for regions that were treated with at least one operational
SEZ before the post-treatment period as stated in Table C.3 in Appendix. The value is
0 for regions that have at least one SEZ notified before this time but none operational
yet. AFTERt is the time indicator, which takes the value 1 for the post-treatment
period, and 0 otherwise. Region, industry42 and year fixed effects are included with
standard errors cluster-robust at the level of the region.
α2 is the coefficient of interest, which describes the change in an outcome such as
average employment of a firm located in the treated region with respect to the control
region due to the presence of at least one operational SEZ. Depending on our analysis
of the formal or the informal sector, our expectations differ about the effect that SEZs
are bound to have on firms. For formal sector firms, we expect positive productivity
spillovers that encourage production, and boost investment and employment. We also
expect an increase in wages paid by the formal firm due to the increase in productivity
42 In an alternate specification, we consider region-industry fixed effects.
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as well as greater demand for labor. For firms in the informal sector, we expect a
priori that the increase in labor demand and wages in the formal sector may lead
to a reduction in sustenance-level self-employment with workers moving to formal
firms that are expanding, paying more and offering greater job security. The increase
in demand for local goods by SEZs could also motivate more productive firms in
the informal sector to pay the cost of being regulated and gain from the increased
profitability of being formal. This would result in a reduction in the overall size of
the informal sector in terms of employment, assets and production.
3.4.3 Aggregate and Distributional Effects of SEZs
Effects on Formal Firms in the non-SEZ economy To study the changes in an
average firm in formal manufacturing, we use a 9-year district-industry panel and fol-
low Specification 3.4. Column 2 of Table 3.4 shows us that every additional operating
SEZ results in a 2.2% increase in an average formal firm’s production, accompanied
by a 1.5% increase in asset usage and 1% increase in employment. Labour productiv-
ity, both average and marginal (i.e., wages paid), experience a significant increase of
1.8% and 1.2% respectively. Assuming a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function, this would point to an increase in total factor productivity between
0.7 % and 1.2% depending on the value of output elasticity of capital.
Note that the presence of an additional notified SEZ (the values of which are
presented in Table C.4) also seems to positively impact firm investment and the
wage level. This is consistent with our findings on the increases in NTL upon SEZ
notification, which we hypothesize could be due to an increase in demand for activities
related to the development of an SEZ as well as the anticipation effect of a bigger
customer base for firms in the future. This would induce a greater demand for labour
and capital, reflected in the increase in wage and investment.
In order to distinguish between direct effects on firms beginning production within
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SEZs and spillovers on firms outside the zones, we explored the effects of SEZs on
firms in different employment size bins- size 1: (0,10), 2: [10,20), 3: [20,100), and
4: [100, .). We do this because all firms within SEZs must necessarily belong to the
registered sector. So we may just be capturing the effect of their presence in column
2 of Table 3.4. Since we are mainly interested in spillovers, the size-wise analysis
helps us check if effects are just concentrated among larger firms, which are more
likely to be firms within SEZs than the smaller ones. From the rest of Table 3.4,
we see that this is not the case. Small firms with employment under 20 also seem
to benefit from significant increases in production and investment in districts treated
with an additional operating SEZ. One plausible reason we do not notice an increase
in employment among size 1 and 2 firms could be because previously unregistered
informal firms join these bins, finding it profitable to register themselves in order
to establish supply linkages with SEZ firms and workers. This would pull down the
average size of formal firms in the under-20 category because the switchers are likely
to be small (due to the 10-worker rule for registration under the Factories Act). Firms,
regardless of size, experience increases in average labor productivity and pay higher
wages as they become more productive and increase their demand for labor.
We also find evidence of every additional operational SEZ instigating a 1% in-
crease in the proportion of new firm formation across size categories, implying that
firm formation is not only restricted to large, newly operating SEZ firms. We addi-
tionally resolve the concern that the positive spillovers we observe in Table 3.4 come
only from these newly formed firms rather than old, already existing firms in the
districts.Table 3.5 splits the samples into firms that are older than 4 years (i.e., older
than the announcement of the SEZ Act of 2005) and those that are not. Every ad-
ditional operating SEZ has a strong effect on new firms, especially with respect to
production and productivity. Put differently, the presence of an additional operating
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SEZ stimulates the formation of new firms that are 18.6% more productive and pay
5% higher wages. Interestingly, the effects of SEZs on old firms are also positive and
significant, albeit lower in magnitude. Old firms, existing before the SEZ policy came
into force, also experience an increase of 0.4% in productivity and wages, expand in
employment by 0.9% and show signs of production and investment expansion of 1.3%
with every additional SEZ operating in their district. The stronger effects on new
firms is reasonable considering that new firms are probably direct results of SEZs
coming into districts and have the flexibility to adopt the latest technology or best
practices right upon formation and do not face the inertia that old firms may face in
changing or upgrading production methods to increase competitiveness.
Effects on Informal Firms in the non-SEZ Economy Our analysis of the
informal sector highlights the opposite effects SEZs have on the formal and informal
portions of the economy. Columns 1 and 3 of Table 3.6 exhibit the values of coefficient
α2 from Specification 3.5 with district, industry and year fixed effects, and Columns 2
and 4 instead employ district-industry fixed effects and year effects. The presence of
at least one operational SEZ in a district has made the average informal manufacturer
experience a halving of value-added and total production and a decrease in asset usage
by 32% compared to a firm located in a district without an operational SEZ. The
firms also shrink in size with respect to employment by about 20%. Since the average
number of workers in these firms is 3.9, this would imply the exit of 0.78 workers
from a firm on average. Labor productivity, as measured by gross value added or
production per worker, and average wages paid are also negatively impacted with
almost a halving of wages paid to an average worker in the treated district relative
to the control.
While the presence of an SEZ seems discouraging to unregistered manufacturing
firm activity, Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.6 show that the negative influence does not
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extend to the unregistered service sector. Here we observe an almost equal and op-
posite trend, especially in firm-level investment and employment. This is in line with
the expectations of big push models such as the one formulated by Magruder (2013),
which expect most of the formalization to happen in the tradeable and industrial-
izable sectors such as manufacturing. In the case of manufacturing, the tradability
factor results in firms facing greater pressure of losing business to those outside the
region if they did not cope with productivity increases of competitors or demand for
higher quality products. Also, since manufacturing is generally industrializable (i.e.,
production is scalable at an industrial level), informal manufacturing may be crowded
out when its formal sector counterpart receives a big push in productivity and de-
mand. On the other hand, since services are not often industrializable and tradeable,
increases in local demand has to be satiated by local service firms, both informal and
formal. This justifies the expectation that the informal service sector does not face
crowding out as in the case of informal manufacturing due to SEZ presence.
Aggregate Effects on the Dual Economy We analyze the informal and formal
sectors within the same empirical framework by considering two pre-treatment years
(2000 and 2005) and one post-treatment year (2010) for the formal sector analysis
instead of the annual data. We then use the totals within a district-industry cell of
production, investment and employment in formal and informal sectors as outcomes.
The results derived from Specification 3.5 are shown in Table 3.7.
While the formal sector in any 2-digit industry in a treated district experiences a
boost of 46% in production, 37% in investment and 18% in employment, the informal
sector of the same district-industry group experiences opposite effects of a larger
magnitude in all the three parameters. The gains to labour productivity in the formal
sector is also accompanied by an even greater loss in the informal sector. Just as in
the firm-level results, we observe that total activity within informal services expands
126
significantly unlike in informal manufacturing.
Given a productivity distribution within the informal sector, its decline as ob-
served in Table 3.6 and the second panel of Table 3.7 could be driven by the movement
of firms at the both ends of the distribution. The most productive firms are likely to
switch out of the unregistered sector in order to gain from the increase in demand for
goods generated by SEZs, which would explain the decrease in average productivity
and total output in the informal sector. Alternatively, they could be shutting down
if they fail to cope with the increased competition from the expanding formal sector.
Informal sector crowding out could also happen due to less productive firms shutting
down because the workers no longer have to resort to subsistence activities (“forced
informality”) with more job opportunities in services or formal manufacturing.
On the bottom panel of Table 3.7, we provide evidence of movements of resources,
in terms of workers and firms, between the formal and informal sectors of treated
district economies. Using the NSS worker-level surveys, we observe an 8.2% decrease
in the proportion of workers employed in small household manufacturing businesses
that are generally less productive, providing some support for a reduction in forced
informality. Correspondingly, the worker-level survey also indicates that the worker
composition in the formal sector, as proxied by the 10-worker rule, rises by 7.9% in
treated districts over control districts. The last two columns in the bottom panel
use the Economic Census to analyze changes in firm counts in districts- both in
the total number of firms as well as the number of informal firms, proxied by the
ten-worker rule. A 21.1% decrease in the number of informal firms in treated over
control districts accompanied by no significant change in the total number of firms
also corroborates the story of increased formalization brought about by SEZs in the
local economy. An upcoming paper, Ravi (2018), weighs the relative importance
of two channels- informal firm deaths versus increased registrations into the formal
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sector- in explaining this tend of SEZ-driven economic formalization.
Effects on the Overall Wage Distribution Table 3.8 uses worker-level survey
data and reveals the results of quantile regressions on worker wages in the 90th, 75th,
50th, 25th and 10th percentile of the income distribution. While the average wage
level in a district treated with at least one SEZ differentially increases by 17.9% rela-
tive to that of the control district, this differential wage increase is clearly not uniform
across the distribution of workers: workers in the upper end of the distribution seem
to gain the most in treated districts relative to control districts, with the 90th per-
centile wage earners experiencing the maximum differential wage increase of around
42%. There is no significant increase in wages among workers in the lower end of
the wage distribution in treated relative to control districts, with the 10th percentile
workers in treated districts even appearing to experience a relative decline in wages,
albeit statistically insignificant.
Table 3.9, which also uses worker-survey data, shows that this pattern is driven
by increases in formal sector wages in both manufacturing and services as well as
increases in the returns to higher education. Workers who have above secondary
school level of education (junior college and above) experience a wage increase of
66% between 2005 and 2010. Workers with lower education levels do not seem to
gain significantly in terms of wages. This is in line with the fact that SEZs directly
increase wages in the formal sector and not in the informal sector and the general
tendency of education and formality of occupation being positively correlated.
Interestingly, we also observe a slight but significant decrease in the proportion of
people in treated districts that are educated below the primary level, the results of
which are in Table 3.10. This could be interpreted as a result of in-migration of more
educated workers in order to take advantage of the higher paying labor market in
treated districts. While data limitations prevent us from directly testing movements
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of workers across the education or skill spectrum, there is some support for a general
increase in population density in areas treated with operational SEZs from the analysis
of NTL per population in Section 3.3.3. Given the short period of analysis, it is less
likely that the effect could be due to the local population being driven to invest in
higher education.
3.5 Conclusion
We show that SEZs did not only benefit firms locating within them but also produced
local economic spillovers which reflected at the aggregate level of a district. We then
delve deeper to show evidence for positive productivity spillovers and firm expansion
in the formal manufacturing sector, as well as for crowding out of the informal man-
ufacturing sector. We thus present evidence of SEZs driving a structural change of
the economy towards greater formalization.
The results are especially striking because of the nature of the Indian SEZs which
are smaller and privatized compared to those in other countries. However, the non-
uniform gains in wages among workers serves as a caution about low-skilled workers
potentially losing out when spatial development policies are implemented. These
lessons could be useful for implementing such programs in other developing countries
that share similar political and economic realities.
While we do not carry out explicit cost-benefit calculations, our work prompts
questions about the cost effectiveness of the SEZ policies. Cost-benefit calculations
of such programs in the past show mixed results. While Busso et al. (2013) estimate
net moderate benefits to the development of Empowerment Zones, Chaurey (2016)
casts a doubt in the case of the New Industrial Policy Scheme that the increase
in reported profits could come from either a true increase in production or simply
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more truthful reporting.43 In our case, a cost-benefit analysis is trickier to carry out
because of difficulties in calculating the cost of foregone tax revenues. Tax holidays
are directed at a much smaller subset of firms and not to all firms in a particular
state or census tract. In this case, weighted survey data on income cannot be used
in conjunction with the tax rate to calculate a tax bill, as is done in Shenoy (2016).
The focus of this paper is hence on an evaluation of the the benefits side, leaving the
estimation of the cost-effectiveness of this venture as work for future papers.
Another interesting future area of research is to compare benefits across the dif-
ferent types of zonal development programs launched by the Indian government in
recent years. The recently launched National Investment and Manufacturing Zones
(NIMZs) differ from the SEZs in some important ways, being mainly state-led initia-
tives, not offering complete tax holidays and also being centers for domestic as well
as export-oriented production. These differences could lead to different outcomes,
and it would be of great policy interest to compare the effects of the different zonal
development styles and draw conclusions on the optimal design for the Indian context.
43 The paper also does not take into account the influence on informal sector workers, who could
be losers in this policy as shown in our research.
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Figure 3·1: Construction of the Cell-level Panel
Note: This figure shows how the cell-level panel is constructed. A grid of 1 square-
kilometer cells is overlaid on the map of India. Cells that are believed to be strictly
outside geo-coded SEZ locations, depicted by the circles, are considered for the anal-
ysis of spillover effects.
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Note: These figures plot the growth rates of NTL backed out from the estimated γk’s
in Specification 3.1. Figures (a) and (b) are obtained by using cells within SEZs while
figures (c) and (d) contain the results from focusing on cells within 3 kilometers away
from SEZs. The base year is the year before operation for Figures (a) and (c) and
the year before notification for Figures (b) and (d). Cell and year fixed effects are
included. 95% confidence intervals are generated based on spatial HAC errors with
30 kilometer cutoff.
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Figure 3·3: Effect of SEZs across Distances
(a) Long Run Effect: NTL (b) Short Run Effect: NTL
(c) Long Run Effect:
NTL per population
(d) Short Run Effect:
NTL per population
Note: Figures (a) and (c) plot the growth rates of NTL and NTL per population,
respectively, backed out from δk’s in Specification 3.1, and figures (b) and (d) present
the growth rates of NTL and NTL per population, respectively, obtained from γk’s in
Specification 3.1. The base period is the pre-notification period of an SEZ in distance
ring x. Cell and year fixed effects included. 95% confidence intervals are generated
based on spatial HAC errors with 30 kilometer cutoff.
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Figure 3·4: Testing the Strength of Identification: Using NTL
(a) Notified SEZs that became
operational eventually
(b) Notified SEZS that did not reach
operation
Note: Figures (a) and (b) compare 5 kilometer neighborhoods around SEZs that have
begun operation before 2013, and those that have been notified but not yet operational
by 2013. The figures plot growth rates in NTL with the year before notification being
the base year. Cell and year fixed effects are included. 95% confidence intervals are
generated based on spatial HAC errors with 30 kilometer cutoff.
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Figure 3·5: Pre-trends in District-level Manufacturing Outcomes
(a) Actual Trend: Production (b) Linear Fit: Production
(c) Actual Trend:Total assets (d) Linear Fit: Total assets
(e) Actual Trend: Employment (f) Linear Fit: Employment
Note: Treated districts are those with at least one operational SEZ before 2011 while control districts
are those with at least one notified SEZ, none of which are operational before 2011. Production,
assets and employment are means across district totals, in logged values. Standard errors for differ-
ences in trend are reported in parentheses.
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Table 3.1: Summary of SEZ & NTL Data
Mean Median Std. Dev.
Panel A: All SEZs
Year of notification 2008.1 2008.0 1.89
Area (km2) 1.47 0.27 4.83
Public 0.29 0.00 0.21
Manufacturing 0.24 0.00 0.43
IT/electronics/engineering 0.69 1.00 0.47
Neighborhood NTL (2000) 20.0 11.6 18.6
Neighborhood NTL (2005) 19.8 11.1 19.2
Neighborhood NTL per population (2005) 0.030 0.017 0.048
Neighborhood NTL per population (2010) 0.054 0.034 0.064
Observations 251
Panel B: Operational SEZs
Year of notification 2007.3 2007.0 1.30
Year of operation 2009.7 2010.0 2.23
Observations 133
Note: An SEZ is considered public if any district or state agency was involved in the development
process. Neighborhood of an SEZ is defined as the area within 3km away from the boundary of
the SEZ.
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Table 3.2: Falsification Test: Impact on Districts before SEZ Notification
Eventual Number of SEZs:


















Note: This table contains results from Specification 3.3.
All outcome variables are average logged firm-level vari-
ables in the formal sector of a district-industry group. In-
dustry and year fixed effects included. Standard errors are
clustered at district level and are reported in parentheses.
Source: ASI data on formal manufacturing firms (2000-
2005).
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Table 3.3: Comparison of Pre-Treatment Averages Across Districts
Variable Control Treated Other Districts
Demographics
Density (per km2) 4,059 3,988 431.8
Primary and Below (%) 66.8 61.7 74.8
Higher Secondary and Below (%) 95.8 92.4 97.4
Worker Composition
Formal Employment1) 0.21 0.27 0.16
HH Employment 0.47 0.46 0.57
Manufacturing 0.67 0.59 0.28
Trade 0.11 0.13 0.03
Services 0.15 0.22 0.05
Agriculture 0.07 0.06 0.64
Firm Composition
Formal Firm1 0.07 0.03 0.01
Firms with No Hired Workers 0.38 0.40 0.64
With Power 0.40 0.34 0.24
Average Firm Size 6.20 3.60 2.41
Manufacturing 0.14 0.16 0.2
Services 0.36 0.32 0.24
Trade 0.47 0.49 0.39
Income
Monthly Earnings (Rs.) 1,263.1 1,665.5 934.5
Districts 28 40 167
Year of Earliest Formal Approval 2007 2006.1 -
Year of Earliest Notification 2008.4 2006.7 -
Year of Earliest Operation 2012.3 2008.3 -
Note: All values are from 2005 (or 2001 in the case of Census variables).
1) Formal Employment takes the value of 1 if firm employs over 10 workers, 0
otherwise.
Sources: ASI, NSS Employment Unemployment Surveys, NSS Unorganized


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.5: Effect of Additional Operating SEZ on New vs. Old
Formal Firms
















District FE Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
Observations 122,624 105,454 17,170
Note: This table reports the results from running Specification
3.4 for the logged firm-level values of the dependent variable
separately for two groups of firms- old and new. Firms are
categorized as old if they have been operating for 4 years or
longer. Industry, district, and year fixed effects are included.




Table 3.6: Impact on the Informal Sector
Manufacturing Services
Dependent Variable Mean (1) (2) Mean (3) (4)
Production
73,967 -0.765 -0.826 71,264 0.243 0.177
(0.26) (0.38) (0.151) (0.25)
Gross Value Added
18,657 -0.578 -0.646 38,715 0.228 0.213
(0.18) (0.24) (0.108) (0.18)
Assets used
200,938 -0.401 -0.419 106,424 0.423 0.444
(0.14) (0.19) (0.194) (0.30)
Employment
3.9 -0.192 -0.157 1.8 0.182 0.192
(0.08) (0.11) (0.060) (0.10)
Gross Value Added per worker
4,836 -0.372 -0.452 21,216 0.044 0.022
(0.12) (0.17) (0.084) (0.14)
Labor Productivity
18,506 -0.545 -0.618 39,054 0.058 -0.017
(0.20) (0.30) (0.122) (0.20)
Wage
3,064 -0.574 -0.626 1,586 0.412 0.435
(0.17) (0.25) (0.168) (0.24)
District FE Y Y
Industy FE Y Y
District-Industry FE Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 59,233 42,056
Note: This table reports the estimated coefficients to the indicator for district treated with at least
one operational SEZ before 2011 (α2) from Specification 3.5. Dependant variables listed in Column
1 are at the firm-level and in logged values. All means in Rupees, except for employment reported
in numbers. Columns (1) and (3) include district, industry, and year fixed effects. Columns (2) and
(4) include district-industry and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at district level
and are reported in parentheses.
Source: NSS Unorganized Manufacturing & Services.
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Table 3.7: Impact on Total Informal and Formal Economic Activity
Panel A. Formal Sector1)
Dependent Variable




0.385 0.166 0.316 0.130 0.214
(0.12) (0.08) (0.14) (0.04) (0.08)
Panel B. Informal Sector1)
Dependent Variable




-0.694 -0.278 -0.416 -0.574 -0.545
(0.237) (0.149) (0.163) (0.17) (0.20)
Services
0.605 0.555 0.732 0.412 0.058
(0.356) (0.288) (0.382) (0.168) (0.122)
Panel C. Overall
Dependent Variable
Household Employed in Number of Number of
Employment Firms>10 Firms2) Informal Firms2), 3)
Manufacturing
-0.082 0.079 0.078 -0.238
(0.036) (0.036) (0.463) (0.137)
Services
-0.039 0.056 0.117 -0.200
(0.034) (0.022) (0.414) (0.103)
Notes: This table reports the estimated coefficients to the indicator if district is treated with an opera-
tional SEZ before post-treatment year, from Specification 3.5. Regressions are carried out separately for
manufacturing and service sectors, and dependent variables are district-industry totals in logged values.
District and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at district level and are reported
in the parentheses.
1) Post-treatment period for formal sector analysis at district level includes until 2009; For informal sector
and worker level analysis, the analysis covers until 2011. 2) Analysis uses the EC data with post treatment
year 2012. 3) Informality is defined according to the 10-worker rule.
Sources: ASI, NSS (Unorganized Manufacturing & Services, Employment survey), EC.
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90% 75% Median 25% 10%
Treatment × After
0.351 0.195 0.139 0.052 -0.042 0.165
(0.101) (0.100) (0.108) (0.118) (0.106) (0.082)
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 63,782 63,782 63,782 63,782 63,782 63,782
Notes: This table reports the average and quantile treatment effects from regressions run on logged
monthly worker wages in the 90th, 75th, 50th, 25th and 10th percentiles of the distribution. District,
2-digit industry and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and
reported in parentheses.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.10: Effect of SEZs on Composition of Educated Workforce
Logged Worker Wages
Proportion of workers with




Mean Proportion 0.59 0.92
District-industry FE Y Y
Year FE Y Y
Observations 303,055 303,055
Note: This table reports the estimated coefficients to Treatment
× After from Specification 3.5. District-industry and year fixed
effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at district level
and are reported in the parentheses.




Constructing Key GEES Variables
To save space, the GEES conducted with the 2011 KHPS respondents will be hereafter
called the KHPS-GEES, and its counterpart will be called the JHPS-GEES. While
the second waves of KHPS-GEES and JHPS-GEES share the same questionnaire,
there is some significant discrepancy between the two surveys in the first wave. The
first round of KHPS-GEES does not supply necessary information for this study and
therefore will not be directly employed. Below explains how the main variables are
constructed.
Changes in sales: In both rounds of the JHPS-GEES and the second round of
the KHPS, respondents are asked if, compared to the same month in the previous
year, the volume of orders/sales at their places of business/work changed due to
effects of the earthquake. In the first round, survey subjects report the changes in
March (immediately after the earthquake), April, May, and June, and the second
round covers June to September. The options offered to the respondents are: (1)
decreased by 21% of more, (2) decreased by 11 to 20%, (3) decreased by 6 to 10%,
(4) decreased by 5% or less, (5) unchanged from same month in previous year, (6)
increased by 5% or less, (7) increased by 6 to 10%, (8) increased by 11 to 20%, and
(9) increased by 21% or more.
In making a continuous variable of changes in sales, options (2)-(8) are converted
to median values (e.g. respondents who chose (2) decreased by 11 to 20% are assigned
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with -15.5%). In deciding the numeric values for (1) and (9), I use the first round of
KHPS-GEES where the survey participants wrote the magnitude of changes in tens
of percents. Specifically, the average of increases larger than 21% (33.3%) is assigned
to individuals who chose (9), and of decreases larger than 21% (-42.6%) is assigned
to those who chose (1).
Changes in hours: In both rounds of JHPS-GEES and the second round of
KHPS-GEES, participants are asked to report how much their use of time changed
after the earthquake compared to the same month in the previous years. The three
categories of time use I focus are: hours worked (including overtime), housework
(cooking, laundry, shopping, and cleaning) and child care. The options44 include (1)
decreased by 21% of more, (2) decreased by 11 to 20%, (3) decreased by 6 to 10%,
(4) decreased by 5% or less, (5) unchanged from same month in previous year, (6)
increased by 5% or less, (7) increased by 6 to 10%, (8) increased by 11 to 20%, and
(9) increased by 21% or more. All answers except (1) and (9) are converted to median
values, with (1) and (9) assigned with -30% and 30%, respectively.
44 The first round of KHPS contains the same question, but the options are limited to indicators































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.4: GEES Summary Statistics
All JHPS/KHPS Responded to GEES Difference
participants No Yes (2)-(3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Comparison between participants and non-participants
Wives:
Age 47.38 47.66 47.03 0.63
Mother worked 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.00
Years of schooling 13.18 13.04 13.37 -0.34∗∗∗
Hourly wages (1,000 JPY) 1.96 2.01 1.90 0.12
Market hours (hours/week) 27.76 28.49 26.90 1.59
Housework hours (hours/week) 20.92 20.31 21.70 -1.39∗
Childcare hours (hours/week) 7.99 8.00 7.97 0.03
Husbands:
Age 49.54 49.56 49.51 0.05
Mother worked 0.63 0.63 0.64 -0.01
Years of schooling 13.62 13.46 13.82 -0.35∗∗
Hourly wages (1,000 JPY) 3.25 3.08 3.46 -0.38∗
Market hours (hours/week) 46.47 46.56 46.35 0.21
Housework hours (hours/week) 1.79 1.63 1.99 -0.35
Childcare hours (hours/week) 1.46 1.37 1.58 -0.20
Households:
Children under age 18 0.94 0.92 0.97 -0.05
Children under age 6 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.01
Panel B. Post-earthquake characteristics
Directly affected 0.13
Experienced changes in sales 0.28
– (among which) Changes in sales were negative 0.79
Experienced changes in income 0.23
Expenditure changed 0.19
Market hours changed 0.17
Housework hours changed 0.10
Childcare hours changed 0.05
Note: This table presents the characteristics of the GEES participants from dual-income
households who satisfy all conditions discussed in Section 1.3.1. Panel A reports sum-
mary statistics of the GEES participants and those who were subjects of the 2011 round
of JHPS/KHPS but not participated in the GEES. In Panel B, post-earthquake experiences
of the survey respondents are summarized by pooling all observations. The sample is com-
prised of 432 working wives and 467 husbands of working wives with an average tracking





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure B.1: Gender Role Attitudes and Birth Year by Home Zone
(a) Africa (South Africa) (b) Asia-Pacific




Note: This figure demonstrates how gendernorm, which represents the degree of
traditionalism in gender roles, evolve over birth cohorts by home country zone. For
each subfigure, the mean value of gendernorm is represented as the solid line. Grey
area includes one standard deviation from the mean with the total width of two
standard deviations. The African Group is comprised with South Africa alone.
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USA 0.34 (1,447) 0.31 (1,171) 0.22 (1,300) 0.29 (3,918)
Canada 0.26 (1,440) 0.25 (952) 0.25 (2,392)
Mexico 0.63 (1,495) 0.60 (1,510) 0.62 (3,005)
Argentina 0.56 (977) 0.56 (977)
Brazil 0.65 (2,000) 0.65 (2,000)
Chile 0.71 (1,505) 0.58 (1,564) 0.65 (3,069)
Venezuela 0.57 (1,016) 0.57 (1,016)
Denmark 0.26 (1,379) 0.16 (1,403) 0.21 (2,782)
Finland 0.28 (1,353) 0.16 (1,171) 0.22 (2,524)
Iceland 0.12 (1,172) 0.12 (1,172)
Norway 0.35 (2,087) 0.26 (1,475) 0.17 (1,444) 0.26 (5,006)
Sweden 0.26 (1,272) 0.21 (1,080) 0.14 (1,060) 0.20 (3,412)
England 0.33 (984) 0.33 (1,960) 0.24 (949) 0.31 (3,893)
Ireland 0.45 (938) 0.35 (1,240) 0.26 (1,168) 0.35 (3,346)
Belgium 0.39 (1,360) 0.39 (1,360)
France 0.35 (1,903) 0.27 (2,409) 0.31 (4,312)
Netherlands 0.35 (1,968) 0.34 (1,249) 0.35 (3,217)
Switzerland 0.48 (1,008) 0.35 (1,237) 0.41 (2,245)
Italy 0.53 (1,018) 0.53 (1,018)
Portugal 0.60 (1,092) 0.60 (1,092)
Spain 0.51 (2,494) 0.47 (2,471) 0.49 (2,595) 0.49 (7,560)
Austria 0.52 (977) 0.48 (2,047) 0.44 (1,182) 0.48 (4,206)
Bulgaria 0.60 (1,126) 0.54 (1,003) 0.41 (1,003) 0.52 (3,132)
Slovakia 0.40 (1,133) 0.27 (1,128) 0.34 (2,261)
Czech Republic 0.47 (1,024) 0.37 (1,289) 0.27 (1,804) 0.37 (4,117)
Germany 0.42 (3,421) 0.34 (1,367) 0.24 (1,761) 0.35 (6,549)
Hungary 0.55 (1,500) 0.46 (1,023) 0.51 (4,260)
Poland 0.56 (1,597) 0.43 (1,252) 0.37 (1,115) 0.45 (2,523)
Croatia 0.29 (997) 0.29 (997)
Latvia 0.48 (1,000) 0.44 (1,000) 0.46 (2,000)
Lithuania 0.35 (1,187) 0.35 (1,187)
Russia 0.60 (1,998) 0.50 (1,798) 0.43 (1,525) 0.51 (5,321)
China 0.42 (5,946) 0.42 (5,946)
Taiwan 0.28 (1,983) 0.28 (2,072) 0.28 (4,055)
Japan 0.30 (1,307) 0.26 (1,132) 0.19 (1,212) 0.25 (3,651)
Korea 0.52 (1,396) 0.52 (1,396)
Philippines 0.45 (1,200) 0.40 (1,200) 0.43 (1,200) 0.43 (3,600)
India 0.49 (1,660) 0.49 (1,660)
Cyprus 0.18 (1,004) 0.18 (1,004)
Israel/Palestine 0.36 (1,287) 0.35 (1,209) 0.40 (1,210) 0.37 (3,706)
Turkey 0.51 (1,590) 0.51 (1,590)
South Africa 0.33 (2,546) 0.33 (2,546)
Australia 0.45 (1,779) 0.36 (1,352) 0.29 (1,559) 0.37 (4,690)
New Zealand 0.43 (1,047) 0.40 (1,025) 0.42 (2,072)
Total 0.43 (31,911) 0.40 (44,558) 0.35 (55,020) 0.39 (131,489)
Note: This table reports the mean gendernorm, which represents the degree of
traditionalism in gender roles. The number of survey respondents is reported in
the parentheses by country and survey round.
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Table B.2: Language Distance by Home Country
Home country
Language score Language score
Language distance
Chiswick and Miller (2004) imputed
(1) (2) (3)
Mexico 2.25 - 1.75
Argentina 2.25 - 1.75
Brazil 2.5 - 1.5
Chile 2.25 - 1.75
Venezuela 2.25 - 1.75
Denmark 2.25 - 1.75
Finland - 2.5 1.5
Norway 3 - 1
Sweden 3 - 1
Belgium - 2.75 1.25
France 2.5 - 1.5
Netherlands - 2.75 1.25
Switzerland - 2.5 1.5
Italy 2.5 - 1.5
Portugal 2.5 - 1.5
Spain 2.25 - 1.75
Austria - 2.25 1.75
Bulgaria 2 - 2
Slovakia - 2 2
Czech Republic 2 - 2
Germany 2.25 - 1.75
Hungary 2 - 2
Poland 2 - 2
Croatia 2 - 2
Latvia - 2 2
Lithuania - 2 2
Russia 2.25 - 1.75
China 1.5 - 2.5
Taiwan 1.5 - 2.5
Japan 1 - 3
Korea 1 - 3
Israel/Palestine - 2 2
Turkey 2 - 2
Note: This table reports the language distance for all source countries that do not have
English as their official language. Column (1) reports the language score in Chiswick
and Miller (2004), which is the average ability of English-speaking Americans after
16 or 24 weeks of foreign language training (1: most distant from English - 3: least
distant from English). Column (2) is self-constructed. If the home country’s language
score is not available, it is imputed based on the linguistic similarities of its official
language(s) to languages that are reported in column (1). In cases where there are
multiple official languages, the score is computed by averaging the language scores of
all official languages. Column (3) contains the final measure of language distance used
in this paper. (1: least distant from English - 3: most distant from English). Those who
are from countries listing English as their official language (Canada, England, Ireland,
the Philippines, India, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand) are assigned with
the value of 0.
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Table B.3: Predicting the Probability of Endogamous Marriage
Dependent variable Endogamy
All Generation 1.5 Non-Mexican
All Working All Working All Working
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probability of marrying within
3.980∗∗∗ 4.567∗∗∗ 3.234∗∗ 3.642∗∗∗ 11.566∗∗∗ 10.636∗∗∗
(1.192) (1.182) (1.335) (1.364) (2.005) (1.619)
Sex ratio
0.279∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.050) (0.055) (0.051) (0.051) (0.047)
Nationwide ethnic density
1.229∗∗ 0.946∗∗ 1.366∗ 1.275 -0.749 -0.649
(0.479) (0.460) (0.724) (0.774) (0.514) (0.540)
Statewide ethnic density
-3.493∗∗∗ -3.988∗∗∗ -2.587∗∗ -2.963∗∗ -9.727∗∗∗ -8.910∗∗∗
(1.148) (1.127) (1.302) (1.311) (1.799) (1.478)
Age at immigration
0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Age at marriage
-0.012∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Language distance
-0.015 -0.017 -0.013 -0.014 0.005 -0.003
(0.024) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
High school
-0.063∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.021) (0.025)
Some college
-0.151∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗ -0.209∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.018) (0.025) (0.026) (0.039) (0.037)
College
-0.163∗∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.029) (0.026) (0.024) (0.047) (0.047)
Graduate school
-0.148∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.031) (0.035) (0.035) (0.042) (0.041)
Any US education
0.021∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.025 0.038 0.020 0.036∗
(0.011) (0.015) (0.026) (0.025) (0.019) (0.021)
Dependent variable mean 0.77 0.72 0.66 0.62 0.62 0.60
Observations 70,365 43,020 14,346 10,242 35,894 25,737
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.26 0.31 0.30 0.22 0.22
Note: Sample is restricted to individuals who married upon arriving in the US and is further restricted to
those who immigrated as minors in columns (2), (4), and (6), and to those who came from countries other
than Mexico in columns (5)-(6). All specifications include race dummies (black and Asian) and home country
zone fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at home country × 10-year birth cohort level and reported in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.4: Falsification Test Results
Dependent variable Labor force participation Full-time employment
(1) (2)












Has a child at age 0-4
-0.134∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.011)
Has a child at age 5-17
-0.048∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.012)
























Dep. Var. Mean 0.51 0.60
Observations 31,976 16,184
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.07
Note: Sample is restricted to individuals who married before arriving the US and is further
restricted to those who work in column (2). All specifications include age, age squared,
race dummies (black and Asian), home country zone fixed effects, metropolitan status,
state fixed effects, and census year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at home
country × 10-year birth cohort level and reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C Chapter 3
Figure C.1: Timeline of SEZ Approval Procedure
· Business plan re-check
· Land deeds check







Note: This figure shows the different stages that SEZs pass through before beginning
operation. Refer to Section 3.2 for detailed stage-wise explanation
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Table C.1: Benefits to SEZ Developers and SEZ Units
Developers Units
Administrative Single-window clearance for Central and State level approval
Tax
Exemption from Minimum Alternate Tax
Exemption from Central and State Sales Tax
Service and Dividend Distribution Tax
Duty-free domestic procurement of goods, services
100% Tax exemption for Year 1-5: 100% tax exemption
10 consecutive years Year 6-10: 50% tax exemption
since SEZ notification Year 11-15: 50% of reinvested profits
Others
Infrastructural support
Upper limit extended for managerial
remuneration, external commercial
borrowings allowed, etc.
Flexible hiring and firing practices
Sources: Department of Commerce, Government of India
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Table C.2: Summary of Key Variables of Workers and Firms before
2005
mean sd 25th pctl 50th pctl 75th pctl min max
Demographics
Density(per km2) 3,989 2,606 2,279 3,597 4,845 250 19,865
Literacy 63.48 10.60 56.67 63.37 69.68 37.49 83.40
Primary and below 0.59 0.49 0 0 1
Secondary and below 0.92 0.28 1 0 1
Amenities1)
Bank Density 1.50 0.59 1.10 1.37 1.73 0.11 3.22
Primary School Density 3.74 1.60 2.61 3.52 4.71 1.27 10.07
Secondary School Density 1.30 0.59 0.93 1.15 1.58 0.48 3.48
Wage2)
Informal Manufacturing 8.5 1.7 7.4 8.1 9.9 3.8 12.5
Informal Services 8.1 1.4 7.3 8.2 9.0 2.0 11.0
Formal Manufacturing 11.0 0.8 10.5 11.0 11.5 4.9 14.2
Per capita Consumption2) 7.0 0.6 6.6 6.9 7.4 3.3 11.0
Firm Composition
Greater than 10 Workers 0.04 0.20 0 1
Any Registration 0.53 0.50 0 1
Own Account Enterprise 0.41 0.49 0 1
Unincorporated 0.93 0.25 0 1
Operating with Power 0.34 0.47 0 1
No External Finance 0.90 0.30 0 1
Informal Finance—Financed 0.41 0.49 0 1
Manufacturing 0.15 0.36 0 1
Trade & Services 0.82 0.38 0 1
Services 0.33 0.47 0 1
Infrastructure 0.02 0.14 0 1
Firm Size
Formal Manufacturing
Employment3) 122.7 596.4 9.0 24.0 114.0 1.0 45,481
Average Labour Productivity2) 13.7 1.5 12.9 13.8 14.7 0.4 19.9
Informal Manufacturing
Employment 5.4 4.8 2.1 3.7 7.0 1.0 35.0
Average Labour Productivity 10.3 2.4 8.8 9.7 12.2 3.6 15.6
Informal Services
Employment 2.0 1.1 1.3 1.8 2.2 1.0 10.0
Average Labour Productivity 11.3 0.7 10.8 11.3 11.8 7.6 13.7
Note: All averages are at the district-level, and when possible, at the village-level. Items under Amenities are values of
2001.
1) per 10,000 population, 2) logged real values, 3) in absolute numbers.
Sources: Census Digital Library of India, NSS and ASI surveys, EC.
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Table C.3: Treatment & Control Group Formation
Dataset
Level Pre-treatment Post-treatment
Considered Set Treated Set
of analysis Year(s) Year(s)
Economic Census Village/Town 2005 2013
1 or more 1 or more
notified SEZs operational SEZs
by 2012 by 2012
NSS Unorganized Firms District 2000-01, 2004-05 2010-11
1 or more 1 or more
notified SEZs operational SEZs
by 2010 by 2010
NSS Worker Survey District 2000-01, 2004-05 2010-11
1 or more 1 or more
notified SEZs operational SEZs
by 2010 by 2010
ASI Formal Manufacturing District 2001 to 2005 2006 - 2009
1 or more 1 or more SEZs
notified SEZs notified or operating
by 2012 each year
Table C.4: Effect of Every Additional Notified SEZ on a Firm in
Formal Manufacturing
Firm size
Dependent Variable All Firms Size 1: <=10 Size 2: (10,20] Size 3: (20,100] Size 4: >100
Production
0.003 0.017 0.002 0.006 0.004
(0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002)
Assets Used
0.018 -0.010 0.017 0.020 0.001
(0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003)
Employment
0.007 -0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.005
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Labour Productivity
0.002 0.010 0.002 0.003 0.004
(0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Wages
0.005 0.008 0.004 0.005 0.020
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
New1)
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
District-industry FE Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 122,624 18,554 21,919 39,533 42,618
Note: This table reports the estimated coefficients to the number of notified, non-operational, SEZs in the
district of the firm in a year from Specification 3.4. Dependant variables listed in Column 1 are at the firm-
level, and enters in logged values, and the regressions are run separately for each dependent variable and size
category. District-industry and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at district level
and are reported in the parentheses.
1) New takes the value of 1 if firm formed after first SEZ gets notified in the district, 0 otherwise.
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Caveat to NTL Usage
NTL cannot be a perfect substitute of traditional socioeconomic data. Each cell has
a value between 0 and 63, which means that some lights are bottom- or top- coded.
Studies that adopt nighttime lights usually suffer from the fact that non-negligible
portion of their data is bottom-coded as most of them focus on underdeveloped coun-
tries. In our case, on the other hand, there is a high probability that we suffer from
top-coded observations. This is because we focus on area that are more likely to be
more developed within India, which is relatively developed among developing coun-
tries. Although the right-censoring might affect the empirical results, this would only
underestimate the positive effects of SEZs on the neighborhood, if there are any. We,
therefore, argue that the estimated spillover effects of SEZs are conservative.
Figure C.2: Distribution of Nighttime Lights
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Alternate specification for Events Study Analysis
We carry out an alternate specification where we consider all cells that have at least
one SEZ within 3 kilometers, where the event is the earliest notification/operation of
an SEZ in the 3 kilometer-neighborhood. We run Specification 3.1 using this alternate
definition of the event and report the results below.






Note: These figures plot the growth rates of NTL backed out from γk’s in Specification
3.1. The year before the event (operation/notification) is the base year. Cell and year
fixed effects are included. 95% confidence intervals are generated based on spatial
HAC errors with 30 kilometer cutoff.
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Alternate specification for Distance Dimension Analysis
We carry out an alternate, less restrictive specification by considering all cells with
at least one SEZ in the distance ring x and controlling for both nearer and farther
away SEZs when studying the effects of SEZs at that particular distance ring around
the cell. For a cell i that is situated outside of SEZs in year t and has one or more
SEZ in x− 1 to x km (1 ≤ x ≤ 15),







The results are reported below.
Figure C.4: Effect of SEZs across Distances
(Alternative Specification)
(a) Long-run effect: NTL (b) Short-run effect: NTL
Note: These figures plot the growth rates of NTL backed out from δx’s in the altered
version of Specification 3.2 where all cells with at least one SEZ in distance ring x
are considered in the distance ring x analysis (instead of only those cells with their
closest SEZ in distance ring x). The base period is the pre-notification period of an
SEZ in distance ring x. Cell and year fixed effects included. 95% confidence intervals
are generated based on spatial HAC errors with 30 kilometer cutoff.
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SEZs’ Influence on Village-level Economic Activity
We follow Specification 3.5 at the village level with the Economic Census data. Ta-
ble C.5 reveals a large and significant increase in the total working population and
an economically, if not statistically, significant increase in the number of firms in a
treated village as compared to the control village. We also observe increased hiring
among firms, with average size expanding by 13.5% (which translates to roughly one
additional worker to an average firm) and with the proportion of firms with no hired
workers decreasing by 4.3%. This analysis gives us a preliminary view of an expan-
sion in industrial activity which is consistent with an expansion in NTL recorded over
areas of similar dimensions.45
Table C.5: Village Level Analysis of Firm and Worker Numbers







Average Workers per Firm
6.2 0.135
(0.055)




Note: This table reports the estimated coefficients to Treatment ×
After from Specification 3.5. All outcome variables are in logged val-
ues. District-industry and year fixed effects are included. Standard
errors are clustered at district level and are reported in the parenthe-
ses.
1) Firms with 0 hired workers are also known as Own Account En-
terprises.
45 The 5-kilometer neighborhood around an SEZ spans an area of roughly 75 square kilometers,
almost twice the area of a typical village in our study.
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SEZs’ Influence on Sub-district level Population Movements
We use the GPW data in conjunction with sub-district level administrative bound-
aries.46 The 251 SEZs in our sample are situated in 126 sub-districts with the number
of SEZs per sub-district varying between 1 and 12 (with a mean of 2.02 and a median
of 1). We restrict our attention to those with at least one SEZ notified before 2010
and evaluate whether the ones with at least one operating SEZ show faster population
growth. For sub-district i in district d at time t,
log(populationidt) = α0 + α1Y eart + α2Districtd + α3Operatingidt (A.6)
+ α4Operatingidt × Aftert + εidt,
where Operatingidt = 1 if there is at least one operating SEZ in subdistrict i and
Aftert = 1 in year 2010. Standard errors are clustered at district level.
The estimation result reported in Table C.6 suggests that there is no differential
trend of population density growth between the sub-districts whose SEZs started
operating before 2010 and those whose SEZs are only notified by 2010. In other
words, it is not likely that there are population movement across sub-districts. This
is consistent with the fact that Indian labor market tends to be spatially restricted,
meaning that the labor mobility is low.
46 The boundaries are acquired from the Survey of India (http://www.surveyofindia.gov.in/).
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Table C.6: Effect of Operating SEZs on Sub-district Population
density















Note: District fixed effects are included, and year
2000 is omitted. Standard errors are clustered at dis-
trict level and are reported in the parentheses.
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Edin, P.-A., Fredriksson, P., and Åslund, O. (2003). Ethnic enclaves and the eco-
nomic success of immigrants—evidence from a natural experiment. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 18(1):329–357.
171
Farole, T. et al. (2011). Special Economic Zones: What have we Learned? World
Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network.
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